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ABSTRACT 
Perhaps the most critically important cognitive mechanism for survival and social 
cohesion is the ability to withhold an action that has been rendered maladaptive or 
inappropriate by altered environmental demands. There is a large body of empirical research 
investigating this process, which is commonly referred to as response inhibition, but which in 
most instances more precisely could be termed reactive inhibition because it constitutes only 
one element of the overall inhibition of an action. Alongside reactive inhibition, though, and 
certainly of at least equally import, is the capacity to recognise erroneous stimulus-response 
patterns in one’s own behaviour and to remediate them where they arise. This has been 
termed proactive inhibition and has received substantially less experimental interest until very 
recently, despite almost certainly contributing to overall response inhibition. Although these 
two cognitive mechanisms, reactive and proactive inhibition, are necessarily interdependent, 
they are representationally distinct and are therefore likely implemented by separate 
biological and cognitive processes. 
The basal ganglia are largely responsible for the coordination of motor control, and its 
neural connections to the motor and frontal cortices plan, select, and direct any intended 
movement, and indeed certain unintended movements also. Owing to an incomplete 
physiological characterisation of this circuitry until only the last decade, a critical re- 
evaluation of those motor functions that rely on computational cognition is germane. It is 
likely that reactive inhibition recruits internal basal ganglia pathways, perhaps in accordance 
with the classical dual-organisation model of direct and indirect pathways, because it is 
principally a motor function; proactive inhibition, on the other hand, requires cognitive 
computation, either consciously or not, and, therefore, may recruit a recently-described 
hyperdirect pathway that connects the basal ganglia to a prefrontal neural population that has 
previously been associated with overall response inhibition, but whose role has been 
theoretically inconsistent with motor models of inhibition because prefrontal regions are 
associated with higher cognitive functions and not motor function. 
With these limitations in mind, in this thesis, I present the experimental findings of 
four empirical investigations into the neurocognitive architecture of proactive inhibition using 
updated models in order to revise the understanding of response inhibition and, in particular, 
the role and underlying properties of proactive inhibition, which we operationalise as post- 
error slowing (PES) of reaction time. 
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In the first study (N = 264), we investigated the role of two dopaminergic single- 
nucleotide polymorphisms (DRD1 rs686 and DRD2 rs1800497) which are differentially 
expressed along basal ganglia pathways in behavioural performance on a Go/No-Go task (the 
Sustained Attention to Reaction Time task, SART). We found that in those with a higher ratio 
of D1:D2 receptors (i.e., more rs686 A and rs1800497 T alleles) PES was engaged to a higher 
degree and that older age magnified this genetic effect (p < .001). In addition, we observed an 
interaction between age and a general factor of intelligence, g, on PES, whereby older age 
and lower estimates of g predicted higher recruitment of PES (p < .001). This supports the 
hypothesis that proactive inhibition appears to be a naturally-occurring compensatory 
mechanism which manifests in individuals whose reactive inhibition may be suboptimal, and 
indicates that the extent to which PES is engaged depends on increased dopamine D1 and 
decreased D2 neurotransmission. 
The neural generators of overall response inhibition are well described, but very little 
effort has been given to proactive processes. If reactive inhibition is largely motoric, then its 
sources can be localised using various techniques that image neural regions using 
haemodynamic response, but since proactive inhibition is largely cognitive, it is necessary to 
use other methods. To investigate the cognitive architecture of proactive inhibition we used 
electroencephalography (EEG). To do this, we use stimulus- and response- locked neural 
activity to compare the four major accounts of PES. These accounts each have wide support, 
explain behavioural data, and can be simulated using computational methods. We 
administered the SART once again to N = 100 healthy young adults and recorded their brain 
activity using EEG. Our results provide support for an attentional account of PES that 
supposes errors disturb, or disorient, attentional processing on subsequent trials indexed by 
the anterior N1. The N1 was significantly blunted by errors (p = .020) and the post-error N1 
was correlated with magnitude of PES (p = .016). In addition, we provide additional support 
for our previous findings indicating an effect of age and g on PES. Here, we find that the 
post-error N1 diminishes with natural ageing, however, higher estimated g seemed to rescue 
these age-related deficits (p < .0001). These results bring into question our previous 
hypothesis that PES is a compensatory mechanism. Rather, it may be a consequence of 
disruptions to processing that incidentally improve response inhibition as a function of that 
disruption which offsets the initiation of response execution. 
Our third study was conducted to investigate the potential efficacy of neurostimulation 
techniques in the modulation of response inhibition and other cognitive and behavioural 
xi  
functions using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). This study had two 
experiments. The first investigated whether such functions could be modulated, and the 
second investigated the nature of that modulation, namely, whether it could be attributed to 
neuroplastic induction measured by changes to motor evoked potentials using transcranial 
magnetic stimulation. In the first experiment, our participants (N = 56) attended three 
sessions, a baseline session followed the following day by single-blind, randomly allocated 
stimulation testing sessions separated by two days, one with a sham control, and the other 
with active anodal tDCS to the motor cortex. We administered a Simple and Choice Reaction 
Time (RT) task, the Inspection Time task, and the SART. This battery allows us to 
disambiguate perceptual, motor, and cognitive elements of a physical action. We observed no 
effect on either RT or Inspection Time and observed an effect on the proactive process on the 
SART (p = .002), such that PES was engaged to a smaller degree after active stimulation 
compared to both baseline and the sham condition. Likewise, we observed somewhat quicker 
RT in the SART under active stimulation (p = .073), likely because of the absence of PES, as 
well as more errors (p = .026), potentially indicating that PES may protect against failures of 
response inhibition. We attribute these results to the location of the cathode, over the right 
supraorbital region, roughly above the right inferior frontal gyrus. The anode in tDCS is 
thought to synchronise neural activity and induce long-term potentiation-like neuroplasticity, 
whereas the necessary cathode is thought to disrupt such synchronicity. As such, we may 
have disrupted prefrontal cortical functioning briefly, which in turn eroded proactive 
functioning. This provides reasonably strong support for frontal regions being implicated in 
proactive, but not necessarily reactive, inhibition, although we cannot conclude this since 
overall response inhibition was somewhat disrupted. 
The final study addresses the theoretical and conceptual limitations in existing 
response inhibition tasks by implementing a recent Bayesian Ψ adaptive staircase (Livesey & 
Livesey, 2016) in novel instantiations of two Stop-Signal Tasks (SSTs) that we developed for 
the purpose of directly observing behavioural proactive inhibition in two forms that are 
explicitly separable to the reactive process. The Ψ staircase provides an algorithm which 
allows for rapid estimation of SSRT in very few trials, the importance of which lies in the 
populations whose response inhibition and behavioural and motoric regulation are impaired 
due to psychopathology or neurodegeneration. Task duration is a considerable limitation on 
reliable estimates of performance on such tasks, and particularly in such populations. We 
administered four tasks (two SSTs and two Go/No-Go tasks) to N = 123 healthy young adults. 
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We included a manipulation that cued the probability of a Stop/No-Go trial in the two SSTs 
and one of the Go/No-Go tasks, which was a modified form of the SART. These two 
probability conditions allow us to compare RT in each condition on Go trials, under the 
assumption that longer RT in higher p(Stop/No-Go) conditions indicates a predictive form of 
proactive inhibition. This is distinct from the remedial form, post-error slowing, that can still 
be observed in the tasks. We report two important findings. The first is that the Ψ staircase is 
highly successful in rapidly converging on reliable estimates of SSRT in as few as 20 stop 
trials, which could prove useful in designing considerably shorter tasks in the future without 
sacrificing reliability. Secondly, we show that predictive and remedial forms of proactive 
inhibition are consistently engaged in all tasks, potentially providing another avenue for 
thinking about proactive inhibition in the future. Thirdly, we show that estimates of SSRT, 
which aims to assess reactive inhibition, are robust against proactive inhibition. 
Taken together, the conclusions reached in this thesis represent a critical update of the 
neurobiology that underlies newly-discretised cognitive processes that contribute to response 
inhibition, as well as their psychophysiological characteristics. We have demonstrated that 
proactive inhibition at least partly reflects a compensatory mechanism that appears to be 
naturally-occurring in individuals whose reactive processes may be insufficient for 
psychological and biological reasons as well as individual differences in intellectual capacity. 
Furthermore, we present and validate a novel, theoretically cogent task paradigm to measure 
what we posit are discrete processes within the proactive process: remedial and predictive 
proactive inhibition. Given what appears to be a naturally-occurring compensatory 
mechanism alongside post-error slowing that corresponds to the timing of a pre-error negative 
inflection in electrophysiological recordings, this work raises fascinating questions about the 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Response inhibition is a critical executive function that is implemented by conscious 
agents, and which allows the suppression of an action that is no longer required or has been 
rendered inappropriate by situational alterations to their environment. For the most part, 
response inhibition facilitates flexible, adaptive, goal-directed behaviour in humans, and 
indeed all animals. Disturbances to the response inhibition network are hallmarks of the 
symptomatic profiles of a diverse range of pathological conditions ranging from transient 
psychological disorders such as anxiety, to currently incurable and sometimes terminal 
neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s and Huntington’s diseases. Furthermore, the 
efficacy of response inhibition seems to be disrupted even in healthy ageing, and there is 
some evidence that its rate of development and decline differs among individuals, indicating 
that it is influenced by some combination of neurodevelopmental, genetic, or environmental 
factors. With the exceptions of probable causes such as known neurotoxins and health status, 
the mechanisms by which these factors operate remain unknown to us. However, given the 
known but not well-understood decline in normal ageing, and recently-investigated 
differential development in early childhood, it stands to reason that response inhibition is 
subtended by a biological substrate. 
Despite substantial clinical, personal, and societal importance, the empirical 
endeavour has been unable to produce a cogent theoretical model that is able to account for 
individual differences and differential decline in response inhibition among healthy 
individuals and pathological populations. The most likely sources of this failure arise from 
inconsistent discretisation and nomenclature of the properties of response inhibition, the 
variable task paradigms administered to measure it that may not actually be measuring the 
same processes, and idiosyncratic interpretations of the data; additionally, and more 
importantly, the overwhelming majority of experimental investigation has failed to measure a 
critical element of response inhibition or account for its influence on the overall inhibitory 
process. 
It is presently important, therefore, to discretise the response inhibition mechanism 
into its constituent processes; that is, its motor processes and its various cognitive processes. 
Overall response inhibition is driven by the psychomotoric ability to stop a planned or 
initiated action outright—commonly referred to as reactive inhibition—and which is thought 
to occur under the principles of the common horse-race model, where the neural signal 
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transmitting a ‘stop’ directive reaches and is encoded by the thalamus before the alternative 
neural signal transmitting a ‘go’ directive. However, it has occasionally been reported that if 
this process fails, most healthy humans implement a corrective process that increases the 
likelihood of future inhibition success, often by way of slowing their response pattern to 
compensate for their error, in what has recently been termed proactive inhibition. Proactive 
inhibition has been largely ignored due to the difficulties associated with its measurement— 
reactive inhibition in itself is the absence of a measurable variable, and so an additional 
process that may or may not contribute to this absence is by definition elusive. Until recently, 
proactive inhibition has been poorly operationalised, and may even take several forms 
(remedial and predictive). Moreover, as a result of these theoretical and practical limitations, 
its underlying cognitive representation and its neural architecture have proven remarkably 
difficult to articulate. 
This thesis is organised in the following way. I introduce the reader to the broader 
ecology of the content, the purpose of which is to situate this thesis explicitly in a necessarily 
multi-disciplinary domain. Following this, I provide a brief historical account of the 
experimental psychological endeavour in measuring human motor response speed, and review 
the empirical response inhibition literature, emphasising the deficits in two key domains that 
reveal the critical importance of this work; that is, of rethinking what we already ‘know’ 
using revised theories, methods, and models—namely, the recent attention given to proactive 
inhibition, and the recent characterisation of a previously unknown neural pathway that is 
likely involved in motor coordination. 
I will introduce the reader to concepts, models, and methods that are required for this 
research. These will include the basal ganglia and dopaminergic system; the effects of ageing 
and neurodegenerative disorders on motor and cognitive processes; genomics and behavioural 
genetics; IQ and intelligence; psychophysiological techniques; mathematical models of 
reaction time distributions; and, two commonly-used task paradigms to assess response 
inhibition. This structure provides a conceptual foundation upon which to build the material 
that follows. Each subsequent chapter will introduce and justify a line of reasoning and a 
method through which it will be investigated. These chapters will, therefore, constitute 
original contributions to the knowledge of response inhibition alongside its corresponding 
manuscript. Manuscripts will be introduced with a brief theoretical orientation and will be 
supplemented with general implications, future directions for the field, a contemporaneous 
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update of the current response inhibition theory, and some introspection on the research 
process. 
The major findings associated with the studies presented in this thesis have been 
summarised in the abstract, above. In short, the first study highlights the importance of 
effective dopaminergic neurotransmission in proactive inhibition using a genetic association 
of two single-nucleotide polymorphisms (rs686/A at DRD1, associated with increased 
expression of the dopamine D1 receptor gene, and rs1800497/T at DRD2, associated with 
reduced dopamine D2 receptor availability) that we observed to be additively associated with 
the engagement of proactive inhibition. Moreover, this study shows that proactive inhibition 
appears to be naturally engaged by those individuals who could most benefit from it (older 
people and those with lower fluid intelligence scores), effectively representing a natural 
compensatory mechanism to maximise behavioural control. 
Using electroencephalography, the second study identifies some of the cognitive 
properties associated with proactive inhibition; contrary to the dominant theory that post-error 
slowing reflects the recruitment of additional attentional resources in order to, presumably, 
allow people to more keenly process critical stimuli following an error, we found the reverse, 
and that attentional components were somewhat negatively associated with magnitude of 
proactive inhibition and not associated at all with number of errors. We found very little 
evidence of event-related potential (ERP) indices of performance on any measure of the 
Go/No-Go task directly, but, interestingly, we found that a general factor of intelligence, g, 
was related to both proactive inhibition and to ERPs commonly considered to reflect attention 
to a stimulus, discrimination between stimuli, and processing of stimuli. So, it appears that g 
is critical in the engagement of proactive inhibition. However, given the absence of any true 
increments in inhibition accuracy, it is unclear whether stimuli are truly processed more 
thoroughly, or only have the potential to be. 
The third study demonstrates that proactive inhibition shares some of the same neural 
architecture as reactive inhibition, but that it likely recruits an additional neuronal pathway 
that connects frontal cortices to the basal ganglia. We demonstrate that modulating synaptic 
activation threshold via transcranial direct current stimulation negatively affects post-error 
slowing (an index of proactive inhibition), but not response time and error rate in the 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), a Go/No-Go paradigm. 
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The final paper is a methodological paper that validates a novel Bayesian adaptive 
staircase algorithm to measure response inhibition in two tasks using the Stop-Signal 
paradigm, and presents a modified version of the SART which includes No-Go probability 
cueing. The purpose of this staircase algorithm is to rapidly converge on an accurate value 
that reflects the minimum time needed for a person to withhold a response after being 
presented with a Stop stimulus. Data yielded by these tasks provide a simple data structure 
that distinguishes reactive from proactive inhibition, as well as distinguishing two novel sub- 
types of proactive inhibition that we here term remedial proactive inhibition and predictive 
proactive inhibition. Furthermore, the data suggest that the measure of reactive inhibition 
(estimated via the Bayesian staircase algorithm) seems robust against influences of proactive 
inhibition, suggesting that this procedure may provide a useful tool for accurately and 
efficiently estimating both reactive and proactive inhibition in future research. 
Throughout this thesis, I highlight limitations in extant methods, bring into question 
the conclusions on which they are based, and provide some thoughts for moving forward. I 
also comment throughout on the roles of age and a general factor intelligence that are 
substantially involved in supporting overall response inhibition by upholding proactive 
processes throughout the lifespan. The mechanisms by which this might occur are discussed 
as an important avenue for future research since our methods do not allow us to make any 
strong conclusions about them. Regardless, in the four experiments described, I demonstrate 
that response inhibition has two distinct elements, reactive and proactive inhibition. In so 
doing, I argue that proactive process relies on distinct neurobiology to the reactive process, 
and that it seems likely that the proactive process compensates for deficiencies that occur 
throughout the lifespan in the reactive process. In addition, I present and validate a novel task 
that distinguishes two forms of proactive inhibition that alongside the traditional SART 
allows for the direct observation of these two forms, as well as of reactive inhibition and 
overall response inhibition. Such a battery of tasks provides the remarkably rich data in a 
short experimental session that will prove useful moving forward in clinical research 
investigating those several psychological disorders and neurodegenerative diseases that are 







1.1 Literature Review 
 
Luce described reaction time as “psychology’s ubiquitous dependent variable” (1960, 
p. 1). This is, indeed, axiomatic given that Helmholtz himself—the progenitor of the 
psychological sciences and academic supervisor to Wundt—developed the first paradigm to 
measure reaction time in 1850, which represented the first experiment in the psychological 
sciences, and which produced what to this day is the only psychological variable that yields a 
true ratio scale of measurement according to Stevens’ (1946) typology. Until this time, little 
thought was given to the mental operations required to carry out relatively simple stimulus- 
response patterns, but when such operations were considered, they were theorised to be 
immediate and to be constrained only by the physical laws of those biological systems 
invoked by such behaviours. Moreover, it was thought that even nerve propagation was either 
also instantaneous or at least immeasurably fast. By this logic, an individual may differ in 
speed of response as a function of his or her acuity for perceiving some stimulus and the rate 
at which that processing passed through its relevant transduction pathway. We now know this 
to not be the case. The speed of a response is mediated by a complex decision-making 
circuitry that is engaged between the perception of the sensory cue and the execution of the 
response. The factors that contribute to individual differences in this circuitry are the critical 
focus of this investigation. 
1.1.1 Early studies on reaction time 
 
In a series of experiments, first in frogs (1848 – 1850), and later in humans (1854 – 
1864), Helmholtz deduced the conduction velocity of nerves and the speed of perceptual 
transduction using various electrical stimulation procedures and measuring the time between 
the application of the stimulus to the sciatic nerve of a frog and subsequent muscle 
contraction, and between various cutaneous locations in the human and a response. By 
holding constant the stimulation intensity and varying the distance between stimulus location 
and muscle contraction (i.e., by moving the stimulation location on the nerve farther from the 
muscle), he inferred that differences in response latency could be attributed to nerve length, 
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and not variability in nerve fibre conductance between individuals. By demonstrating a 
relative constancy in conduction velocity of nerve fibres (a rate of approximately 65 metres 
per second under normal myelination), it is fair to assume that the length of the nerve fibre 
(that is, the distance between the muscle that needs to be contracted in some context and the 
cerebellum) is a contributing factor to reaction time but cannot account for individual 
differences in it. Subsequent human experiments allowed Helmholtz to reason that the time 
needed for a human to decide to engage a response and to physically enact it was 100 
milliseconds (whereas his data showed that a reaction time range of 120 – 200 milliseconds 
with a probable error of 3 milliseconds, indicating a highly reliable variable), allowing, 
therefore, 20-80 milliseconds for perceptual transduction. This decision and elicitation 
element of the response accounts for a large proportion of the variance between individuals in 
reaction time. By way of metaphor involving telegraph wires, Helmholtz described the three 
elements of such a response, between stimulation1 and reaction, as the “sending of the signal” 
through perceptual transduction pathways, the rate of message propagation from the 
cerebellum to the relevant muscle, and the time required “in the brain for the processes of 
perceiving and willing” (1850, p. 878). 
To provide a more empirical account of those “processes of perceiving and willing” 
(1850) inferred by Helmholtz twenty years prior, Donders (1868-1869) undertook what were 
amongst the first investigations in the experimental psychology tradition, and which 
concerned the speed of mental processes inferred from the time that elapsed between 
presentation of an auditory stimulus and a behavioural response. In these experiments, two 
participants were seated in front of a phonautograph (an early device for recording sounds), 
and Participant A uttered a phoneme and Participant B replicated it as quickly as he could, 
whilst the oscillations caused by the two sounds were marked on a rotating paper cylinder. 
The time interval between the two points was deduced using a simultaneously-recorded 
tuning fork oscillating at 261 Hz, where response latency could be directly mapped onto the 
number of oscillations between the utterance and the response. Although his methods differed 
somewhat from Helmholtz’s human reaction time (RT) experiments, Donders reported results 
that were remarkably similar (an average visual RT of around 165-170 milliseconds, and an 
auditory RT of around 75 milliseconds. The quicker RT in his auditory paradigm reflects the 
much greater speed of auditory transduction compared to visual transduction. It is possible 
 
1 The distinction between stimulation and stimulus here is not impertinent. Helmholtz referred here to his 
experiments in which electrical stimulation was the critical stimulus to which his subjects responded 
(either with her hands or teeth). 
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that Donders’ experiments yielded quicker RTs than Helmholtz’s because Donders used the 
average of his participants’ minima, whereas Helmholtz used the average of his participants’ 
arithmetic means. It was not until the full RT distribution across many trials and many 
individuals was represented, and the positive skew characteristic of such distributions became 
clear, roughly in the 1920s, that we recognised that each of these descriptive methods would 
be inappropriate). 
In the years following the introduction of the auditory paradigm described above, 
Donders devised three experimental methods that are still used today to measure the 
componential structure of the response. It is not likely that he used these same names for his 
tasks, but in their current forms—and described in this dissertation—they are commonly 
referred to as Simple Reaction Time, Choice Reaction Time, and Go/No-Go tasks. This 
battery of three tasks, administered to a single individual, yield remarkably elegant data that, 
given certain assumptions, permit the delineation of the duration of the processes associated 
with initiating, selecting, and either carrying out, or withholding, a response. By presenting a 
series of stimuli in a constant fashion to a participant whose role is to respond, for example 
by pressing a button, as quickly as possible following each stimulus, measuring the latency of 
each response, and calculating some summary statistic (usually the median), one can establish 
an individual’s Simple Reaction Time. With the addition of a Choice element (e.g., 
responding to two or more stimuli with two or more corresponding response actions), one can 
infer the additional duration required for selecting an appropriate response from an array of 
choices. Not unlike the Choice task, sequentially presenting participants with a randomised 
series of two or more stimuli and tasking them with responding only to one or a subset of 
them, Donders assumed that he could measure the speed required for stimulus discrimination. 
The simple logic of “interposing into the process some new components of mental action 
[revealing] the time required for the interposed item” (Donders, 1868-1869, p. 418) using this 
method of subtraction was mathematically sensible, fit the data, and seemed to have face 
value. Valid application of the subtraction method relies on the assumption of pure insertion: 
mental processes can be added or omitted without altering the speed of the other processes. 
Examination of this assumption does not provide support for it; introspective accounts 
suggest that increased task complexity influences quantitative and qualitative cognitive 
processing at each stage (Ulrich, Mattes, & Miller, 1999); inserting an additional task demand 
will compel the participant to alter his or her strategy, and thus, their pattern of information 
processing. Despite these limitations, Donders’ subtraction method continues to influence 
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modern cognitive psychology. Sternberg’s seminal Additive Factors Method (Sternberg, 
1969) is based on the work that formed the subtraction method. Likewise, modern brain 
imaging techniques such as PET and fMRI rely on subtraction logic to infer the parts of the 
brain that are activated during basic mental processes. 
So, while Donders’ Go/No-Go task probably did not measure precisely what he 
thought it did, it still provided useful insights into mental processes, as well as a task 
paradigm with vast utility to this day. Donders assumed that with the Go/No-Go task he could 
measure stimulus discrimination time (i.e., is the stimulus on any given trial a stimulus that 
requires a response or one that does not?). It is not known what methods Donders used to 
analyse his data in this task, but it has been speculated that he used the same simple 
subtraction method as in his previous experiments which might suggest that he subtracted 
error RTs from correct Go RTs to infer the speed of discrimination. Although it was later 
empirically supported that errors tend to be quicker than correct responses, it is not always 
the case (e.g., Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Furthermore, in my own experience performing this 
task and others like it, I am well aware that I am about to commit an error on No-Go trials 
before I have pressed the button. So, what Donders may have been measuring what was in 
fact the latency of the stopping process of the motor system. 
Galton also noticed the utility in measuring reaction time, perhaps independently but 
at least forty years after Helmholtz, and many textbooks will incorrectly attribute its 
empirical conceptualisation to him. Few methodological details are known about Galton’s RT 
experiments other than that he took measurements from only one trial on a visual measure 
and another on an auditory measure, and that the mean average of the visual RT 
measurements in his sample (N > 7,000) was around 185 msec, substantially quicker (10- 
20%) than visual RTs now (Silverman, 2010). He qualitatively remarked that quicker RT 
seemed to be associated with sociodemographic factors that he interpreted to pertain to some 
kind of higher intellect, although the nature of his argument in favour of this connection 
appears to have been greatly overstated (Johnson et al., 1985). What his data did show, 
however, is that RT was, at least at the time, negatively correlated with age and physical 
attributes that probably relate to height, but which at the time may have related more so to 
adequate nutrition and generally good physical health (Galton 1889; Johnson et al., 1985). 
Investigations into reaction time have demonstrated remarkable utility in 
discriminating individuals on various metrics of ability, and continue to do so (e.g., Deary & 
Der, 2005; Dougherty & Haith, 1997; Lonstreth, Walsh, Alcorn, Szezulski, & Manis, 1986). 
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Test-retest reliability of RT measures is usually remarkably high, and trial-by-trial reliability 
(i.e., a participant’s standard deviation) is usually very small (Baker, Maurissen, & Chrzan, 
1986; Henry, 1956; McKinney et al., 1985; Resch et al., 2013; Schatz, 2010; Schatz & Ferris, 
2013; Soreni, Crosbie, Ickowicz, & Schachar, 2009; Weafer, Baggott, & de Wit, 2013; 
Williams, et al., 2005). Furthermore, twin studies provide evidence that RT is substantially 
heritable, although the extent to which this is accounted for by familial genetic uniformity or 
by shared environmental variables is not established (Boomsma & Somsen, 1991; Finkel & 
McGue, 2006; Luciano et al., 2001; Vernon, 1989). Despite the identification of hundreds of 
genes that have been found to account for a good proportion of individual differences in RT 
(Birket et al., 2007; Kuntsi, Rogers, Swinard, & Börger, 2006; Luciano et al., 2004; Vogler et 
al., 2014; Wood, Ashrson, van der Meere, & Kuntsi, 2010; for GWAS studies, see Davies et 
al., 2018; Hagenaars et al., 2016; Trampush et al., 2017), the mechanisms by which they 
contribute to it are difficult to identify. This is unsurprising given that the generation and 
regulation of a motor action relies on known anatomical structures and physiology (e.g., size 
of corpus callosum and white matter integrity), the structure, integrity, and function of which 
are to some degree mediated by heritability (Anstey et al., 2007; Bertisch, Li, Hoptman, & 
DeLisi, 2010; Camchong, Lim, Sponheim, & MacDonald III, 2009; Deary et al., 2006; 
Jackson, Balota, Duchek, & Head, 2012; Mink & Thach, 1991; Rafal, Walker, Posner, & 
Friedrich, 1984). RT consistently demonstrates a positive correlation with age (Bellis, 1933; 
Der & Deary, 2006; Fozard, Vercruyssen, Reynolds, Hancok, & Quilter, 1994; Gottsdanker, 
1982; Pierson & Montoye, 1958), and negative correlations with a general factor of 
intelligence, g (and many, if not all, of its individual underlying constructs; Carlson, Jensen, 
& Widaman, 1983; Jensen, 1982; Jensen & Munro, 1979; Smith & Stanley, 1983), and 
general physical health (Anstey, Dear, Christensen, & Jorm, 2007; Koeneman, Werheijden, 
Chinapaw, & Hopman-Rock, 2011). Furthermore, emerging data seem to be converging on 
the idea that rate of RT slowing in healthy ageing may predict other age-related cognitive and 
psychomotor decline, and perhaps even cognitive reserve (e.g., Bielak, Hultsch, Strauss, 
MacDonald, & Hunter, 2010; Zahodne et al., 2011). The relationships between RT, a general 
factor of intelligence (g), and age may not be consistent over time, perhaps because the effect 
of genetic variation on RT seems to be magnified over the lifespan (Lindenberger et al., 
2008; Papenberg, Lindenberger, & Bäckman, 2015). The interaction between these systems is 
complex in itself, but particularly given what is now known about intergenerational 
phenomena such as what appears to be a general slowing of RT over the last century even 
when accounting for differences in methodology (Silverman, 2010). What is particularly 
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interesting about this debate, given the intra-individual positive correlation between RT and 
g, is that g appears to be increasing within the population over the last few decades, despite 
the decline in RT, but whilst retaining the association between the two variables (e.g., 
Nettelbeck, 2014; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1997; Woodley, te Nijenjuis, & Murphy, 2013). 
What is illustrated by these points is the biological basis of RT (and g), which will be 
discussed below in detail in so far as it pertains to response inhibition. So, RT is moderated 
by biological factors (e.g., white matter integrity, myelination, muscle tensor capacity), but 
even in models that account for such factors, other factors such as age remain as significant 
predictors. It is therefore clear that RT relies on biological functions as well as cognitive ones 
(which may be influenced by factors such as age), but the nature of these cognitive functions 
are not yet fully described. 
RT has much utility. Experiments using RT as the main variable of interest are not 
restricted to simply measuring the speed with which humans or animals can respond to a 
stimulus in itself, but RT can also be used as a proxy variable to investigate perceptual and 
sensory discriminability, or how well some stimulus or behaviour has been conditioned in 
reinforcement learning paradigms, and so on. Thurstone (1954) postulated that using RT, one 
could measure mental phenomena as elusive as attitudes with the law of comparative 
judgement (Thurstone, 1954; see also Luce, 1994). 
1.1.2 What mental processes can we infer from reaction time? 
 
Much like most variables in psychology (Bono, Blanca, Arnau, & Gómez-Benito, 
2017), RT distributions do not follow a Gaussian distribution. They are asymmetrical and 
invariably positively skewed, precluding the arithmetic mean of multiple measures from 
being a sensible measure of central tendency (McKormack & Wright, 1964; Miller, 1988; 
Whelan, 2008). In a Simple Reaction Time task, in which participants are given one possible 
response to one possible stimulus, skewness values generally range around 1.0-1.5; the 
simplest explanation for such values is that the outcome measures for such tasks (that is, RT 
in msec) has an explicit lower bound (0 msec) and a theoretical lower bound as a function of 
motor limitations (~150 msec), but no upper bound (with the exception of outlier exclusion 
heuristics), which results in a floor effect. With the addition of more cognitive processes, 
such as a choice element in the stimulus-response mapping or a discrimination element which 
dictates the appropriateness of responding at all, the skew statistic tends to increase (i.e., a 
more extreme rightward skew), which is likely both a function of more mental processes that 
could generate extreme RT values, but also that RTs themselves in such tasks are longer, and 
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as such, the tail is extended. This represents a difficulty for data analysis and interpretation of 
summary statistics. The arithmetic mean of an asymmetrical distribution is not representative 
of the full distribution. This is problematic both for the distributions of one participant, and 
for the distribution of averages for the sample, both of which tend to be skewed. 
Given the problematic characteristics of the RT distribution, it has been thought that 
using information from the whole distribution of RTs may provide better estimates than do 
simple measures of central tendency. One such method is to fit an explicit density function, 
the ex-Gaussian (Hohle, 1965). It is the convolution of two stochastic independent process 
distributions: a Gaussian function whose mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) approximately 
represent the rise of the distribution’s left tail; and an exponential function whose mean (τ) 
approximately represents the skewed tail (Sternberg, 2014). Any given RT trial can be 
partitioned into a decision component, and a transduction component; that is, the perception 
of a stimulus and decision to respond, and the true physical-motor response, respectively 
(Dawson, 1988; Luce, 1986). The use of the ex-Gaussian assumes that the transduction 
component is Gaussian (represented by the μ and σ parameters), whereas the decision 
component is exponential (represented by the τ parameter; Hohle, 1965). 
Later, Ratcliff defined a type of sequential sampling model that accounts for 
nonsensory components of performance on such tasks that the ex-Gaussian could not, the 
Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000). Such models 
consider variability in RT (i.e., the shape of the distribution) of two separate response 
outcomes (e.g., left vs right, bright vs dark, word vs non-word; i.e., stimulus discrimination or 
choice tasks) as the empirical signature of a noisy evidence accumulation process (Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2015). DDMs assume that decision processes follow a random walk process in a 
continuous timescale from a starting point, when the stimulus is presented, to a decision 
threshold that is associated with one of two possible choices, when a response is made, which 
reflects stochastic sensory evidence accumulation (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Voss et al., 
2013). This model structure provides a unified account of the processes underlying RT and 
the probability with which one response or the other is chosen. There are four critical 
parameters yielded by DDMs: drift rate, boundary separation, starting point or response  
bias, and an additive lag parameter for nondecision time (see Figure 1, below; Forstmann, 
Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016). Drift rate is the amount of sensory and/or semantic 
evidence accumulated about the stimulus per unit of time, and varies as a function of stimulus 
discriminability, task difficulty, participant ability, and so on. A high drift rate leads to 
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quicker responses and usually indicates task or condition ease (e.g., highly discriminable 
stimuli in a discrimination task), and a low drift rate, owing to stochastic drift, usually 
indicates task or condition difficulty and, thus, the model would predict more errors with 
slower reaction times which is supported by empirical data in choice tasks (Wagenmakers, 
Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008). Boundary separation essentially reflects response 
caution by implementing the speed-accuracy trade-off; it indicates the distance between the 
criterion level required for evidence to be accumulated before a decision to respond is made, 
where wider boundaries require more evidence, and thus more time, before a decision to 
respond is made. Starting point is the participant’s a priori bias or preference toward one 
response or the other, likewise implementing speed-accuracy trade-off under some 
experimental conditions. The accumulation process does not necessarily commence 
equidistant from each decision boundary, so when starting point is nearer to the evidence 
criterion boundary for responding, for example, “word”, then responses for “word” will be 
quicker than for “non-word”, and responses for “non-word” would, therefore, require a 
greater amount of evidence to be selected as a response. Nondecision time is the residual time 
after accounting for these three processes and the actual Reaction Time; that is, it is the time 
required for peripheral processes required for a response, such as stimulus encoding, 
representation transformation, and the motor processes associated with executing the 
response. 
 
Figure 1. The Drift-Diffusion Model implemented in data from a two-choice decision task. 
Reprinted from “Stochastic Process Underlying Emergent Recognition of Visual Objects 
Hidden in Degraded Images” by Tsutomu Murata, Takashi Hamada, Tetsuya Shimokawa, 
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Manabu Tanifuji, Toshio Yanagida, 2014, PLoS ONE, 9(12). Copyright 2014 by Murata et 
al.. 
These models account exceptionally well for behavioural patterns in choice response 
tasks where participants must respond in one of two ways corresponding to one of two 
choices. Not only do they explain individual differences in RT, but they also account for the 
relationship between RT and response probability, the shape of the RT distribution, and how 
each of these covary with stimulus difficulty, and change as a function of experimental 
condition (Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016). With somewhat limited success, 
these models can also be applied to simple, one-choice RT tasks, where the upper decision 
threshold reflects response and the lower decision threshold reflects no response but this 
application remains questionable (see further discussion to this point below). 
Both of these models and others (e.g., Linear Ballistic Accumulator models) provide 
additional data that are not available simply using the mean or the median of the RT 
distribution. DDMs explain RTs as a function of the psychological processes that underlie 
variability in them, and provide a measure of nondecision time. The ex-Gaussian includes a 
theoretical parameter for perceptual transduction, which is known to differ between 
individuals, and which is somewhat compatible with the nondecision time measure. 
Interestingly, this parameter maps reasonably well onto Helmholtz’s original model of RT: 
that individuals may vary in both perceptual transduction latency and on response latency 
independently of transduction latency. This process was left unaccounted for by Donders and 
many others, and may reflect the assumption that perceptual transduction speed operated 
outside of conscious representation, and is, therefore, not subject to individual differences. 
The premise is likely true, but its conclusion does not logically follow. Individual differences 
in the speed of perceptual transduction in the visual domain have been investigated using the 
Inspection Time paradigm, developed at the University of Adelaide’s Department of 
Psychology (Vickers, Nettelbeck, & Willson, 1972). 
The Inspection Time paradigm was developed to further tease apart the componential 
temporal structure of response time by measuring the speed of processing of a stimulus and 
removing it from the confounds of individual differences in motoric response rate. 
Interestingly, Inspection Time (i.e., the exposure duration required to reliably identify or 
discriminate a reasonably simple stimulus) is, like RT, moderately heritable (Luciano et al., 
2005) and correlated with g (Nettelbeck & Lally, 1976). Indeed, the Inspection Time task 
provides another piece of the puzzle in the componential structure of Reaction Time. 
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It is because of the experiments described in the previous sections that the 
measurement of reaction times became established as an important psychophysical method, 
“able to account with remarkable precision for various mediating processes between stimuli 
and responses” (p. vii), and indeed that psychology developed as a truly quantitative science 
(Welford, 1980). 
Precisely 100 years after Donders’ experiments, Rabbitt (1966a, 1966b) described 
differences in the reaction time distributions of responses in Choice Response tasks as a 
function of the type of response. He showed that responses following an error were usually 
slower than those preceding an error, and that error responses themselves were, on average, 
quicker than other response types (Rabbitt 1966a, 1966b; see also Laming 1979a, 1979c). 
Despite these empirical observations demonstrating remarkable reliability across task 
paradigms and participants, and testing sessions within participants, the information 
processing that underlies these response patterns remained unclear. Indeed, theorising on the 
processes that trigger this post-error slowing was taking place, but inferring internal cognitive 
representations from alterations to the tails of distributions yielded only dubious accounts. 
One decade later, roughly forty years ago, Rabbitt and Rodgers (1977) asked, “what does a 
man do after he makes an error?” A fascinating question, indeed, and one that remains largely 
unanswered. Given the critical role of errors and how we respond to them in refining and 
guiding our behavioural profiles in life, this is an important question. Hence, it is a question 
that I try to provide some answers to here. 
1.1.3 Reacting versus responding: A critical distinction 
 
Until now, I have used RT to refer to reaction time, and have not distinguished 
reaction time from response time. It now becomes important to make this distinction. 
Reaction time should refer to the latency of a speeded simple reactive response (i.e., reacting 
to stimulus onset or just noticeable difference), such as in a Simple Reaction Time task; of a 
speeded choice reactive response, such as in a Choice Reaction Time task; or of a speeded 
decision response, such as in a task that requires participants to discriminate between a group 
of shapes moving left or moving right amongst individual shapes moving in random 
directions, or whether a string of letters is a word or not a word. Response Time, on the other 
hand, should refer to the latency of a response when a response is conditionally required (i.e., 
is required under some circumstances but not others). This distinction will be maintained 
from here on. 
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1.1.4 Measuring the difference between stopping and not starting 
 
So, while rapid reaction or response to an imperative stimulus in the environment, as 
represented by RT tasks, is certainly helpful for survival and for day-to-day goal-directed 
behaviour, stopping an inappropriate response is considerably more important. Response 
inhibition is a complex cognitive function that requires the confluence of various mental 
operations that otherwise operate more or less individually. Whereas in performing a planned 
action in response to a known stimulus that requires that action entails a see process followed 
by a do process, stopping a prepared action in response to an ambiguous stimulus that under 
some conditions requires that response, but under others requires a different response or no 
response, requires a see process, a process and evaluate process, and, based on the outcome 
of that, either a do process, a do something else process, a stop doing process, or a do not 
start process. This operation, and the environmental conditions under which it is required, are 
much more commonly encountered in the real-world than simply seeing and unequivocally 
acting. Real-world behaviour is very rarely met with a definitive stimulus-response 
interaction, and so we approach goal-directed actions with natural uncertainty and flexibility. 
The stop doing and the do not start processes are ostensibly similar, but not identical (this 
critical distinction is described in later sections). The way in which these processes are 
engaged, overridden, or offset in order to successfully adapt behaviour is the subject of 
considerable investigation across the psychological and neuroscientific disciplines. The 
reason for this empirical interest is the critical importance of the operation for everyday 
functioning; furthermore, response inhibition is known to be disturbed in a large, diverse 
array of pathological profiles in the psychological and in the medical domains. This is likely a 
result of the multiple potential points of ingress for disturbance to the efficacy of the overall 
process by disease. Before introducing the neurobiological elements, the behavioural and 
cognitive bases, and the clinical implications of response inhibition, I will describe and 
explain the tasks commonly used to measure it. I do this so that the reader can use the tasks as 
a point of reference for the material that follows. 
Response inhibition is most commonly measured using either some instantiation of 
the Go/No-Go paradigm first developed by Donders, or the Stop-Signal Task first 
implemented by Logan and Cowan (1994). These tasks represent the gold-standard tools to 
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evaluate response inhibition—they are broadly-accepted, thoroughly-researched, and well- 
validated. 
In the Go/No-Go paradigm, a participant is presented with a series of stimuli, usually 
visual but sometimes auditory, and are instructed to respond as quickly as possible, for 
example by clicking a mouse or the button of a button-box. In some trials, the stimulus 
presented to participants will differ on some salient dimension, and require participants to try 
to withhold their response. For example, participants may be shown an arrow that faces either 
right or left and are instructed to click a mouse when it faces right but not when it faces left. 
This critical stimulus is the No-Go stimulus; in the previous example, the No-Go stimulus is 
the arrow facing left, and the Go stimulus is the arrow facing right. Here, the overall measure 
is usually the overall number or the proportion of failed stopped responses to No-Go stimuli; 
these are the errors of commission, and response inhibition is conventionally thought of as 
the complement proportion of errors of commission. Response time for Go trials is very 
commonly reported in experiments using the Go/No-Go paradigm, but for the most part it is 
unclear why because they are rarely thoughtfully synthesised with, or interpreted relative to, 
the measure of inhibition, and are subject to large individual differences in speed-accuracy 
trade-off and, therefore, in boundary separation and response bias, thereby confounding the 
measure. 
The Stop-Signal Task (SST), on the other hand, instead of displaying a No-Go 
stimulus as in the Go/No-Go paradigm described above (i.e., requiring not starting a 
response, or interrupting its planned deployment), displays a Go signal sometimes followed 
by a Stop signal, the delay of which is varied (the Stop-signal delay, SSD), which indicates 
that the cessation of the initiated response is required. In the typology I described above, this 
distinction maps onto the do not start process (most likely engaged in Go/No-Go tasks) and 
the stop doing process (most likely engaged in SSTs), respectively. Performance in this task 
can be formalised as a race between a Go process triggered by the Go signal, and a Stop 
process triggered by the Stop signal. If the Stop process wins the race, the response is 
inhibited, and vice versa (Logan 1981; Logan & Cowan, 1984). There have been a number of 
different formalisations of the so-called horse-race model (see Matzke, Verbruggen, & 
Logan, 2018; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009), but the racing processes principle is sufficient for 
our purposes. The shorter the delay between the Go stimulus and the Stop signal (i.e., the 
SSD), the easier it is to withhold a response because the time between response initiation and 
response execution or response inhibition is longer, allowing the stop process to be engaged. 
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The critical measure of performance in this task is Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT), which 
represents the covert latency of the stop process (Figure 2). There are a few ways of 
calculating a participant’s SSRT which is contingent on two things. The first is the 
assumption regarding the dependence or independence of the stop and go processes according 
to the race model, which according to differing accounts is either completely independent, 
stochastically dependent, or contextually dependent. The second is the procedure for 
determining the SSD on Stop trials, which could be fixed (i.e., predetermined in stepwise 
increments and selecting the increment that most closely reflects participants’ success in 
stopping a response), or adjusted dynamically using a tracking procedure or an adaptive 
staircase. The SSRTs yielded by these measures are more distinct in theoretical terms than in 
empirical terms, and they tend to be concordant (Camalier et al., 2007; Ma & Yu, 2016; 
Matzke et al., 2013; Montagnini & Chelazzi, 2009; Wiecki & Frank, 2018; Wiecki, Sofer, & 
Frank, 2013). The most common method for deriving SSRT is computing the SST at which 
the probability of successful stopping is 0.5 and subtracting it from mean Go RT. The 
resultant SSRT is thought to be a measure of response inhibition. 
 
Figure 2. A model of RT distributions in the Stop-Signal Task and how they are used to 
derive Stop-Signal Reaction Time. Reprinted from “Release the BEESTS: Bayesian 
Estimation of Ex-Gaussian STop-Signal reaction time distributions” by Dora Matzke, 
Jonathon Love, Thomas V. Wiecki, Scott D. Brown, Gordon D. Logan, and Eric-Jan 
Wagenmakers, 2013, Frontiers in Psychology. Copyright 2013 by Matzke et al.. 
1.1.5 External and ecological validity 
 
It is assumed that performance on these two types of tasks in some way corresponds 
to the real-world ability to regulate one’s behaviour in conceptually similar ways, and indeed 
that largely appears to be the case in some domains of behaviour and personality. Whitely 
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(1983) outlined a structuralist approach that compels research pertaining to both the 
nomothetic span and the construct representation of a candidate function in order to establish 
its construct validity. Response inhibition as it is operationalised in the experimental context 
can be mapped onto impulsivity and broad behavioural dysregulation in the real-world 
context. Whiteside and Lynam (2001) and Cyders and Smith (2007) suggested that the 
structure of self-report scales that measure impulsivity can be factored into a five-disposition 
model in which each factor predicts important outcomes, and, using this factor structure, 
Cyders and Coskunpinar (2011, 2012) commented on Whitely’s structuralist approach by 
investigating the overlap between self-reported indices of impulsivity and behavioural 
dysregulation and experimental measures of impulsivity and response inhibition. The authors 
found small but significant relationships between self-reported and lab-measured impulsivity 
and, indeed, that the myriad measures of both self-report and experimental task nature 
seemed to tap into an underlying ‘impulsivity’ construct, but that self-report and behavioural 
measures of impulsivity were nevertheless discrete components of that underlying factor 
(Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011, 2012; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). This meta-analysis (Cyders 
& Coskunpinar, 2011) quite reliably showed that slower SSRT on SSTs and more errors of 
commission on Go/No-Go paradigms are both predicted by higher self-rated impulsivity on 
two well-established scales: the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Barratt, 1965) and the 
Urgency-Premeditation-Perseverance-Sensation Seeking-Positive Urgency (UPPS-P) 
Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Consistent with the discrete motor 
and cognitive elements of response inhibition, SSRT and error rate were each associated with 
the motor and the cognitive subscales of the BIS, and with items that load onto negative 
emotional valence behaviour (e.g., acting impulsively when in a negative mood) and lack of 
premeditation on the UPPS-P, highlighting the importance of individual differences in 
domains other than the motor domain in response inhibition measurement. 
The conclusion based on the synthesis of these data is that lab-based response 
inhibition tasks are, ostensibly, externally valid. Based on this conclusion, it has been 
assumed that important psychosocial outcomes are directly associated with task performance, 
but the accounts derived from these tend to overlook the link between task performance and 
biology, which may provide alternative accounts. Lab-based and self-report measures have 
each had their ecological validity occasionally brought into question. Lab-based tasks may 
map onto underlying constructs to some degree, but the goal of the research that uses them 
often intends for their results to be applicable outside of the lab; that is, does successfully 
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suppressing a mouse click in the lab apply to successfully suppressing an inappropriate 
behaviour? Self-report measures, on the other hand, are subject to scrutiny for other reasons; 
humans tend not to exhibit highly-calibrated metacognitive awareness of their abilities, nor 
are they particularly accurate in self-reporting actual past or expected future behaviour (e.g., 
Bowman & DeLucia, 1992; Cole & Gonyea, 2010; Gorber, Schofield-Hurwitz, Levasseur, & 
Tremblay, 2009; Krosnick & Sedikides, 1990; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; van de Mortal 
2008). Ideally, to confidently accept the construct and ecological validity, we should like to 
observe not only a relationship between lab-based and self-report measures of the construct, 
but also a capacity to predict real-world outcomes. 
Perhaps, then, broader outcome measures that are less introspective and subjective in 
nature may provide an insight into the true ecological validity of response inhibition 
measures. Evidence to this end is reviewed in a later section (section 1.1.7). Some evidence 
that substantiates the ecological validity of response inhibition comes from the previous 
meta-analysis, in which those subscales most strongly correlated with task-based response 
inhibition are those which have demonstrated the capacity to predict clinical outcomes, 
largely in the domain of psychological disorders (e.g., gambling and other addictive 
behaviours, compulsive disorders; Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011). We can therefore expect, 
but not assume, some triangulation where lab-based response inhibition measures likewise 
predict clinical outcomes or are predicted by developmental stages. 
1.1.6 The development and decline of response inhibition 
 
Inhibition of a motor response cannot be measured in very early life because motoric 
behaviour may not be goal-directed or regulated in infancy. Response inhibition can 
theoretically be investigated, though, by observing oculomotor control in very young humans. 
Over the first few weeks of life, saccades appear to be automatic, and triggered by external 
factors with no evidence of regulation (Johnson, 1990). In an anti-saccade task, Johnson 
(1995) observed the ability to inhibit a reflexive saccade in four-month old infants, in line 
with a good amount of behavioural and neuroscientific evidence suggesting that such 
oculomotor control shifts from largely subcortical, originating in superior colliculus, to 
cortical control in the frontal eye fields of prefrontal cortex at approximately this age 
(Atkinson, 1984; Bronson, 1974). So, the developmental trajectory of response inhibition 
seems to be associated with maturation of brain function and the emergence of prefrontal 
development, which commences in earnest from around four to five months, at which time 
neurogenesis, synaptogenesis, neuronal differentiation and myelination all slow, and there is 
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an increase in the rate of synaptic pruning, dendritic tree complexity, and white matter 
volume (e.g., Diamond, 2002; Kolb et al., 2012; Mrzljak, Uylings, Van Eden, & Judáš, 
1991). Case in point, Diamond (1990) showed that controlled inhibition of motor reflexes can 
occur from five months, and, under conditions in which a controlled action which would 
normally suit the achievement of a simple goal is not suitable (e.g., a piece of glass is put in 
between a desired object and an infant, requiring reaching above or around the glass), 
dynamic behavioural adaptation can occur from around seven to eight months. 
Converging evidence from behavioural experiments, imaging studies, and twin 
studies (Bell & Livesey, 1985; Cohen et al., 2010; Livesey & Morgan, 1991, 2007; Rubia, 
Smith, Taylor, & Brammer, 2007; Stevens, Kiehl, Pearlson, & Calhourn, 2007 Wiebe, 
Sheffield, & Espy, 2012) appear to suggest that from around three until seven years of age, 
response execution (i.e., RT) and response inhibition (i.e., withholding a response measured 
either by SSRT or by errors of commission) both improve in a generally linear fashion 
independent of learning processes (see Livesey, 1988; Livesey & Dawson, 1981) when 
mental representations of task rules are accounted for (Bell & Livesey, 1985; McAuley, 
Christ, & White, 2011), probably as the result of maturation of brain function and improved 
connectedness between frontal and motoric brain regions (Luna & Sweeney, 2006; Tamm, 
Menon, & Reiss, 2002), and also of improvements in processing speed (McAuley & White, 
2011). Interestingly, in a longitudinal study of preschool-aged children, growth curve 
modelling showed that working memory and g were each related to better response inhibition 
overall, but that the relationship between general cognitive ability and response speed 
changed with age such that better cognitive abilities were related to slower responding in 
younger children (3 years) and quicker responding in older children (5 years) when holding 
inhibition accuracy constant (Wiebe, Sheffield, & Espy, 2012). This supports other findings 
(e.g., Lee, Lo, Li, Sung, & Juan, 2015) demonstrating a relationship between age-related 
improvements in IQ and in response inhibition, but appears to implicate not simply global 
developmental progress, but rather judicious management and regulation of behaviour under 
uncertainty as a skill conferred by intellectual resources. It seems plausible that this 
development results in strategic alterations in approaching the task such that RT is adjusted 
on Go trials to enhance the chance of success in cases of No-Go or Stop trials, rather than 
global improvements to the ability to stop or prevent an inappropriate response. From a 
cognitive development standpoint, it has been proposed that a developmental shift from an 
immediacy preference to a delayed preference (i.e., delayed gratification as per the 
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‘marshmallow test’) in 3-to-6 year olds, using response inhibition as an analogue, that seems 
to occur from around 5 years of age (Nisan, 1974) From eight or so years until late 
adolescence, improvements in response execution continue, but appear less associated with 
processing speed and more with improved sustained attention (Bartgis, Thomas, Lefler & 
Hartung, 2008; Johnstone et al., 2007; Booth et al., 2003), which according to some accounts 
is not entirely separable from response inhibition itself; whereas improvements in response 
inhibition are increasingly explained by working memory and higher order cognition and 
problem solving as well as multiplicative outcomes of these rather than of simple motor 
control mechanisms (e.g., Asato, Sweeney, & Luna, 2006; McAuley & White, 2011; Cragg & 
Nation, 2008). 
These developmental studies in young children clearly demonstrate that successful 
response inhibition is acquired in the early years, which is unsurprising given its importance. 
Such acquisition could reflect brain development or the cognitive and psychosocial 
development associated with contingency rule learning, performance motivation, and the 
capacity to attend to task demands and sustain attention, or some combination of these things 
insofar as they are separable. Evidence from later life provides support for the developmental 
account, but does not preclude the cognitive account. 
Consistent with a well-established and well-understood slowing of RT in simple 
reaction time tasks, response speeds in response inhibition tasks slow considerably from the 
mid-twenties onward. The age at which such slowing occurs is approximately equal to the 
age at which fluid abilities tend to commence their decline (Horn & Noll, 1994) and, 
interestingly, some evidence suggests that higher levels of education mediate the rate at 
which these declines occur (e.g., Tun & Lachman, 2008). Using a serial visual feature- 
conjunction Choice Reaction Time task, Woods and colleagues (Woods, Wyma, Yund, 
Herron, & Reed, 2015) show that around 80% of the response latency decline associated with 
ageing is accounted for by processing and transduction, the remaining 20% with decrements 
to the motor system, and that there are no clear deficits to stimulus discrimination abilities. 
The conclusions of this and other work (e.g., Porciatti, Fiorentini, Morrone, & Burr, 1999) 
are that the negative effect that ageing exerts on RT has sensory and motor origins, but not 
cognitive origins (see also Adrover-Roig, Sesé, Barceló, & Palmer, 2012 and Salthouse, 
1996, for latent variable analyses and a theoretical model revealing the importance of 
processing speed in protecting against cognitive decline in ageing). Such effects are the result 
of physical changes to nerve fibres, slowing the speed of conduction and perceptual 
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transduction, and to muscle fibres, requiring stronger signals for activation, as well as the loss 
of motor neurons in the brain (Booth, Weeden, & Tseng, 1994; Hunter, Pereira, & Keenan, 
2016; Lexell, 1997; Manini, Hong, & Clark, 2013; Maxwell et al., 2018; Tomlinson & Irving, 
1977). That is to say, it is the body and not the mind that slows our responses as we age. 
In line with this, response latency on response inhibition tasks likewise slows with 
age. It is probable that a substantial proportion of this slowing can be accounted for by the 
sensory and motor changes just described, but it is plausible that internal cognitive rules that 
govern the threshold for a response, such as bias and boundary separation are equally 
responsible, which may be explained by older adults adopting a more cautious approach to 
action under uncertainty. Response speed on Go trials in such tasks seems to slow earlier than 
simple or choice RT (which does not necessarily reflect age-related decline) whereas SSRT, 
the measure of inhibition in Stop-Signal Tasks, decays from around the mid-forties, 
implicating a contribution of cognitive factors to age-related decline (Bedard et al., 2002; 
Williams, Ponesse, Schacher, Logan, & Tannock, 1999; see Figure 3 for illustration). The 
measure of inhibition in Go/No-Go tasks, on the other hand, errors of commission, does not 
seem to be negatively affected by age in the same way, being somewhat maintained in 
middle-age and decaying only in older age (Kubo, Kawai & Kawai, 2010; Leversen, 
Hopkins, & Sigmundsson, 2013). Together, this indicates the presence of a compensatory 
mechanism that is invoked to a different degree in Go/No-Go tasks compared to Stop-Signal 
tasks, or that the outcome inhibition measures of these tasks are not analogous, or both of 
them. Indeed, fMRI evidence has shown that older adults invoke more bilateral activation in 
inhibition tasks than young adults (Langenecker & Nielson, 2003), implying the existence of 
a compensatory mechanism that may sustain the ability to inhibit an inappropriate response in 
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Figure 3. Go RT in response inhibition tasks, number of errors, and SSRT across the lifespan 
(interpolated from Bedard et al., 2010 (Stop-Signal Task), Kubo-Kawai & Kawai, 2009 
(Go/No-Go Task) Sebastian et al., 2013 (Go/No-Go Task), Williams et al., 1999 (Stop-Signal 
Task)). Measure of Errors is uniformly modified for scale. 
1.1.7 Response inhibition, ecological validity, and psychopathology 
 
Throughout the lifespan, performance in response inhibition tasks is reasonably 
effective at predicting important life outcomes such as academic performance, health-related 
lifestyle choices, and even longevity (Chapman, Roberts, & Duberstein, 2011; Friedel, 
DeHart, Madden, & Odum, 2014; Friedman et al., 1995; Lawyer, Boomhower, & Rasmussen, 
2015; Maag, 2005; Zorza, Merino, & Acosta Mesas, 2017). Since response inhibition is 
probably psychometrically related to inhibitory control, delayed gratification, and the ability 
to sustain attention on a primary tasks and ignore distractors (Carter, Russell, & Helton, 
2013; Jiang, Liu, Ji, & Zhu, 2018; Kirmizi-Alsan et al., 2006), this relationship is not 
surprising. But it does point to a role of top-down control in response inhibition. Deficits in 
response inhibition predict psychopathological behavioural dysregulation in problem 
gambling (Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian, & Clark, 2009; van Holst, van Holstein, van 
den Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2012), alcohol and other drug use (Monterosso, Aron, 
Cordova, Xu, & London, 2005; Nigg, Wong, Martel, & Jester, 2006), as well as proclivity for 
criminal (Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2007) and other risky behaviours and aggression (Brown 
RT 
SSRT 





et al., 2015; Feilhauer, Cima, Korebrits, & Kunert, 2011; Nydegger, Ames, Stacy, & Grenard, 
2014; Van den bergh et al., 2006). Furthermore, measures of response inhibition demonstrate 
robust predictive power for such outcomes. Wong and colleagues (Wong, Brower, & Nigg, 
2010) reported that poorer response inhibition compared to age-matched peers in childhood 
predicted problematic alcohol and drug use in adolescence and young adulthood. 
Likewise, performance on response inhibition tasks is able to discriminate between 
healthy and pathological populations. So, in addition to the congruence between behavioural 
performance on response inhibition tasks and self-report data on impulsivity scales, humans 
who satisfy diagnostic criteria for disordered behavioural and emotional regulation perform 
differently than do healthy humans. To illustrate this point, I will use two of the most 
commonly diagnosed neuropsychiatric diseases, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Brem, Grünblatt, Dreschler, Riederer, & 
Walitza, 2014). There is a high comorbidity between OCD and ADHD, especially in 
paediatric populations, and although their psychopathological profiles are distinct, both 
groups perform worse than healthy controls on response inhibition tasks (Balogh & Czobor, 
2014; Brem et al., 2014; Geller et al., 2000, 2007a, 2007b; Masi et al., 2006, 2010; Sheppard 
et al., 2010). There are substantial similarities between these populations, but also very 
critical behavioural differences. Despite these differences, there is considerable overlap in 
genetic predictors of ADHD and OCD (Hirschtritt et al., 2018; Ritter et al., 2017). There has 
been a recent effort in the clinical literature to characterise deficits in response inhibition as a 
candidate endophenotype for ADHD. Endophenotypes are used to distinguish behavioural 
symptoms into stable phenotypes that have a clear genetic origin (Bernard & Lewis, 1966). If 
the disturbances to response inhibition have genetic aetiology and are phenotypes of genetic 
disorders, it is important for treatment to unravel how these genes affect a complex cognitive 
mechanism (this idea is reflected in a recent and interesting commentary by Marshall, 2020). 
There is no difference between OCD patients and healthy controls in terms of their 
response latency on Go trials, but OCD patients are less effective at inhibiting a response 
(reflected in SSRT and errors of commission) and even fail to respond to Go stimuli more 
frequently than do control groups (e.g., Bannon, Gonsalvez, Croft, & Boyce, 2002; 
Herrmann, Jacob, Unterecker, & Fallgatter, 2003; Kang et al., 2013; Roth et al., 2007). This 
indicates not only a poorer ability to withhold an inappropriate response, but also to engage 
an appropriate response, suggesting dysfunction in the cognitive but not necessarily the motor 
processes required for action. In OCD, fMRI evidence points to lower activation in the 
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cingulate cortex, basal ganglia regions, and frontostriatal circuitry compared to healthy 
controls during Go/No-Go tasks (Kang et al., 2013), and topographic evoked potential 
mapping shows greater bilateral patterns of activation, as well as posteriorisation of frontal 
activity, both at rest and during continuous performance Go/No-Go and Stroop tasks 
(Herrmann et al., 2003; Roth et al., 2007). The magnitude of the effects reported in these 
studies and others like it (e.g., Bannon et al., 2002) were correlated with severity of 
symptomatology. This led Rosenberg and colleagues (Rosenberg, Dick, O’Hearn, & 
Sweeney, 1996; see also Penadés et al., 2007) to suggest that impairment of frontostriatal 
circuitry, which mediates behavioural inhibition and control, underlies the disturbances to 
response inhibition and regulation which, in turn, underlie the repetitive symptomatic 
behaviours that characterise OCD. 
OCD is typically characterised by recurrent, intrusive thoughts that elicit a negative 
emotional state which is attenuated somewhat by the performance of repetitive stereotypic 
behaviour (American Psychiatric Society [APS], 2013; Thomsen, 2013; Walitza, 2014). In 
OCD, inexorable physical movements reflect cognitive dysfunction, but not motor 
dysfunction. ADHD, on the other hand, is characterised by a persistent pattern of inattention, 
hyperactivity, and impulsivity (APS, 1994); that is, a general inability to regulate emotional, 
motivational, and behavioural responses that often presents as contextually inappropriate 
behavioural activation. So, whereas behaviours expressed in ADHD are generally fully 
articulated but performed in inappropriate social circumstances, behaviours in OCD are more 
reflexive, haptic self-soothing actions – the critical distinction is repetition in OCD and no 
repetition in ADHD. This is interesting in terms of response inhibition as a construct. Two 
disorders of dysregulation that are distinct in their emotional architecture and their cognitive 
origins, but which appear somewhat similar in their pathophysiology, elicit similar disordered 
performance on response inhibitions tasks (similar RT, poorer inhibition, and more errors of 
omission; Barkley, 1999; Casey et al., 1997; Crosbie et al., 2013; Epstein, Johnson, Varia, & 
Conners, 2010; Wodka et al., 2006). This gives us some reason to expect that response 
inhibition is not a unitary construct. So, given the pathophysiological similarities between 
these disorders, and the convergent evidence from positron emission tomography 
(Buchsbaum et al., 1990; Kawashima et al., 1996), near-infrared spectroscopy (Fallgatter & 
Strik, 1997), functional magnetic resonance imaging (Casey, Trainor, Orendi, & Schubert, 
2008; Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff, 2003; Konishi, Nakajima, Uchida, Sekihara, 
& Miyashita, 2001), and electroencephalographic (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi 2001) 
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studies that reliably implicate their affected neural regions in the provision of the inhibition of 
a motor response (i.e., anterior frontparietal and prefrontal regions, especially in the right 
hemisphere), we can therefore conclude that defective brain function contributes to 
disordered response inhibition, and that disordered response inhibition predicates 
psychopathology. 
Conversely, in other diseases, disordered response inhibition is a symptom, not a 
diagnostic criterion; that is, it could be used to categorise a set of behavioural and cognitive 
symptoms to diagnose, or it could be the manifestation of a diagnosis with known biological 
mechanisms—but in each instance, it is likely that the pathophysiological aetiology is to 
some degree overlapping. Whereas OCD and ADHD are cognitive dysfunctions that manifest 
as motor dysregulation, Parkinson’s disease (PD) and Huntington’s disease (HD) are 
principally motor dysfunctions with physical and behavioural manifestations (Agostino, 
Berardell, Formica, Accornero, & Manfredo, 1992; Mayeux, 1984). This is reflected in their 
respective pathophysiological profiles: OCD and ADHD primarily affect frontal regions, 
whereas PD and HD primarily affect motor and subcortical regions (Forno, 1992), yet, it is 
widely reported in the literature that response inhibition is similarly impaired in PD and HD 
populations (Beste, Saft, Andrich, Gold, & Falkenstein, 2008; Beste, Willemssen, Saft, & 
Falkenstein, 2010; Ray et al., 2009). What is common to these four diseases is a 
neurochemical imbalance in the dopaminergic system in frontostriatal regions and the basal 
ganglia (Bernheimer, Birkmayer, Hornykiewicz, Jellinger, & Sietelberger, 1973; Biederman 
& Spencer, 1999; Bradshaw, 2001; Bradshaw & Sheppard, 2000; Chudasama & Robbins, 
2006; Denys, Zohar, & Westenberg, 2004; Engert & Pruessner, 2008; Hollander et al., 1988; 
Lichter & Cummings, 2001; Lotharius & Brundin, 2002; Melloni et al., 2012; Ring & Serra- 
Mestres, 2002; Seeman et al., 1987; Swanson et al., 2000). Because the principal role of the 
basal ganglia is implementation and coordination of motor action, a brief comment on their 
neural circuitry, and on the pathogenesis of PD and HD is apposite. 
1.1.8 Response inhibition and neuropathology 
 
According to the classical model of basal ganglia function, motor commands 
generated by the frontal cortex are relayed to the thalamus via basal ganglia structures. The 
basal ganglia are functionally interposed between cortex and thalamus, and their role is to 
process and organise incoming signals from cortex, and to generate and project the 
appropriate output signal to cortex via the thalamus (Blandini et al., 2000). This process 
modulates movement. The thalamus is under the influence of basal ganglia, whose function is 
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to facilitate or constrain motor commands. Because the resting state of the thalamus is one of 
tonic inhibition from the internal segment of globus pallidus (GPi), disinhibition is required 
to produce movement. Within this circuit (see Figure 4), a disinhibitory ‘direct’ pathway 
favours the selection of a motor command generated by the frontal cortex, and an inhibitory 
‘indirect’ pathway suppresses the execution of motor commands generated by the frontal 
cortex (Berretta, Parthasarathy, & Graybiel, 1997; Calabresi, Picconi, Tozzi, Ghiglieri, & Di 
Filippo, 2014; DeLong & Wichmann, 2007; Jahanshahi, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015b; 
Tekin & Cummings, 2002). The functional outcome of such organisation is that activation of 
the direct pathway leads to opposite changes in net output of the basal ganglia to activation of 
the indirect pathway. The notion that the direct and indirect pathways exert opposing 
influences on action selection is supported by recent animal studies (Albin, Young, & 
Penney, 1989; Bateup et al., 2010; DeLong, 1990; Freeze, Kravitz, Hammack, Berke, & 
Kretzer, 2013; Kravitz et al., 2010). Recent research has identified a third pathway directly 
linking the prefrontal cortex to the subthalamic nucleus that inhibits the thalamus and 
suppresses motor commands (Meyer & Bucci, 2016; Nambu, 2004; 2005). This pathway is 
an excitatory pathway which can stimulate neurons in subthalamic nucleus (STN) to give a 
dominant initiative to the output neurons of the internal segment of globus pallidus (GPi) and, 
as such, rapidly inhibit the thalamus (Nambu et al., 2000; Nambu, Tokuno, & Takada, 2002). 
Because it bypasses the striatum, this pathway was named the ‘hyperdirect’ pathway. 
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Figure 4. The structural anatomy of the basal ganglia pathways and the neurotransmitters that 
modulate their activity. Adapted from Mikael Häggström in Wikipedia, “Basal Ganglia” (CC 
BY-SA). 
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The activity of the three pathways is differentially modulated by dopamine acting 
upon dopamine D1 and D2 receptors on glutamatergic neurons (see Figure 5). Although a 
small subpopulation of striatal medium spiny neurons contains both D1-type and D2-type 
mRNA, it is known that the direct pathway preferentially expresses dopamine D1 receptors 
and the indirect pathway expresses dopamine D2 receptors (Perreault et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, synaptic plasticity in the direct and indirect pathways has been shown to depend 
on the activity of dopamine D1 and D2 receptors, respectively, and on tonic dopamine levels 
(Shen et al., 2008). High tonic dopamine levels and dopamine D1 receptors seem critical for 
synaptic plasticity in the direct pathway, which facilitates the selection of motor plans. In 
contrast, low tonic dopamine levels and dopamine D2 receptors seem critical for synaptic 
plasticity in the indirect pathway, which prevents response execution (Apicella et al., 1992; 
Frank, 2005; Kravitz et al., 2010; Kravitz et al., 2012). Few studies have investigated the 
cognitive neurophysiology of the hyperdirect pathway, but histological evidence shows that 
this pathway expresses both D1 and D2 receptors (Flores et al., 1999). According to this 
model, the functional consequence of such organisation is that activation of the direct 
pathway and the indirect/hyperdirect pathways lead to inverse changes in the net output of the 
basal ganglia circuitry (for comprehensive reviews, see Blandini et al., 2000; Namu 
Tachnibana, Kaneda, Tokuno, & Takada, 2009; Ness & Kreitzer, 2014; Schroll & Hamker, 
2016), Importantly, evidence suggests that increases in dopamine facilitate long-term 
potentiation along the direct pathway, long-term depression along the indirect pathway, and 
long-term potentiation along the hyperdirect pathway (Schroll & Hamker, 2013; Schroll, 
Vitay, & Hamker, 2014). Thus, dopamine D1 receptors are thought to enhance 
neurotransmission along the hyperdirect pathway (Schroll, Vitay, & Hamker, 2014), with 
dopamine D2 receptors having the opposite effect. 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is caused by degeneration of the nigrostriatal dopaminergic 
pathway and the denervation of dopamine secreting neurons in substantia nigra pars 
compacta to the putamen, a nucleus of the striatum. The aetiology of this degeneration is not 
well understood, but since dopamine acts to facilitate the disinhibition required to perform an 
action, PD therefore manifests as slowness or absence of movement (bradykinesia and 
akinesia, respectively), or as movements that are smaller than intended (hypokinesia), or both 
of them. According to this model, dopaminergic denervation to striatum leads to a 
concatenation of events that results in increased activity of basal ganglia output nuclei which, 
in turn, results in increased inhibitory control over the thalamus and subsequent reduction of 
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thalamic glutamatergic output to motor cortex (Blandini et al., 2000). The mechanism of this 
effect is diminished activation of the direct pathway and diminished inhibition of the indirect 
pathway resulting in abnormal activation of GPi, which keep thalamic neurons inhibited. That 
is, PD pathophysiology results in a balance between direct and indirect pathways that favours 
the indirect pathway, and, therefore, elicits the bradykinesia, akinesia, and hypokinesia just 
described. This hypothesis has been supported by optogenetic activation of these pathways in 
animal models (Kravitz et al., 2010). The characteristic tremor associated with PD is the 
result of thalamic oscillatory patterns that are not directly relevant here and reviewed 
extensively elsewhere (e.g., Buzsáki et al., 1990; Haeri, Sarbax, & Gharibzadeh, 2005; Hua, 
et al., 2008; Lamarre, 1984; Lenz, Vitek, & DeLong, 1993; Zirh, Lenz, Reich, & Dougherty, 
1998). 
 
Figure 5. Basal ganglia pathway circuit topology. Reproduced from Beu et al. (2019). 
 
These empirical findings have been supported by computational simulations. Frank 
(2005; see also Frank, 2006), for example, investigated the effect of dopamine loss on the 
functions of direct and indirect pathways in a learning task. Based on the results of these 
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experiments, Frank demonstrated that phasic dopamine depletion strengthened the Stop 
process via the indirect pathways and weakened the Go process via the direct pathway (see 
also Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004). Using a reward prediction error paradigm, Schroll 
and colleagues (Schroll, Vitay, & Hamker, 2014) found that the direct pathway learned to 
facilitate rewarded responses, the hyperdirect pathway inhibited alternative responses, and the 
indirect pathway inhibited responses that were previously but no longer rewarded. On the 
basis of these findings, they concluded that dopamine loss resulted in the impairment of the 
direct pathway to learn the facilitation of rewarded responses (i.e., translating to quickening 
of response patterns after subsequent correct Go responses in Go/No-Go tasks). In another 
study, these authors used neurocomputational models that simulate the effect of dopamine 
loss in PD and they successfully simulated a range of empirical findings based on the 
assumption that dopamine loss results in reduced functioning of the direct and hyperdirect 
pathways potentially as a result of its effect on synaptic plasticity (Schroll, Vitay, & Hamker, 
2013). So, consistent with the assumptions based on Frank’s simulations, this response 
execution impairment is due to the indirect pathway actively inhibiting their execution. In 
sum, computational simulations suggest that the degeneration of midbrain dopamine neurons 
associated with PD cause both tonic and phasic dopamine loss that, in turn, impairs the 
execution of motor actions. Reduced levels of dopamine in basal ganglia cause changes in 
their functioning as a function of changes in neuronal excitability and synaptic plasticity. The 
proficiency of the excitatory direct pathway (striatum → GPi) decreases, whereas the 
effectiveness of the inhibitory indirect pathways (striatum → GPe → STN) increases (Gerfen 
et al., 2008; Shen, Flajolet, Greengard, & Surmeier, 2008). 
In many respects, the manifestation of HD is the opposite to that of PD (see Figure 6). 
HD is characterised by choreiform movements, that is, continuous and involuntary sporadic 
movement of the limbs and face (hyperkinesia). The cause of these are selective loss of 
GABAergic striatal efferents innervating GPe in the indirect pathway, which tips the balance 
between direct and indirect pathways in favour of the direct pathway (Berardelli et al., 1999; 
Milnerwood & Raymond, 2010). So, without the normal inhibitory influence of thalamus 
over basal ganglia output nuclei that is normally provided by the indirect pathway, neurons 
fire sporadically, resulting in the motor cortex executing uncontrolled motor programs 




Figure 6. Basal ganglia circuit topology under pathology of Parkinson’s disease (left panel) 
and Huntington’s disease (right panel). The red oval indicates the origin of pathology in each 
disease. 
Since both PD and HD affect dopaminergic function in the basal ganglia, depleting 
and increasing levels respectively, there are non-motor sequelae of the diseases which present 
in a broad range of cognitive and psychosocial disturbance (see de Boo et al., 1997; Duff, 
Beglinger, O’Rourke, Nopoulos, Paulson, & Paulsen, 2011; Lyle & Gottesman, 1977; Park & 
Stacy, 2009; Narayanan, Rodnitzky, & Uc, 2013; Tremblay, Achin, Macoir, & Monetta, 
2013). For current purposes, I will summarise only the RT and response inhibition literature. 
Experimental data in PD and HD populations consistently reveal deficits in response 
latency and response initiation in Simple RT tasks, but evidence is mixed for Choice RT. In 
HD, Choice RT appears to be slower than age-matched controls, but it is less clear whether 
this is the case in PD, with data pointing to marginally slower responses, potentially 
suggesting that the motor component, but not necessarily the choice component, is disturbed 
by the neuropathology of the disease (Cooper, Sagar, Tidswell, & Jordan, 1994; Fielding et 
al., 2012; Gauntlett-Gilbert & Brown, 1998; Jahanshahi, Brown, & Marsden, 1993; Martínez 
Pueyo et al., 2016; Pullman, Watts, Juncos, Chase, & Sanes, 1988). Deficits to motor control 
are hallmarks of both HD and PD, albeit at different stages of the disease, and in different 
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expressions. The similar deficit in RT despite opposite pathophysiology comes from the 
effect of that pathophysiology; in PD, there is bradykinesia (reflecting a difficulty in selecting 
and generating the correct motor command), whereas in HD there is interference in initiation 
of intended movement due to hyperkinesia (i.e., interference produced by the lack of 
suppression of incorrect motor commands), reflected in degeneration to the direct and 
indirect pathways, respectively. 
Even in the absence of impulsive disorders, Parkinson’s patients tend to exhibit poor 
response inhibition in both Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks compared to age-matched 
healthy controls, even when controlling for group differences in response time (Gauggel, 
Rieger, & Feghoff, 2003; Ye et al., 2014). This deficit is diminished when these patients are 
administered atomoxetine, a norepinephrine and dopamine agonist (Ye at al., 2015), but not 
citalopram, a serotonin uptake inhibitor, except in cases of severe disease (Ye et al., 2014). 
Interestingly, evidence from both EEG (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2005) and fMRI 
(Vriend et al., 2014) studies localise this deficit in frontal regions in Parkinson’s patients. 
Beste and colleagues (Beste, Willemssen, Saft, & Falkenstein, 2009), however, reported EEG 
data suggesting that PD-related deficits in response inhibition were also related to pre-motor 
inhibition failure, whereas those in HD were related to failures in error-monitoring systems 
(see also Beste, Saft, Andrich, Gold, & Falkenstein, 2007; Rao et al., 2014). Since both 
Parkinson’s and Huntington’s patients exhibit similar deficits in response inhibition on both 
Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks despite opposite pathophysiological and dopaminergic 
changes, one may wonder why that is the case (see Aron et al., 2003). The motor and 
cognitive distinction in response inhibition may be considered, given the conclusions of Beste 
and colleagues (i.e., pre-motor inhibition failures compared to error-monitoring system 
failures), but the degree to which these map onto behaviour is not known. They may indeed 
reflect underlying cognitive processes, but whether and how they impact behavioural 
performance is not yet known. The paucity of empirical investigation into mechanisms that 
may support response inhibition, such as proactive inhibition or post-error slowing, in these 
populations is problematic for this reason, and requires consideration. 
1.1.9 Convergent validity or a dual-mechanism of control? Limitations in the 
empirical literature 
The evidence summarised here strongly indicates a dual mechanism of control: A 
motor mechanism and a cognitive mechanism. This is sensical if we consider the 
circumstances under which we might be required to inhibit an action. For example, suppose 
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you are driving a car and as you near an intersection you notice the traffic light turn from 
green to amber, so you slow down and stop. When the light turns green, you engage your 
normal pattern of behaviour and remove your foot from the brake pedal and engage the 
accelerator. As you do so, another car drives through the intersection on the intersecting road. 
Clearly, your task is to rapidly stop your acceleration action to avoid collision. The measure 
of response inhibition yielded by Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks is, in fact, a measure of 
two distinct constructs. In the Go/No-Go task, the measure of response inhibition is the 
proportion of correctly withheld responses to No-Go stimuli (i.e., the complement proportion 
of errors of commission), and reflects the see, process and evaluate, and do not start course 
of action, which is an overall measure of response inhibition that is confounded by proactive 
inhibition, but does not contain a pure measure of reactive inhibition. In the Stop-Signal 
Task, the critical measure of inhibition is the time required for a participant to successfully 
stop a motor program (i.e., the SSRT), and reflects the see, process and evaluate, and stop 
doing course of action, which is in fact a measure of reactive inhibition, but not proactive 
inhibition or overall response inhibition. The operational definition of response inhibition in 
these tasks is, therefore, unsatisfactory and, as such, the convergent validity of these two 
tasks is questionable, and their outcome measures are not equivalent. 
Whether these two tasks assess the same underlying construct and engage the same 
neural systems is a critical concern, since the assumption that they do has theoretical and 
practical implications. Very little work has administered both tasks to one sample with the 
intention to assess the relationship between performance across tasks; however, many studies 
that administer one of the two main response inhibition tasks also administer a Simple RT 
task. Almost all such studies report positive correlations between measures of Simple RT and 
response time on response inhibition tasks. So, it seems that response initiation is to some 
large degree a similar process. To my knowledge, only two studies have investigated the 
neural correlates of performance on these two tasks, each of which report very little 
commonality between regions of activation with the exception of the insula cortex and the 
right inferior frontal gyrus (Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2011; Zheng, Oka, Bokura, & 
Yamaguchi, 2008), indicating some common locus required for stopping and for not going 
that may indicate a common process underlying each. In a large cross-species review of the 
neuropsychopharmacology of inhibition including data from both tasks, Eagle, Bari, and 
Robbins (2008) reported little overlap in the drugs that modulate performance, concluding 
that serotonin is implicated in Go/No-Go tasks, whereas SSRT in the Stop-Signal Task is 
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more sensitive to noradrenaline, providing further evidence that these tasks represent 
different forms of action inhibition. Both Littman and Takács (2017) and Verbruggen and 
Logan (2008) did not find any substantial correspondence between performance on Go/No- 
Go and Stop-Signal tasks in their respective measures of response inhibition, which further 
supports the hypothesis that proactive inhibition influences response inhibition and that 
response inhibition and reactive inhibition are not linearly related. In the only study of its 
kind investigating the latent structure of impulsivity using a battery of self-report and 
behavioural impulsivity and inhibition measures in a reasonably large (N = 1,252), cross- 
sectional sample, MacKillop and colleagues (MacKillop et al., 2016) found a small but 
significant correlation between performance on Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks (r = .22), 
but their measure of performance in the SST was not SSRT, as is common. They instead used 
the percentage of errors, which in most implementations of the SST is held constant at 50% 
by an adaptive staircase so as to derive the SSRT. In any case, in their three-factor model 
which best fit the data, performance on these two tasks loaded onto the same factor. 
However, the conclusions that we can draw from this model are limited owing to their 
outcome measure. 
Further to the above, despite broad use of these tasks, analysis of their data has been 
limited by the incomplete conceptualisation of response inhibition. Until around 2007 (e.g., 
Aron et al., 2007), proactive inhibition was not considered, despite the data structures yielded 
by response inhibition tasks allowing for the computation of post-error slowing (PES), a 
measure of proactive inhibition2. By way of illustration, take again the example of driving. 
Pure response inhibition is represented by the overall success rate of braking in time to avoid 
collision. This rate of success is independently influenced by reactive inhibition (a motor 
program) and proactive inhibition (a cognitive program). Reactive inhibition is represented 
by the speed with which your foot depresses the brake pedal, and could be measured by the 
minimum distance at which you see the intersecting car and are still able to brake in time. 
This is analogous to the SSRT measure of SSTs (if we assume that a linear relationship 
between distance and time, that is, that all intersecting cars travel at the same speed). 
Proactive inhibition, on the other hand, is represented by the additional time that you add to 
the duration between the light turning green and accelerating. Hypothetically, this process is 
influenced by two discrete processes: a remedial process and a predictive process, where the 
former would be engaged after having been in, or nearly avoided, a collision under similar 
 
2 The purity of a measure of PES in SSTs depends on the method for determining the Stop-Signal Delay. 
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circumstances, and the latter engaged based on the probability with which you expect an 
intersecting car to appear. Both processes may increase the delay between the light turning 
green and accelerating on subsequent occasions, which may increase the likelihood of a 
successful stop should an intersecting car appear again. Thus, such proactive inhibition 
mechanisms might contribute to successful response inhibition by engaging cognitive 
strategies that increase the likelihood of successfully stopping or preventing a response. The 
discreteness of proactive inhibition as two processes has not yet been described in the 
literature, but is introduced in the final chapter of this thesis. For the most part, we will deal 
only with the former of these process, what I refer to later as remedial proactive inhibition, 
but which is measured by PES in the Go/No-Go task. 
1.1.10 What a man does after he makes an error 
 
This dual mechanism of control, reactive and proactive inhibition, seems to be what 
Rabbitt (1966) was referring to when he asked what a man does after he makes an error. 
Despite his anthypophora that men (and presumably also women) slow down after an error, 
little serious empirical investigation has been devoted to the cognitive processing, the neural 
circuitry, or the psychometric properties that lead to and constitute PES; that is, the 
neurocognitive architecture of proactive inhibition. 
Fewer than one in one thousand papers investigating response inhibition have 
considered the critical influence that proactive inhibition plays in its success (Beu, 2018). In 
those few studies, response patterns tend to follow the course illustrated in Figure 7. Despite 
the empirical regularity of PES, only a few theoretical accounts have been put forward to 
explain the phenomenon (see Dutilh et al., 2012a, 2012b). These accounts rely on different 
assumptions and make different predictions about post-error accuracy, some assuming the 
probability of error decreases after an error with PES (Laming, 1968, 1979b), and others 
assuming no change, or even an increased probability of error (Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977), the 
latter prediction is most commonly confirmed (e.g., Hajcak & Simons, 2008; Hajcak et al., 
2003). Since the conception of these accounts, evidence remains mixed as to whether post- 
error behavioural adjustments exert any effect whatsoever on post-error accuracy, potentially 
because these two accounts in particular were constructed using data from Choice RT tasks, 
not response inhibition tasks, in which errors reflected an error in choice or in discrimination 
rather than a failure to inhibit a response, whereas more recent studies have focused on 




Figure 7. A typical pattern of response behaviour surrounding an error. Shading highlights 
trials used to compute PES 
Decreases in activity in distractor-encoding brain areas, and increases in activity in 
task-relevant brain areas have been observed following an error, but the magnitude of such 
modulations do not appear to be correlated either with PES or with increased accuracy in 
subsequent No-Go or Stop trials. Likewise, downregulation of activity in the motor system 
and synchronisation of mid-frontal theta power are also observed, which are thought to 
harmonise intention programs with action programs (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011). 
There are five competing hypothetical accounts of PES, each with a small amount of 
evidence in its support (Dutilh et al., 2012b); see also Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011). The 
first was proposed by Laming (1968, 1979b), as well as Rabbitt and Rodgers (1977), which 
claims that people become negatively biased against the response option that was just 
executed in error. This account applies less in response inhibition tasks because it implies that 
an error facilitates response alternations and hinders response repetitions, which is more 
applicable to Choice RT tasks. Laming (1968, 1979a) offered an alternative account 
suggesting that, following an error, the onset of evidence accumulation is more precisely 
regulated. Here, Laming suggested that people may start to sample stimulus-unrelated 
information from the display before the stimulus is presented, which prompts variability in 
the starting point of the accumulation process, and, therefore, an artificial bias toward one 
response boundary or the other. This is somewhat similar to an account proposed by Rabbit 
and Rodgers (1977), according to which, errors delay the start of evidence accumulation due 
** 
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to the emotional consequences of an error. The former of these two accounts suggests that 
early evidence accumulation is more tightly regulated to control the start point of the 
diffusion process once the stimulus is presented, whereas the latter suggests that evidence 
accumulation does not begin until sometime after stimulus presentation to overcome 
disappointment or frustration. In the fourth account, Notebaert and colleagues (Notebaert et 
al., 2009) drew on the oddball effect to inform an orienting account which supposed that the 
commission of an error is usually infrequent, and as such, the associated surprise distracts 
participants from commencing processing of the subsequent stimulus (they also observed 
post-correct slowing when correct responses were more rare than errors). On the basis of this 
assumption, they compared RTs under two conditions which should elicit oddball effects: 
infrequent errors and frequent correct responses, where PES was expected and observed; and, 
frequent errors and infrequent correct responses, where slowing was observed after correct 
responses. These results indicate that PES may not be post-error reflection, but rather an 
orienting response to an infrequent, unexpected (oddball) event. To reach this conclusion, 
though, the authors used an unsatisfactory method for deriving PES that has since been 
discarded. Instead of taking the difference between the average of four correct Go trials 
before an error and four correct Go trials after an error to reflect PES, as suggested and 
validated by Dutilh and colleagues (Dutilh et al., 2012a), Notebaert et al., (2009) used the 
difference between the average of post-correct Go trials and post-error Go trials, which does 
not take into account fluctuations in responding across the task, or the effect of pre-error 
trials, which are generally quicker than average Go trials. In any case, to my knowledge there 
is no other data supporting the claim that PES only occurs when errors are rare. The fifth 
account has considerably more empirical support than the previous four accounts, and it 
claims that participants adjust the separation of their response boundaries such that more 
evidence is required to reach decision threshold (i.e., increasing the caution associated with a 
response; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Brewer & Smith, 1989; Cohen, 
Botvinick, & Carter, 2000; Fitts, 1966; Smith & Brewer, 1995; Vickers & Lee, 1998). An 
alternative explanation of this account, but consistent with its underlying logic, is that PES is 
explained in terms of decreased motor activity in the response priming unit, which results in 
increased motor threshold. This account is supported by fMRI evidence showing reduced 
activity in motor areas in post-error trials (King et al., 2010), which is negatively correlated 
with PES (Danielmeier et al., 2011). The intuitiveness of this account is so attractive that it is 
often accepted at face value. 
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Dutilh and colleagues (2012b) used drift-diffusion models (DDMs) to compare how 
well these accounts fit empirical data in a lexical decision making task. Their results point 
toward adaptive response boundary separation as the cause of quickening with successive 
correct responses because participants assume, since their response was correct, that their 
boundary separation was too conservative and they therefore shift them closer together. Their 
models also support the inverse: that errors indicate to participants that their boundary 
separations are too liberal and should be shifted farther apart. According to drift-diffusion 
logic, this leads to fewer errors but also causes slower responding, which is consistent with 
PES. Since these models are theoretical, it is important to gather empirical evidence that 
supports, or at least converges on, these conclusions, or evidence that PES has a neural 
substrate. 
Making an error is, naturally, an emotionally uncomfortable experience. Hajcak, 
McDonald, and Simons (2003) reported that errors in a two-choice discrimination task were 
associated with increased galvanic skin response (i.e., a momentary increase in skin 
conductance that indicates sweating), but also that PES was independently associated with 
the sweat response and that it increased in a linear relationship with the magnitude with 
which PES was engaged, but not with any changes to heart rate fluctuations. These authors 
reported that a late event-related potential (ERP) component, the error positivity Pe, in EEG 
correlated significantly with both presence and magnitude of PES, but that the error-related 
negative ERN did not (Hajcak, MacDonald, & Simons, 2003). What this means, though, is 
not known; source localisation allows us to assume that the neural generator for PES is the 
same as the neural generator for the Pe, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), but does not 
allow us to make any inferences about its underlying cognitive processes. 
In some cases, imaging techniques have been used to investigate PES (e.g., Li, 
Huang, Constable, & Sinha, 2006), but due to the temporal lag of the haemodynamic 
response, meaningful conclusions about basal ganglia activity can only be drawn about 
overall response processes. On the other hand, proactive adjustments in PES can be localised 
to frontal regions using fMRI in rats (Narayanan & Laubach, 2008) and humans (e.g., 
Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; Li, Huang, Yan, & 
Paliwal, 2008) localising it to ventrolateral prefrontal, posterior medial, and dorsomedial 
prefrontal regions. Other accounts suggest that parietal cortex is involved in PES (Purcell & 
Kiani, 2015), but the authors used a motion discrimination task which is known to recruit 
parietal and temporal regions in its processing (Cornette et al., 1998), so these conclusions 
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should be interpreted with caution since activation associated with stimulus processing and 
task demands could be confounded with the reactive process itself. 
It has been well-documented that both Parkinson’s and Huntington’s patients have 
manifest deficits to response inhibition, despite inverse dopaminergic dysfunction. It is 
known that dopamine is responsible both for movement and for the inhibition of movement 
as a function of pathway activation. So, one might wonder why this is the case. Using PD and 
HD as a model for the two constituent elements of response inhibition, since overall response 
inhibition is consistent, we should focus on either reactive or proactive inhibition. Much of 
the data reported above suggests a general compatibility between reactive processes, and a 
general compatibility between overall inhibitory processes, leaving us with proactive 
processes, PES. Given its novelty in the empirical endeavour, there is little investigation into 
PES even in healthy populations, let alone pathological populations. Nevertheless, two 
elegant studies have investigated PES in each of these disease populations. 
In a population of Parkinson’s patients, Siegert and colleagues (Siegert et al., 2014) 
administered an Eriksen-Flanker task (a task somewhat analogous to classical response 
inhibition tasks) both on and off levodopa treatment (L-Dopa, a medication that temporarily 
increases dopamine in the brain) and on and off deep brain stimulation (DBS to the 
subthalamic nucleus, STN, which stimulates the STN3 in a manner consistent with healthy 
functioning). They found that the Pe component (an ERP component that was operationalised 
as an error signal, or error recognition) was not conveyed to the STN off medication and so 
no PES was engaged; whereas, on the other hand, on medication, Pe was detected by the STN 
and thus PES was engaged (i.e., activity in STN increased following Pe on medication but not 
off medication, and this post-Pe STN activation predicted PES). This is a compelling case 
against previous imaging studies implicating only frontal regions in recruiting PES, further 
strengthened by Chevrier and Chachar’s (2010) findings that PES increased activity in the 
STN, which in turn deactivates the requisite behavioural adjustments in structures that exert 
control over dopamine output. In another experiment with Huntington’s patients, RT data 
showed that premanifest and at-risk of HD patients did not engage PES, whereas early 






3 This account of DBS to the STN is contentious. Frank et al. (Frank, Samanta, Moustafa, & Sherman, 
2007) found that choices became more impulsive under DBS because it may impair STN functioning. 
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1.2 Novel contributions 
Since the downstream effect of STN in the direct and indirect pathways are 
differentially affected by PD and HD, and appears to be involved in PES, then there is a clear 
path toward greater understanding of these disorders. It is known that very subtle changes to 
cognitive functions can long precede motor and gross cognitive symptoms such as memory 
deficits (for example, see Grady, 2012; Harada, Natelson Love, & Triebel, 2014; Hedden & 
Gabrieli, 2004; Kluger et al., 1997), so, establishing such changes may provide critically 
important clinical outcomes. It is important here to use empirical and theoretical methods to 
converge on practicable outcomes. 
Since the neurochemistry of response inhibition has largely only been investigated 
using pharmacological manipulations and indirectly in studies of pathological populations, 
there is little evidence of the genetic architecture of response inhibition overall, and less so of 
the genetic architecture of reactive and proactive processes. Determining whether these 
processes can be disambiguated using genotype associated studies is an accessible starting 
point which would allow inferences to be made not only about the biology of these processes, 
but also to be made about isolating the source of deficits to overall response inhibition under 
pathological conditions to the process of inhibition that is disturbed. This approach addresses 
an important limitation in extant literature that fails to separate these two contributory 
processes to overall inhibition. Using imaging techniques, namely, EEG, we might be able to 
build on genetic association analyses by parsing the cognitive architecture of reactive and 
proactive processes and, in so doing, allow us to think about the role of those cognitive 
processes in supporting successful inhibition. Some of the evidence reviewed above (and 
further reviewed in Chapter 3) described neural correlates and anatomical structures that 
support overall inhibition, but they fail to categorise them as a function of the reactive and 
proactive process. If, for instance, proactive processes are poorer in young people and 
reactive processes are poorer in older people, we might observe similar task performance 
(provided that proactive and reactive processes equally contribute to inhibition) and similar 
neural activation. But if we are interested in precisely describing the mechanisms underlying 
these processes, or if we are interested in intervening to improve them where they need 
improvement, we need to establish the separate neural and genetic correlates of each 
individually. These two approaches – a genetic approach and an EEG approach – might allow 
us to parse the neurocognitive architecture of proactive inhibition and its role in response 
inhibition. But alone they cannot tell us whether it is a suitable candidate for intervention. 
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Neurostimulation techniques allow us to investigate this and might also provide answers to a 
critical question left open in the literature: which basal ganglia pathway does proactive 
inhibition rely on? Since clinical neurologists are quite interested in neurostimulation 
techniques, those motor and cognitive functions that are suitable for treatment should be 
highlighted. 
Whether or not response inhibition is a suitable candidate for such treatments is not yet 
known principally because of the empirical limitations in describing its processes. If we are 
able to modulate one or both of its processes, then we allow clinical work to refocus its 
attention on appropriate clinical targets. These three investigations rely on valid and reliable 
measurement of proactive processes, which can be inferred from performance on the 
Sustained Attention to Response Task. However, this task has limitations when administered 
to pathological populations most affected by disturbances to response inhibition. It is 
therefore important to evaluate various tasks that could be used with people in such 
populations to ensure valid and reliable measurements of reactive and proactive response 
inhibition. 
This thesis consists of four papers addressing the four lines of investigation just 
described. The first three papers are experimental investigations into the substrate of PES 
using various approaches. Taken together, it is expected that the results yielded by these 
experiments will contribute important findings to the clinical literature on the behavioural and 
cognitive dysregulation that is apparent in dopaminergic pathology, specifically in diseases 
and disorders of that system. Furthermore, the papers will provide evidence in favour of 
differential roles of basal ganglia pathways supporting PES, and the cognitive architecture of 
that support. By including measures of intelligence, alongside age and genetic approaches, 
we are uniquely able to consider the adaptive role of PES across the lifespan, and can make 
inferences about the extent to which it operates under top-down control. That is, if there are 
predictable changes in PES based on age and intelligence that are mediated in some way by 
dopaminergic function, we may therefore be better able to understand the changes to PES, or 
indeed the absence of changes to PES, in pathological populations. The fourth paper presents 
a novel task to the field of response inhibition. It provides an argument for its robustness 
grounded in theory, presents data that validates its rigour in a large sample, and puts forth an 
argument for multiple types of proactive inhibition based on its results. Essentially, the novel 
experiments conducted here help us to parse the architecture of response inhibition, each of 
which provide important clinical outcomes, advances for the theoretical cognitive sciences, 
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and considerations for cognitive decline, genetic therapies, early development, and 









The aim of this thesis is to investigate the properties of post-error slowing: To identify 
it, to verify whether it is separable from reactive inhibition, to test whether it is underpinned 
by some biological substrate that may be divergent from reactive inhibition and moderated by 
non-modifiable factors, to situate it in the current neuroanatomical model of psychomotor 
regulation, and to clarify its cognitive architecture. Since it is very well-established that 
dopamine is central to movement and motor regulation, it is logical to use the dopaminergic 
system as a point from which to start the investigation: can we use differences in 
dopaminergic neurotransmission between individuals to account for performance or to 
disambiguate reactive and proactive processes? Since the basal ganglia represent the primary 
locus of motor control and dopaminergic activity in the brain, this provides us with an 
opportunity not only to attempt to associate genetic variation with the components of 
response inhibition, but also to begin to postulate on an emerging debate about whether PES 
originates in motor, prefrontal, or subcortical regions, and whether it is supported by different 
basal ganglia pathways than reactive inhibition. 
Given the evidence reviewed below, we start with the assumption that proactive 
inhibition relies to some degree on some basal ganglia circuitry, much like reactive 
inhibition. There is conflicting evidence as to whether reactive and proactive inhibition rely 
on different pathways, and in particular, on which. Most previous approaches have 
investigated this question indirectly and using data which is unable to discretise the inhibitory 
processes. In the following study, then, we attempt to home in on the uniqueness of proactive 
inhibition to the response inhibition network using a genetic association approach. In taking a 
genetic approach, we can indirectly probe subcortical regions of the brain, which are 
probably more reliably involved in the processes that we are attempting to observe. 
Imaging techniques are limited in their ability to distinguish activity in these pathways 
due to their spatial complexity and density, so a genetic association approach might 
complement these techniques. A possible way to determine which pathway is involved in 
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proactive inhibition is to investigate the involvement of specific dopamine receptors. The 
activity of the three pathways is differentially modulated by dopamine acting upon dopamine 
D1 and D2 receptors. The direct pathway preferentially expresses dopamine D1 receptors and 
the indirect pathway expresses dopamine D2 receptors (Perreault, Hasbi, O’Dowd, & George, 
2011). Furthermore, synaptic plasticity in the direct and indirect pathways has been shown to 
depend on the activity of dopamine D1 and D2 receptors, respectively, and on tonic 
dopamine levels (Shen, Flajolet, Greengard, & Surmeier, 2008). High tonic dopamine levels 
and dopamine D1 receptors seem critical for synaptic plasticity in the direct pathway, which 
facilitates the selection of motor plans. In contrast, low tonic dopamine levels and dopamine 
D2 receptors seem critical for synaptic plasticity in the indirect pathway, which prevents 
response execution (Apicella, Scarnati, Ljunberg, & Schultz, 1992; Frank, 2005; Kravitz et 
al., 2010; Kravitz, Tye, & Kreitzer, 2012). Finally, neurotransmission along the hyperdirect 
pathway relies on dopamine D1, rather than D2, receptors. 
In such an approach, it is apropos to identify single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 
that could allow us to discretise the functional cognitive architecture by associating individual 
differences in performance on the response inhibition subprocesses with genetic differences 
that can differentiate basal ganglia pathway preferential activity. For this reason, we focused 
on two dopaminergic genes (the dopamine D1 receptor gene, DRD1, and the dopamine D2 
receptor gene, DRD2) because dopamine allows the unique ability to distinguish between 
activity in the hyperdirect and direct pathways versus the indirect pathway. 
The rationale of this design is that if we observe differences in a measure of proactive 
inhibition, PES, in individuals who carry more A alleles in the DRD1 SNP rs686 (associated 
with increases DRD1 expression) and more T alleles in the DRD2 SNP rs1800497 
(associated with increased dopamine D2 receptor density), then we could conclude that PES 
is supported by greater dopamine D1-receptor neurotransmission and reduced dopamine D2- 
receptor neurotransmission, which would indicate a reliance on the direct and/or hyperdirect 
pathway. 
So, the primary aim of this paper is largely exploratory. It is to attempt to use 
individual differences in genetic expression and behavioural performance on the SART to 
map proactive inhibition to the basal ganglia pathway that subserves it. PES probably confers 
a dynamic, adaptive advantage to response inhibition in the SART, but it is not clear why. 
Since there has been so little empirical investigation into PES and proactive processes of 
inhibition, and that response inhibition seems to be greatly affected by such a diverse range of 
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pathologies, we thought it pertinent to explore the possibility that PES is differentially 
expressed between people who vary on other important factors, such as age and intelligence, 
which may otherwise negatively impact the reactive inhibition process. That is to suggest that 
PES may be a compensatory tactic in individuals with a diminished capability to invoke 
reactive inhibition (e.g., the elderly and those with lower scores on fluid intelligence tests), 
and that genetic predispositions that increase the likelihood of successfully engaging 
proactive inhibition might therefore have a stronger effect in these individuals. Other 
populations with a known diminished capability to invoke response inhibition are those with 
diseases and dysfunctions associated with the dopaminergic system. As such, a potential 
positive development that may stem from mapping the processes of response inhibition to 
basal ganglia pathways is in the clinical domain. I previously described the pathological 
dopaminergic unbalance in Parkinson’s and Huntington’s Diseases, in each of which 
response inhibition is negatively affected, and, since the physiological structure of the basal 
ganglia pathways can to some degree be separated by the role that dopamine has in each, then 
elucidating the pathway on which reactive and proactive inhibition rely, then we provide a 
theoretical and conceptual framework from which to better investigate their pathological 
dysfunction and trajectory. It is currently unclear what element of response inhibition, or 
where in the stopping and inhibiting unwanted physical movement, such dysfunction arises. 
Therefore, evidence that, for instance, proactive inhibition relies on the direct or hyperdirect 
pathway, and reactive inhibition relies on the indirect pathway, is useful in order to predict 
symptomatic trajectory or present early psychometric markers of neurocognitive decline since 
having an understanding of the physiological, neurochemical, and psychometric disturbances 
provides a more detailed conceptual model of disease-related disturbances. 
If we are able to identify the structural anatomy that underpins proactive inhibition, 
the next step is to articulate its cognitive structure. Additionally, if our data support the 
hypothesis that reactive and proactive inhibition rely on separate neural substrates, then it is 
logical to apply this to the clinical applications of the field. Taking again the example of 
Parkinson’s Disease, a common treatment of which is neurostimulation, our data may point 
toward the capacity for neurostimulaltion to modulate not only motor control, but also the 
extent to which those deficits in motor control are the result of cognitive deficits in some 
way, which might provide benefits to patients with other dopaminergic disorders of the basal 
ganglia, such as Huntington’s Disease. 
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The ability to inhibit a prepared emotional or motor action is difficult but critical to 
everyday functioning. It is well-established that response inhibition relies on the 
dopaminergic system in the basal ganglia. However, response inhibition is often measured 
imprecisely due to a process which slows our responses and increases subsequent inhibition 
success known as proactive inhibition. As the role of the dopamine system in proactive 
inhibition is unclear, we investigated the contribution of dopaminergic genes to proactive 
inhibition. We operationalised proactive inhibition as slower responses after failures to inhibit 
a response in a Go/No-Go paradigm and investigated its relationship to rs686/A at DRD1 
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(associated with increased gene expression) and rs1800497/T at DRD2 (associated with 
reduced D2 receptor availability). Even though our sample (N = 264) was relatively young 
(18-40 years), we found that proactive inhibition improves the ability to withhold erroneous 
responses in older participants (p = .002) and those with lower fluid intelligence scores (p 
< .001), indicating that proactive inhibition is likely a naturally-occurring compensatory 
mechanism. Critically, we found that a polygenic risk score consisting of the number of rs686 
A and rs1800497 T alleles predicts higher engagement of proactive inhibition (p = .040), 
even after controlling for age (p = .011). Furthermore, age seemed to magnify these genetic 
effects (p < .001). This suggests that the extent to which proactive inhibition is engaged 
depends on increased dopamine D1 and decreased D2 neurotransmission. These results 





We often find ourselves in a circumstance in which we should attempt to 
countermand a planned motoric action in response to altered environmental demands. We 
might be stopped at a red light, and, when the light turns green and we disengage our brake to 
continue, a speeding car enters the intersection without warning – it is imperative that we 
rapidly interrupt our habitual ‘go’ response to avoid collision. This is response inhibition. Our 
relative success rate of this process contributes to perhaps every domain of our lives. 
Response inhibition mediates interpersonal (Hoaken, Shaugnessy, & Pihl, 2003; Romer et al., 
2009), educational (Spinella & Miley, 2003), financial (Moffitt et al., 2011), and health 
(Friedman, 2000) outcomes, among many others, including intelligence (Bari & Robbins, 
2013; Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2007; Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff, 2003; 
Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997). 
Deficits in one or more of the three concatenated cognitive and/or psychomotor 
processes underlying response inhibition (action selection, generation, and inhibition) 
characterise many psychiatric disorders (e.g., abnormal executive functioning and emotional 
dysregulation (Casey et al., 1997), addiction (Nigg et al., 2006), schizophrenia (Kiehl, Smith, 
Hare, & Liddle, 2000), and motor disorders, such as Parkinsonism (Taylor, Saint-Cyr, & 
Lang, 1986) and Huntingtonism (Lawrence et al., 1996)). This relationship is so well- 
characterised in some disorders that such disturbances constitute an endophenotype (Aron & 
Poldrack, 2005). Although regularly enacted (or at least attempted), and the subject of 
extensive investigation, this complex process remains puzzling. Given the varying views on 
what response inhibition is, and its disputed ecological validity (Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 
2010), it is unsurprising that we have not reached a consensus on its underlying cognitive 
architecture. This is likely due to inconsistent discretisation and nomenclature of its 
properties, the many task paradigms administered to measure it, and idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the resultant data (Criaud & Boulinguez, 2013; Evenden, 1999; Lowe, 1979; 
Mostofsky et al., 2003; Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008; Parker & Bagby, 1997; Perry & 
Hodges, 1999; Stein, Hollander, & Liebowitz, 1993). By nature, the measurement of response 
inhibition is not straightforward; inhibition is, by definition, the absence of a measurable 
variable. 
These inconsistent findings can be explained further as a consequence of successful 
response inhibition being driven not by one global stopping process, but by at least two 
discrete ones: reactive inhibition and proactive inhibition (Aron et al., 2007). Reactive 
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inhibition can be thought of as the capacity to withhold a prepotent motor response when it is 
no longer appropriate, and is thought to occur when the neural signal encoding ‘stop’ 
information reaches the thalamus before the motor response is initiated (Aron, 2011). 
Conversely, proactive inhibition is an adaptive cognitive strategy observed in most healthy 
people that is partially accounted for by the evaluative processes that take place following an 
error, or by uncertainty in the likelihood of encountering a need to rapidly disengage a motor 
program in the near future (Aron, 2011). One such strategy is post-error slowing (PES), 
whereby individuals slow down their response time (RT) following experience with failed 
inhibition. 
In the Go/No-Go paradigm (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), 
participants respond to frequent ‘Go’ stimuli and attempt to inhibit their response to 
infrequent ‘No-Go’ stimuli. In this task, the measure of response inhibition is the complement 
proportion of errors of commission (i.e., failures to inhibit a response to No-Go stimuli); 
however, successful reactive inhibition (the ability to stop a response) is plausibly enhanced 
by proactive inhibition, or PES (Dutilh et al., 2012a). That is, post-error slowing in 
responding allows a greater amount of time to accumulate relevant information about the next 
stimulus, and thus reduces the likelihood of future commission errors on No-Go trials. Dutilh 
et al. (2012b) used a drift-diffusion model to investigate the nature of PES by mapping the 
possible outcome parameters of the model neatly onto explanations proposed to account for 
PES (e.g., reduced drift rate logically maps onto distracted attention; for full description see 
(Dutilh et al., 2012b)), thus providing support for the position that PES is the result of 
increased response caution. These authors derived their measure of PES by comparing 
reaction times (RTs) from trials following correct inhibition to RTs from trials following an 
error, which does not account for established fluctuations in response patterns across such 
tasks if the distribution of errors is not constant across the task (Dutilh et al., 2012a), and their 
word/non-word lexical discrimination task included an equal number of correct and error 
trials, thereby yielding a relatively low proportion of errors (10.8%). Despite these potential 
limitations, this evidence accumulation interpretation is thought to shift the decision threshold 
for executing a response, such that more information, and thus more time, is required to 
decide to respond to subsequent stimuli (Schiffler, Bengtsson, & Lundqvist, 2017; Ullsperger 
& Danielmeier, 2016). Such an interpretation is consistent with theory, but deserves further 
investigation. 
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Furthermore, it is possible that proactive inhibition might be a compensatory 
mechanism engaged when reactive inhibition is inefficient. There is some evidence that 
response inhibition is associated with intelligence (Lee, Lo, Li, Sung, & Juan, 2015), and that 
this relationship is mediated by age (Duan & Shi, 2011; Lee et al., 2015), but it is not 
conclusive due to limitations already described here. That is, it is plausible that proactive 
inhibition masks the true nature of the effect that age may have in response inhibition. If 
proactive inhibition is a compensatory mechanism, it may be differentially employed by 
different groups. For example, given the strong relationship between age and both dopamine 
and intelligence, older individuals may preferentially express proactive processes compared 
to younger individuals as a result of their limited capacity to overtly withhold a response (i.e., 
a limited capacity to engage reactive inhibition). 
Neuropharmacological studies in both animals and humans support the role of 
dopamine in inhibitory control; however, attempts to synthesise these studies are similarly 
encumbered by what seems to be a reductive aim to formulate a unified aetiology for the 
pathogenesis of impulsive disorders. Vaidya and colleagues (Vaidya et al., 1998) 
demonstrated that administration of methylphenidate, a dopamine reuptake inhibitor, to 
humans reduces error rate in a Go/No-Go task; however, it is unclear whether this reduction 
may be attributable to enhancements in proactive processes. In the Stop-Signal Task, another 
paradigm used to measure response inhibition, both methylphenidate and 
dextroamphetamine, another dopamine reuptake inhibitor, have improved performance under 
some conditions in animals and humans (Chamberlain et al., 2006; Eagle & Robbins, 2003; 
Nandam et al., 2011), but animal models seem to suggest that this positive effect is only 
observed in those with poorer baseline performance (Eagle, Tufft, Goodchild, & Robbins, 
2007; Feola, de Wit, & Richards, 2000). Such findings have been replicated in delay 
discounting procedures in both animals and humans (Floresco, Tse, & Ghods-Sharifi, 2008; 
Isles, Himbu, & Wilkinson, 2003; van Gaalen. Van Koten, Schoffelmeer, & Vanderschuren, 
2006; Wade, de Wit, & Richards, 2000), but they too are not consistent (Helms, Reeves, & 
Mitchell, 2006; Slezak & Anderson, 2009; Wooters & Bardo, 2011; for a review, see Dalley 
& Roiser, 2012). Inferences about the D1- or D2-like families of dopamine receptors cannot 
be made based on these findings, because both pharmacological interventions introduced here 
operate on the dopamine transporter and not the receptor (Seeman & Madras, 2002; Volkow 
et al., 2001). Few studies have administered drugs that operate on the receptor. Of these 
exceptions, conclusions remain limited because many of the drug interventions administered, 
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such as cabergoline, have a high affinity for the full range of dopamine receptor sub-types, as 
well as for several serotonergic receptor types, which have a known, but not well-described, 
role in response inhibition (Dalley & Roiser, 2012). Thus, disentangling these findings 
remains a priority. 
The pharmacological studies reviewed above nevertheless suggest that successful 
response inhibition relies on the dopamine system, and it is now well known that it 
specifically relies on the integrity of information transmission between basal ganglia 
structures and stimulus-specific cortical regions (Graybiel, 2000; 2005). According to the 
classical model of basal ganglia function, motor commands generated by the frontal cortex 
are relayed to the thalamus via basal ganglia structures. The thalamus is under the influence 
of basal ganglia, whose function is to facilitate or constrain motor commands. Because the 
resting state of the thalamus is one of tonic inhibition from the internal segment of globus 
pallidus, disinhibition is required to produce movement. Within this circuit (see Figure 8), a 
disinhibitory ‘direct’ pathway favours the selection of a motor command generated by the 
frontal cortex, and an inhibitory ‘indirect’ pathway suppresses the execution of motor 
commands generated by the frontal cortex (Berretta, Parthasarathy, & Graybiel, 1997; 
Calabresi, Picconi, Tozzi, Ghiglieri, & Di Filippo, 2014; DeLong & Wichmann, 2007; 
Jahanshahi, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015b; Tekin & Cummings, 2002). The notion that 
the direct and indirect pathways exert opposing influences on action selection is supported by 
recent animal studies (Albin, Young, & Penney, 1989; Bateup et al., 2010; DeLong, 1990; 
Freeze, Kravitz, Hammack, Berke, & Kretzer, 2013; Kravitz et al., 2010). Recent research 
has identified a third pathway directly linking the prefrontal cortex to the subthalamic nucleus 
that inhibits the thalamus and suppresses motor commands (Meyer & Bucci, 2016; Nambu, 
2004; 2005; Nambu et al., 2000; Nambu, Tokuno, & Takada, 2002). Because it bypasses the 




Figure 8. Basal Ganglia network topology, indicating dopamine- receptor expression and 
neurotransmitter affinity. The connections linking substantia nigra (pars reticulata and pars 
compacta) to striatum denoted with a solid black line are thought to subtend a regulatory 
function regardless of which pathway is activated, so are not categorised. Dopaminergic 
innervation from pars compacta modulates striatal output by acting on D1 receptors 
(stimulation of direct pathway) or D2 receptors (inhibition of indirect pathway). 
Converging evidence from imaging studies generally supports the hypothesis that 
reactive inhibition is implemented by the hyperdirect pathway (Erika-Florence, Leech, & 
Hampshire, 2014; but see Dunovan, Lynch, Molesworth, & Verstynen, 2015; Jahanshahi et 
al., 2015b), but there is no consensus on the role of the basal ganglia in proactive inhibition, 
with some theorising that it relies on the direct and/or indirect pathways (Forstmann et al., 
2008; Majid et al., 2013; Smittenaar, Guitart-Masip, Lutti, & Dolan, 2013; Zandbelt & Vink, 
2010), others on the hyperdirect pathway (Jahanshahi, Obeso, Baunez, Alegre, & Krack, 
2015a; Schmidt, Leventhal, Mallet, Chen, & Berke, 2013), and even some suggesting it relies 
on both the indirect and hyperdirect pathways (Hikosaka & Isoda, 2010; Isoda & Hikosaka, 
2007); however, imaging techniques are limited in spatial resolution. Given that the processes 
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required for response inhibition occur in spatially complex, and interconnected subcortical 
loops, data using different techniques is required (Criaud & Boulinguez, 2013). Based on data 
derived from psychiatric studies in which Parkinson’s patients were administered deep-brain 
stimulation to the subthalamic nucleus, which increases its inhibitory hold over the thalamus, 
it was hypothesised that both reactive and proactive inhibition are mediated by the 
hyperdirect pathway (Frank, Samanta, Moustafa, & Sherman, 2007). Further support for this 
hypothesis was provided by findings that subthalamic nucleus activity in the β band is 
correlated with proactive inhibition (Benis et al., 2014). A comprehensive review (Aron, 
2011) indicated that the hyperdirect pathway is involved in reactive inhibition, whereas 
proactive inhibition likely requires either the direct or indirect pathway. However, others 
(Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2011; Chen et 
al., 2010; Jahfari et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2010; Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2010) have not 
unequivocally come to these same conclusions. 
A possible way to determine which pathway is involved in proactive inhibition is to 
investigate the involvement of specific dopamine receptors. The activity of the three 
pathways is differentially modulated by dopamine acting upon dopamine D1 and D2 
receptors (see Figure 8). Although a small subpopulation of striatal medium spiny neurons 
contains both D1-type and D2-type mRNA, it is known that the direct pathway preferentially 
expresses dopamine D1 receptors and the indirect pathway expresses dopamine D2 receptors 
(Perreault et al., 2011). Furthermore, synaptic plasticity in the direct and indirect pathways 
has been shown to depend on the activity of dopamine D1 and D2 receptors, respectively, and 
on tonic dopamine levels (Shen et al., 2008). High tonic dopamine levels and dopamine D1 
receptors seem critical for synaptic plasticity in the direct pathway, which facilitates the 
selection of motor plans. In contrast, low tonic dopamine levels and dopamine D2 receptors 
seem critical for synaptic plasticity in the indirect pathway, which prevents response 
execution (Apicella et al., 1992; Frank, 2005; Kravitz et al., 2010; Kravitz et al., 2012). 
Few studies have investigated the cognitive neurophysiology of the hyperdirect 
pathway, but histological evidence shows that this pathway expresses both D1 and D2 
receptors (Flores et al., 1999). Importantly, evidence suggests that increases in dopamine 
facilitate long-term potentiation along the direct pathway, long-term depression along the 
indirect pathway, and long-term potentiation along the hyperdirect pathway (Schroll & 
Hamker, 2013; Schroll, Vitay, & Hamker, 2014). Thus, dopamine D1 receptors are thought to 
enhance neurotransmission along the hyperdirect pathway (Schroll, Vitay, & Hamker, 2014), 
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with dopamine D2 receptors having the opposite effect. Given that the indirect pathway relies 
on D2-mediated neurotransmission whereas the hyperdirect pathway relies on D1-mediated 
transmission, one would expect that genetically-determined individual differences in 
expression of the two genes that code for these receptors, DRD1 and DRD2, might help us 
understand which type of receptor is most likely involved in proactive inhibition, and 
therefore shed light on which basal ganglia pathway is engaged in proactive inhibition. 
Here we use this genetic approach to investigate whether proactive inhibition is more 
likely to involve dopamine D1 or D2 receptors. We do so by investigating the relationship 
between individual differences in behavioural proactive inhibition and single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) associated with DRD1 and DRD2 expression (see Table 1). To our 
knowledge, no previous studies have investigated the magnitude of the polygenic relationship 
between D1 and D2 receptors on human proactive inhibition. 
 
Table 1 
Description of molecular function and significance of DRD1 and DRD2 
Gene Candidate Protein function Polymorphism Functional significance 
DRD1 DA receptor Encodes D1 A to G D1 receptors stimulate adenyl 
  subtype of DA mutation cyclase and activate cAMP- 
  receptor; receptor (rs686) dependent protein kinases; 
  density; DA  regulate neuronal growth and 
  reuptake  development; A (major) allele 
    associated with increased mRNA 
    levels in vitro 
DRD2 DA receptor Encodes D2 C to T D2 receptors inhibit adenyl 
  subtype of DA mutation cyclase; C (major) allele 
  receptor; receptor (rs1800497) associated with increased 
  density; DA  dopamine D2 receptor availability 
  reuptake  in vivo 
In the rs686 mutation of DRD1, the A allele results in increased expression of the 
gene and dopamine receptor sites and is thought to be involved in neuroplasticity via cell- 
mediated immunity (Cosentino, Ferrari, Kurstrimovic, Rasini, & Marino, 2015; Huang, Ha, 
& Petitto, 2013). Furthermore, it has been shown that the G allele decreases DRD1 
expression relative to the A allele by inhibiting the binding of microRNA miR-504 to the 3′- 
UTR of the DRD1 gene (Huang & Li, 2009), providing a potential causal mechanism through 
which this SNP modulates gene expression. rs686/A is associated with increased risk of 
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schizophrenia (Zhu et al., 2011), various addictions and dependencies (e.g., nicotine: (Huang 
et al., 2008); alcohol: (Batel et al., 2008); opioid: (Zhu et al., 2013)), autism spectrum 
disorders (Hettinger, Liu, Schwartz, Michaelis, & Holden, 2008), and cognitive but not 
behavioural impulsivity, particularly in children with ADHD (Oades et al., 2008). 
rs1800497 is located between the DRD2 and ANKK1 genes. A series of positron 
emission tomography studies has shown that the T allele (i.e., Taq1A/A1) is associated with 
reduced dopamine D2 receptor availability (Jonsson et al., 1999; Pohjalainen et al., 1998; 
Ritchie & Noble, 2003; Thompson et al., 1997). Zhang et al. (2007) reported that this SNP is 
in strong linkage disequilibrium with two other polymorphisms that appear to affect the 
relative splicing of dopamine D2 short (presynaptic) and long (postsynaptic) receptor 
variants, thus providing a potential explanation for the observed association between 
rs1800497 and various behavioural and clinical outcomes. Indeed, several studies report 
associations between rs1800497 and substance abuse (e.g., nicotine (Comings et al., 1996a; 
Noble et al., 1994b); opioid (Lawford et al., 2000); cocaine (Noble et al., 1993)), obesity 
(Noble et al., 1994a), risk of schizophrenia (Golimbet et al., 1998), attention- 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Comings et al., 1991), Tourette’s syndrome (Comings et al., 
1996b), susceptibility to post-traumatic stress disorder (Comings, Muhleman, & Gysin, 
1996), and Huntington’s disease (Ramos et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 1997). Eisenberg and 
colleagues (Eisenberg et al., 2007) reported that rs1800497/T was not associated with self- 
reported impulsivity but did predict behavioural impulsivity on a Delay Discounting Task; 
however, impulsivity on this task represents delayed gratification, and not response inhibition 
as it is conceptualised in the cognitive literature. A similar discordance has been observed in 
cognitive but not behavioural impulsivity in polymorphisms of other dopaminergic genes 
(Oades et al., 2008). 
With some exceptions (e.g., rs1800497/T is not associated with alcohol dependency 
(Gelernter & Kranzler, 1999); but, similar to rs686/A, is, however, associated with antisocial 
behavioural characteristics in alcohol-dependent individuals (Ponce et al., 2003)), these 
mutations in DRD1 and DRD2 exhibit notably parallel phenotypes in humans. Moreover, 
DRD1 and DRD2 expression have also demonstrated an additive effect under some 
conditions on response inhibition tasks in rat (Eagle et al., 2011) and non-human primate 
models (see Eagle, Bari, & Robbins, 2008), such that inhibition is more successful where 
there is a higher ratio of DRD1 to DRD2 expression (note, however, that animal tasks of 
response inhibition are presently unable to account for proactive inhibition). 
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Despite the apparent lack of coherence in genetic and pharmacologic investigations of 
behaviour on tasks of response inhibition and given the clinical efficacy of dopamine agonists 
in disorders that manifest dysfunctional behavioural or cognitive control, it is axiomatic that 
dopamine plays a role beyond its recruitment by more simple motor systems for the 
deployment of goal-directed stimulus-response action. Genetic data may allow us to 
instantiate response inhibition and the processes that underpin its mechanisms within a neural 
architecture that may improve our understanding of the pathological profiles of 
neurodegenerative conditions and their treatment, and reconcile the empirical inconsistencies 
described above (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Aron & Poldrack, 2005; 2006; Aron, 
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2001; Chambers, Garavan, & 
Bellgrove, 2009; Gauggel, Rieger, & Feghoff, 2004; Isoda & Hikosaka, 2008; Jahanshahi, 
Obeso, Baunez, Alegre, & Krack, 2015; Kuhn et al., 2004; McCarter, Walton, Rowan, Gill, 
& Palomo, 2000; Mink, 1996). Disentangling proactive processes from reactive processes is 
important as they may rely on different neural substrates and may therefore be differentially 
affected by neurological disorders and by the dopamine loss that occurs in healthy ageing. It 
is therefore pertinent to investigate the role of intelligence in these processes. By doing this, it 
may be possible to more precisely characterise how these processes are associated with 
intelligence, or whether they are artefacts of age. If proactive inhibition relies on the direct or 
the hyperdirect pathway, then individuals with a genetic predisposition toward enhanced 
dopamine D1-receptor neurotransmission (rs686 A allele carriers) and reduced dopamine D2- 
receptor neurotransmission (rs1800497 T allele carriers) should exhibit more PES. This 
would be consistent with some of the animal models mentioned above (Eagle et al., 2008; 
Eagle et al., 2011), according to which, response inhibition is associated with the ratio of 
DRD1 to DRD2 expression. In contrast, if PES relies on the indirect pathway, then this type 
of proactive inhibition should be more pronounced in individuals carrying the rs1800497 C 
allele, which is associated with increased dopamine D2 receptor availability. In addition to 
investigating the relationship between rs686 and rs1800497 and proactive inhibition, we 
further tested the hypothesis that proactive inhibition might play a compensatory role when 
reactive inhibition is inefficient. According to this hypothesis, individuals who are most 
likely to engage proactive inhibition processes are those with a reduced ability to withhold 
incorrect responses, including older individuals and those with lower fluid intelligence. 
Genetic predispositions that increase the likelihood of successfully engaging proactive 
inhibition might therefore have a stronger effect in these individuals. 
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2.5 Materials and methods 
 
The experimental protocol was approved by the University of Adelaide Human 
Research Ethics Committee and administered in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki 
(2013 revision). Participants were recruited from a classifieds advertisement website. All 
participants provided written, informed consent, and were remunerated for their time at the 
rate of AU$20 per hour. Two hundred and ninety-six adults (50% female; age: M = 24.8, SD 
= 5.47, range = 18-40 yrs) participated in one of three independent experiments, each with 
identical inclusion criteria. Experiment 1 was completed by 67 participants, Experiment 2 by 
129, and Experiment 3 by 100. Saliva samples were collected from all participants for 
genotyping using Oragene saliva collection kits (Genotek Inc., Ontario, Canada). Thirty-four 
participants were omitted from analyses due to inadequate task engagement (absence of 
response on >40 Go trials; n = 26), or due to failed genotyping (n = 8). The final sample (N = 
264; 53% female; age: M = 24.8, SD = 5.41 yrs; Experiment 1: N = 60; 52% female; age: M = 
25.2, SD = 5.33 yrs, range = 18–39; Experiment 2: N = 110; 49% female; age: M = 24.9, SD 
= 6 yrs, range = 18–40; Experiment 3: N = 94; 59% female; age: M = 24.3, SD = 4.74 yrs, 
range = 18–40) is thus comprised of healthy, Caucasian adults aged 18-40 yrs who self- 
reported to researchers prior to consenting as having normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
not taking medications with sedative or stimulant mechanisms or medications indicated for 
neuropsychiatric dysfunction (e.g., antidepressants, antipsychotics) for at least six months; 
not suffering from major medical or psychiatric conditions; having no history of drug or 
alcohol dependency; and, not smoking more than five cigarettes per day. 
2.5.1 Genotyping 
 
The Australian Genome Research Facility, Ltd (AGRF) performed DNA extraction 
and genotyping. DNA for each participant was recovered from stabilised saliva samples using 
the manual prepIT system according to the manufacturer’s instructions (Oragene DNA (OG- 
500); DNA Genotek Inc, Ontario, Canada). DNA precipitates were resuspended for a 
minimum of 48 hrs before quantification by fluorimetry (QuantiFluor™ dsDNA System; 
Promega Corporation, Madison, Wisconsin, USA) in conjunction with a Gemini™ 
Spectramax XPS fluorescence microplate reader (Molecular Devices, LLC; Sunnyvale, CA, 
USA). DNA stocks were adjusted to a working concentration of between 10 and 50 ng/μl for 
subsequent genotyping. 
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The DRD1 (rs686) and DRD2 (rs1800497) polymorphisms were genotyped using the 
Sequenom iPLEX MassARRAY® platform according to the methods described by Gabriel, 
Ziaugra, and Tabbaa (Gabriel, Ziaugra, & Tabbaa, 2009). PCR and extension primers were 
designed using Sequenom Assay Designer v3.1. The following sequences of primers were 
used: rs686 (PCR-1: ACGTTGGATGGCTCATCCCAAAAGCTAGAG, PCR-2: 
ACGTTGGATGAGAGTCTCACCGTACCTTAG, extension primer: 
GAGATTGCTCTGGGG), rs1800497 (PCR-1: 
ACGTTGGATGTGTGCAGCTCACTCCATCCT, PCR-2: 
ACGTTGGATGTCAAGGGCAACACAGCCATC, extension primer: 
GCTGGGCGCCTGCCT). 
2.5.2 Testing procedure 
 
Participants were seated 60 cm from a 21.5-inch iMac Apple computer with a 60 Hz 
screen refresh rate. Responses were made with a standard 1,000 dpi computer mouse. 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by Xojo software (Xojo Inc., Texas, USA). 
Demographic and personal data were collected by a purpose-coded computerised 
questionnaire administered prior to behavioural testing. 
2.5.3 Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) 
 
In the SART (Robertson et al., 1997), a Go/No-Go paradigm, participants are 
presented with random single digits (1 – 9) displayed in the centre of the screen in fonts of 
differing sizes (48, 72, 94, 100 and 120 point, ranging from 12 mm to 29 mm on the screen; 
i.e., subtending 1° × 0.75° to 2.4° × 1.8° at the retina). Each digit is displayed for 245 ms, 
immediately followed by a mask for 900 ms, resulting in a response period of 1,145 ms from 
digit onset to mask offset (see Figure 9). The mask interrupts residual visual processing 
(Herzog, 2008) and attenuates fixational drift (Snodderly, 2016). Participants are instructed to 
rapidly respond by pressing the left mouse button, using their dominant hand, as soon as 
possible after any digit, except the digit ‘3’, is displayed (‘Go trials’; 0.89 probability), and to 
inhibit this response when the digit ‘3’ is displayed (‘No-Go trials’; 0.11 probability). This 
task consists of 225 trials, each digit presented with equiprobability in random order, with 25 
No-Go trials. Participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible without sacrificing 
accuracy. This task allows us to isolate proactive inhibition as PES. We use median RTs for 
our overall RT variable because it is robust to the influence of skew and truncation (Ulrich & 
Miller, 1994). We exclude RTs shorter than 150 msec (these trials are assumed to reflect 
56  
anticipatory responses); however, we do not apply an upper bound for RT outlier exclusion 
because this task uses a fixed inter-stimulus interval, imposing a limit on responding (1,145 
msec), which approximates the acceptable upper bound of most RT distributions (Luce, 1991; 




Figure 9. Two complete SART trials. The first trial is a Go trial in which participants 
respond to the stimulus, followed by a No- Go trial in which participants should inhibit their 
response. 
2.5.4 Behavioural analysis 
 
2.5.4.1 Overall response inhibition and proactive inhibition. Our measure of 
overall response inhibition is the proportion of successfully withheld responses on No-Go 
trials; that is, the complement proportion of errors of commission, where an error of 
commission is the failure to inhibit a response to the No-Go stimulus. It is worth noting, 
however, that this traditional measure of response inhibition is potentially confounded by 
proactive inhibition, and therefore might not purely reflect reactive inhibition (the ability 
to stop a prepared response). Our measure of proactive inhibition is post-error slowing 
(PES). In the SART, PES is calculated by subtracting the average RT of four trials after an 
error of commission from the four trials before the error of commission. PES is, therefore, 
the temporal response pattern adjustment that participants make after failing to correctly 
inhibit a response. It has been established that four trials are sufficient to yield an accurate 
and computationally efficient estimate of PES. Because stimulus presentation was 
randomised, the number of trials that could be classified as both pre- and post- error trials 
differed between participants. Two participants, and, on average, 7.10 (SD = 7.05) trials 
were excluded from the PES analysis for this reason; this includes trials that could be 
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classified as both pre- and post-error trials, and No-Go trials that fall within these windows. 
Naturally, the number of trials that will be excluded from such an analysis will increase as a 
function of the number of errors made by each participant. The average number of pre-error and 
post-error trials was 27.16 (SD = 12.25) and 26.71 (SD = 11.77), respectively. 
2.5.4.2 Psychometric analysis. We administered a battery of tests of fluid abilities on 
the same computing and peripheral hardware described above and used structural equation 
modelling (SEM) to calculate a latent general intelligence (g) factor. Our SEM includes 
additional samples to those described in the current paper. These additional samples comprise 
a larger series of experiments with a common theme and similar battery of cognitive tasks, 
and with identical participation inclusion criteria. This method for g derivation allows a more 
robust population estimate due to the larger sample size (N = 569). The model is robust (χ2 
(N = 569) = 34.5, P = 0.03, CFI = .98, TLI = .97), and includes tasks measuring the following 
domains: higher-order inductive reasoning (Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices short- 
form, RPM (Raven, 2000), and the Comprehensive Abilities Battery-Induction, CAB-I 
(Hakstian & Cattell, 1975)), visuospatial ability (Mental Rotation (Vandenberg & Kuse, 
1978)), visuospatial working memory (Dot Matrix (Law, Morrin, & Pellegrino, 1995)), 
verbal working memory (Sentence Span (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, Yang, & Ecker, 2010)), 
visual processing speed (Inspection Time (Vickers, Nettelbeck, & Wilson, 1972)), and 
response and decision speed (Simple and Choice Reaction Time (Deary, Liewald, & Nissan, 
2011)). These domains were chosen for their known associations with g (Jensen, 1998). All 
samples completed the Simple and Choice Reaction Time, RPM, and Dot Matrix tasks. 
Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 additionally completed the Inspection Time task; those in 
Experiment 1 also completed the Mental Rotation task, and those in Experiment 2 also 
completed the CAB-I and Sentence Span tasks. Although participants completed different 
tasks, all participants included in the model completed RPM and Dot Matrix, each of which 
accounted for a large proportion of estimated individual variance in g (RPM: R2 = .42, p 
< .0001; Dot Matrix: R2 = .48, p < .0001). This method of estimating SEM with samples that 





Genotype frequencies did not deviate from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (both p > .2), 
and varied independently within participants (r262 = .05, p = .41). No significant differences 
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were found among genotype frequencies with respect to age (largest effect: F1,258 = 0.50 p 
= .482), sex (largest effect: Χ2 = 1.90, p = .386), or g (largest effect: F1,256 = 2.86, p = .092). 
2.6.2 Behavioural performance on the SART 
 
Response time (RT), error rate (failure of reactive inhibition), and paired-samples t- 
tests for PES (proactive inhibition; i.e., comparing RT before versus after errors) for each 
experiment and in the total sample are shown in Table 2. Probability density functions 
(shown in Figure 10) show a quantitative difference in RT distributions for Go and No-Go 
responses, and for pre- and post- error responses. Overall, the mean error rate was 44.1% (M 
= 11.0, SD = 6.10 errors), and all but four participants made at least one error of commission. 
These four participants were not included in analyses of proactive inhibition since PES 
cannot be calculated when no errors are made. 
 
Table 2 
Sample statistics for median response time (RT) and mean response inhibition (errors), and 
































































































Note. We performed one-way ANOVAs on errors of commission and RT to test for systematic 
differences between our three experimental samples to further justify our combination of these 
samples. These ANOVAs show no difference in errors (F2,261 = 2.07, p = .128) or RT (F2,261 = 
0.58, p = .558) between groups. †i.e., proactive inhibition as measured by PES (in msec), 
reflecting the difference in RT before and after an error. Parenthesised following PES is the 




Figure 10. Probability density distributions of response times (RTs) for each trial- type (Go, 
No- Go, and the four trials Before, and After, an error). The main plot maps the full RT 
distribution, including responses quicker than 150 ms (n = 67,779). The inset shows RTs for 
responses within a common response period (150–600 ms; n = 62,667), with bars 
representing the mean for Go (M = 338.06 msec, SEM = 0.47), No- Go (M = 267.43 msec, 
SEM = 1.24), Before error (M = 297.43 msec, SEM = 0.98) and After error (M = 315.47 
msec, SEM = 1.15) responses. 
Consistent with common findings, most participants engaged proactive inhibition, 
however, 68 (26%) did not. A t-test indicated that those participants who slowed down 
following an error (M = 11.5, SD = 6.21 errors) did not significantly differ from those who 
did not (M = 10.3, SD = 5.24 errors) in terms of number of errors, p = .15. However, 
magnitude of proactive inhibition was somewhat associated with greater reactive inhibition 
overall (r258 = -.12, p = .051), although this relationship was not consistent between samples 
(see Table 3). This suggests that proactive inhibition (reflected in PES) modestly confounded 
response inhibition (reflected in the number of errors). Response inhibition was also 
associated with RT reliably across all three samples, such that faster RT was associated with 
more errors (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
Correlation coefficients for relationships between response inhibition 
(errors) and proactive inhibition (PES) and response time (RT), (N = 260) 
r258 (p-value) 
 PES RT 
Experiment 1 .23 (.075) -.78 (< .001) 
Experiment 2 .19 (.051) -.72 (< .001) 
Experiment 3 -.03 (.747) -.72 (< .001) 
Total sample .12 (.051) -.73 (< .001) 
 
There was no effect of biological sex on any measure of SART performance (all 
p > .3). Increased age, however, was associated with successful response inhibition (i.e., 
fewer errors; r = -.20, p = .001), slower RT (r258 = .18, p = .003), and more proactive 
inhibition (r258 = .13, p = .027). Age was also negatively correlated with general intelligence, 
g (r258 = -.19, p = .003); however, whereas age was associated with fewer errors, slower 
responses and greater PES, g, on the other hand, was not associated with response inhibition 
(p = .81), but was associated with quicker RT (r258 = -.18, p = .003) and less proactive 
inhibition (r258 = -.28, p < .001). 
A regression model testing the effects of g and age on PES revealed a significant main 
effect of g (β = 20.0, t254 = 2.06, p = .040), but not age (p = .74). A significant interaction was 
found between these variables on PES (β = 1.13, t254 = 1.13, p = .002) indicating that the 
strength of the association between intelligence and proactive inhibition increased with age 
(R2 = 0.12, F3,254 = 11.66, p < .001). In other words, the negative relationship between g and 
PES is accentuated by age. This can be seen by separating the sample into age tertiles, where 
the strength of relationship varies between tertiles (18-25 yrs: r258 = .16, p = .021; 26-33 yrs: 
r258 = .29, p = .033; 34-40 yrs: r258 = .52, p = .013; see Figure 11). Likewise, regressing 
response inhibition onto age and proactive inhibition reveals significant main effects of both 
(proactive inhibition: β = 167.7, t253 = 2.51, p = .013; age: β = 4.40, t253 = 3.49, p < .001), and 
a significant interaction (β = -7.66, t253 = 7.66, p = .004), such that in younger participants, 
proactive inhibition does not appear to contribute to successful response inhibition, whereas it 
does in older participants (R2 = .06, F3,256 = 5.39, p = .001). These interactions can be seen in 
Figure 11. They suggest that if proactive inhibition is a compensatory mechanism that may 
improve overall performance (i.e., decrease errors), it is most engaged in older individuals 




Figure 11. The effect of age (tertiles) interacting with response inhibition (i.e. error rate; top 
frame) and g (bottom frame) on proactive inhibition (i.e. post-error slowing in msec). 
2.6.3 Genetic association analyses 
 
First, we regress PES onto each SNP individually in simple models to test for a 
general effect of allele frequency on proactive inhibition. We then include age in an additive 
model to investigate whether each SNP is able to account for meaningful variance above and 
beyond the variance accounted for by age, then we include an interaction term in these 
models so that a potential relationship between age and allele frequency of each SNP can be 
observed. This regression modelling showed that the A allele of rs686 may exert a modest 
positive effect on proactive inhibition, although it is not statistically significant here (β = 
10.70, t249 = 1.88, p = .062), and the T allele of rs1800497 demonstrated no such effect (p 
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= .271). Models that control for the possible effect of age did not reach statistical significance 
for either rs686 (β = 9.86, t254 = 1.76, p = .08), or rs1800497 (p = .227). Models which 
included the interaction between age and each SNP were able to account for more variance 
than simple additive models including these variables for both rs686 (R2 = .043, F3,253 = 3.81, 
p = .011; R2 increase = .012, interaction β = 1.83, t253 = 1.83, P = 0.069) and rs1800497 (R
2
 
= .053, F3,253 = 4.76, p = .003; R
2 increase = .029, interaction β = 3.30, t253 = 2.79, p = .006). 
We further analysed the combined effect of the two polymorphisms by computing a 
simple, unweighted count method (the unweighted genetic risk score, uGRS) to derive a 
relative polygenic risk score for each participant. This method allows interval interpretation 
of resultant scores, where a higher uGRS is associated with higher PES. In the uGRS method, 
we assumed a simple additive model, where the numbers of alleles associated with increased 
PES for each polymorphism were added. This method results in uGRS factors ranging from 0 
to 4, where a higher score is associated with increased dopamine uptake via increased D1 
receptor sites and decreased D2 receptor sites. This method has been shown to be capable of 
reliable and effective predictive accuracy in large samples, and utility in association testing 
for complex traits (Dudbridge, 2013). This uGRS derivation method resulted in five factors 
(see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Number of participants in each unweighted genetic risk score factor 
Factor Included genotypes N 
0 GG/CC 19 
1 GG/CT; GA/CC 97 
2 GG/TT; AA/CC; GA/CT 104 
3 AA/CT; GA/TT 35 
4 AA/TT 5 
 
Importantly, a uGRS consisting of the number of A and T alleles, which minimises 
the limitations of simple interactions between two SNPs, significantly predicted proactive 
inhibition in a regression model, β = 8.43, t254 = 2.07, p = .040. In a model controlling for 
age, the main effect of uGRS remained significant, β = 8.35, t254 = 2.06, p = .040 (R
2 = .035; 
R2 increase = .015; F2,254 = 4.60, p = .011). Figure 12 highlights that the increase in RT 
following an error tends to increase in an additive fashion with increasing frequency of 
rs686/A and rs1800497/T. In addition, a significant interaction was found between uGRS and 
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age on proactive inhibition (β = 2.36, t253 = 3.20, p = .002), and accounted for an additional 
3.7% of variance in proactive inhibition than the simple additive model alone (R2 = .072, 
F3,253 = 6.58, p < .001). Figure 13 shows this interaction, whereby the uGRS effect on PES is 
magnified by age. 
 
 
Figure 12. Proactive inhibition (ms) by rs686 (left series), rs1800497 (centre series), and 





Figure 13. Interaction between unweighted genetic risk score (uGRS) and age on proactive 
inhibition. Higher uGRS indicates higher rs686/A expression and lower rs1800497/C 
expression. Shaded grey areas bounding the lines reflect 80% confidence intervals. 
Inverse variance fixed-effect meta-analyses, using the ‘meta’ package v4.9-0 
(Schwarzer, 2007) for R (Team, 2013), for each SNP on proactive inhibition indicate that 
effect sizes in each experimental sample are of similar magnitude (rs686: Q = 0.92, p = .630; 
rs1800497: Q = 4.65, p = .098; uGRS: Q = 0.62, p = .735; see Figure 14). We report Q 
statistics here as a substitute for I2 due to the small number of samples included in each 
analysis, as suggested by Huedo-Medina et al. (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
these models support a general overall main effect for rs686 (Χ2 = 1.84, p = .065) and uGRS 
(Χ2 = 2.05, p = .040), but not rs1800497 (p = .25); this, however, is likely due to the small 
number of T carriers of this SNP in each of our samples. These analyses are shown in Figure 
12, and illustrate a clear and consistent additive trend of uGRS on increased PES. 
Genetic association analyses for both RT and response inhibition using linear 
regression show, notably, that neither SNPs, nor uGRS, yielded any substantive relationships, 




Figure 14. Forest plots showing the regression coefficients and their associated 95% 
confidence intervals for the effect of rs686 (top), rs1800497 (middle), and uGRS (bottom) on 
proactive inhibition across experimental samples. Square sizes surrounding the mean average 
regression coefficient reflect relative weightings of each sample in the fixed effect model. 
Diamonds are summaries of each model, whose length represents 95% confidence. 
 
Table 5 
Regression of coded allele frequencies in rs686, rs1800497, and uGRS 
on reaction time and response inhibition 
 Reaction time Response inhibition 
rs686 t258 = 1.50, p = .495 t258 = 0.47, p = .642 
rs1800497 t258 = 1.50, p = .134 t258 = 0.20, p = .844 




This is the first study to investigate the influence of polymorphisms in dopaminergic 
genes on proactive inhibition. We used a theoretically-driven approach to test which 
dopamine receptor type most likely contributes to proactive inhibition, as measured by post- 
error slowing in a Go/No-Go task. As different cortico-basal ganglia pathways preferentially 
express different receptor types, this analysis also allows some speculation regarding which 
pathway underlies proactive inhibition. 
We provide novel evidence for the role of dopaminergic genes in the engagement and 
magnitude of proactive inhibition. Allelic variation in two polymorphisms (rs686 at DRD1 
and rs1800497 at DRD2/ANKK1) exerted an additive effect on proactive inhibition that was 
independent of associations with other behavioural measures such as number of commission 
errors and RT, and that was similar across three separate samples, which was supported by 
meta-analysis. We further found that a uGRS consisting of the number of rs686 A alleles and 
rs1800497 T alleles predicted higher engagement of proactive inhibition, particularly in older 
participants. There is substantial a priori evidence to suggest that a higher ratio of D1 
receptor expression relative to D2 receptor expression increases overall response inhibition 
and control mechanisms (Eagle et al., 2008; Eagle et al., 2011), which is consistent with our 
findings. 
Our findings are broadly consistent with recent results reported by Cummins and 
colleagues (Cummins et al., 2012), who tested the effect of the full array of autosomal 
catecholamine gene variations in neural and behavioural measures of response inhibition in 
the Stop-Signal Task. Although these authors did not isolate proactive inhibition, they 
reported a general role for dopamine in response inhibition, and nominal significance for 
rs686 on measures of inhibition. Likewise, Beste et al. (Beste, Willemssen, Saft, & 
Falkenstein, 2010), using a Go/No-Go paradigm similar to the present study, reported that 
two dopaminergic SNPs (rs4532, the G allele of which is presumably associated with higher 
D1 receptor efficiency, and rs6277, also known as C957T, for which higher striatal D2 
receptor density is associated with the T allele; see Beste et al., 2010) predicted inhibitory 
subprocesses: both rs4532/A and rs6277/C were associated with more errors of commission 
(i.e., what we have conceptualised in this study as poorer overall response inhibition). 
Furthermore, they separated the effective influence of each SNP using electrophysiology, 
showing that the polymorphism affecting D1 receptor efficacy that was associated with more 
errors was also associated with an attenuated N2 event-related potential on No-Go trials; and, 
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that the polymorphism affecting D2 receptor density was also associated with an attenuated 
P3 event-related potential on No-Go trials, each relative to A/G and C/T heterozygotes, and 
G/G and C/C homozygotes, respectively. That is, rs4532/A was associated with more errors 
and a blunted No-Go N2, potentially indicating less attentional resources, and rs6277/C was 
associated with more errors and a blunted No-Go P3, potentially indicating less post-error 
cognitive evaluation (Beste et al., 2010). Indeed, although this could be interpreted as only 
marginally consistent with our findings (we found no such effect on rate of errors, but rather 
on PES, our measure of proactive inhibition), Beste and colleagues failed to measure 
proactive inhibition, which we have demonstrated contributes to successful inhibition. 
Moreover, the electrophysiological correlates reported by Beste et al. (Beste et al., 2010) 
appear to be confounded by motor activity (Go trials include a response in the time window 
of the N2 and P3 whereas the No-Go trials do not), or could alternatively be explained by 
effects arising from the difference in frequency of presentation of the Go and No-Go stimuli, 
such as an oddball effect (i.e., the less frequent stimulus, the No-Go stimulus in this case, 
typically elicits a larger P3) (Smith, Johnstone, & Barry, 2008; Verleger, Grauhan, 
Smigasiewicz, 2016). 
Similar to our study, Colzato and colleagues (Colzato, van den Wildenberg, Van der 
Does, & Hommel, 2013) also reported an interaction between a DRD2 polymorphism and 
age, as they demonstrated that the genetic impact of the C allele of rs6277 at DRD2 on 
response inhibition is magnified by ageing. It is widely acknowledged that the ageing brain is 
characterised by altered dopamine signalling (Volkow et al., 1998), which might accentuate 
genetic individual differences related to dopamine neurotransmission. Although we 
investigated a different SNP, rs1800497, the effects of the two SNPs on striatal D2 binding 
potential are comparable (Hirvonen et al., 2004), and rs6277 is in strong linkage 
disequilibrium with rs1800497 (Hirvonen et al., 2009). In their study, Colzato et al. (Colzato, 
van den Wildenber, & Hommel, 2013) report that allelic variation in the gene associated with 
higher density of extrastriatal D2 receptors was associated with more effective reactive 
inhibition (consistent with an earlier study by the same group (Colzato et al., 2010)), and this 
effect was larger in old adults (M age = 69 yrs) than in younger adults (M age = 21 yrs). In 
contrast, we found that allelic variation associated with lower density of D2 receptors 
predicted proactive inhibition, but not an overall measure of response inhibition (the number 
of errors), in a considerably narrower age range. In other words, Colzato et al.’s results 
suggest that higher D2 receptor density leads to more efficient reactive inhibition, especially 
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in (very) old individuals, while we found that reduced D2 transmission together with 
increased D1 transmission increases proactive inhibition, especially in middle age. 
These apparently conflicting results can be reconciled when considering that reactive 
and proactive inhibition are most likely not independent processes. In our study, the overall 
measure of response inhibition (the number of errors) was confounded with post-error 
slowing (our measure of proactive inhibition), particularly in those individuals with lower g 
scores and older participants. It is important to note here that our sample was comprised of 
young adults. Our oldest tertile represents the ages 34-40 years; so, while our sample is 
indeed young, and this study does not constitute an ageing study, that we see the observed 
results in such a limited age range, consistent with ageing theory, is striking. This suggests 
that those individuals who were less likely to exhibit efficient reactive inhibition relied more 
on proactive inhibition processes to improve their performance (see also van de Laar et al., 
2011; and Bloemendaal, et al., 2016 who reported similar age-related effects). Furthermore, 
the extent to which participants could engage proactive inhibition increased with the number 
of alleles predictive of higher DRD1 expression and lower DRD2 expression. The results of 
Colzato et al. (Colzato et al., 2010; Colzato et al., 2013) further suggest that lower DRD2 
expression is associated with poorer reactive inhibition, which might explain why those 
individuals might be more likely to engage proactive inhibition as a compensatory 
mechanism. So while Colzato et al. (Colzato et al., 2010) argue that their genetic effects 
suggest that reactive inhibition relies on the indirect basal ganglia pathway, our results do not 
support such a conclusion, suggesting a more complex role of basal ganglia connections. 
Note, however, that Colzato and colleagues (Colzato et al., 2010; Colzato et al., 2013) did not 
assess proactive inhibition nor whether it could have contaminated their measure of reactive 
inhibition, whereas we did not have a measure of reactive inhibition uncontaminated by 
proactive inhibition. 
Taken together, our results and those of Colzato and colleagues (Colzato et al., 2010; 
Colzato et al., 2013) point to the importance of differentiating between proactive and reactive 
inhibition in future studies, and attempting to measure each process independently (e.g., 
Bloemendaal et al., 2016). We found modest evidence that PES overall confounds response 
inhibition (errors), and strong evidence that this occurs mostly in middle-adulthood compared 
to young adulthood and in individuals with lower estimated g. It is therefore plausible that 
PES is a compensatory mechanism that is engaged when an individual has lower cognitive 
resources. This might explain why our genetic effects were most pronounced in older 
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participants: rs686/A and rs1800497/T appeared to allow older participants to engage PES as 
a compensatory mechanism. Here, we have effectively used uGRS to show a clear additive 
effect of rs686/A and rs1800497/T on proactive processes of response inhibition, suggesting 
that this compensatory mechanism relies on increased dopamine D1 neurotransmission and 
possibly decreased D2 transmission, and the direction and magnitude of which is strongly 
mediated by age. 
Our data seem to reflect the engagement of some age-related compensatory strategy 
for effective response inhibition. While direct evidence regarding healthy age-related decline 
in D1 receptor availability is inconsistent in human and rat models (Antonini et al., 1993; 
Antonini & Leenders Klaus, 2006; Giorgi et al., 1987; Hytell, 2009; Keeler et al., 2016; 
Morelli, Mennini, Cagnotto, Toffano, & Di Chiara, 1990; Rinne, Lönnberg, & Marjamäki, 
1990; Rothmond, Weickert, & Webster, 2012; Suhara et al., 1991; Volkow et al., 1996; 
Wang et al., 1998; Wong et al., 1984), a recent meta-analysis concluded that while dopamine 
synthesis does not appear to change across the lifespan, its effective neurotransmission 
declines via alterations in binding potential, reduced transporter protein, and changes to D1- 
D4 receptor availability (Karrer, Josef, Mata, Morris, & Samanez-Larkin, 2017). So, it is 
possible that older adults exhibit higher proactive inhibition and are thus able to maintain 
their ability to inhibit a response outright, despite reduced dopaminergic neurotransmission. 
A similar compensatory mechanism has been observed in right inferior frontal gyrus 
(rIFG) following left-hemispheric stroke-related aphasia (Watkins & Devlin, 2008) which is 
pertinent because activation in this region has been associated with response inhibition (Aron 
et al., 2004; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & 
Taylor, 2003). Hampshire et al. (Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010) 
reported that the role of rIFG is primarily in the provision of attention to relevant cues, and is 
recruited to the same extent regardless of whether cue detection is followed by either 
successful or unsuccessful inhibition. Although our findings pertaining to age-related 
compensation could be interpreted as reflecting normal age-related changes in rIFG, it is 
unlikely to be the case given that demyelination does not occur until later in life, and thus 
would not yet have affected our sample (Branzoli et al., 2016; Peters, 2002; 2009). This could 
provide an interesting line of investigation for future studies to consider whether rIFG 
delivers the same compensatory mechanism in proactive inhibition after normal dopamine 
loss in healthy ageing, thus contributing further evidence to the topography of the effect we 
have reported here. It is possible that rIFG relies on differential adrenergic characteristics to 
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effectively regulate response inhibition (Chamberlain et al., 2009), perhaps even being 
modulated by dopamine (Rothman et al., 2001). 
The majority of existing data has been unable to reconcile seemingly incompatible 
findings with regard to dopaminergic dysfunction in pathology and differential decrements in 
response inhibition. This is likely due to failure to distinguish between reactive and proactive 
psychomotor processes, and overlooking the mediating effect of age and cognitive reserve. 
This is particularly noteworthy because most previous work, especially with pathological 
populations, uses the Stop-Signal Task. In a series of recent experiments, Verbruggen and 
Logan (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008; 2009) and colleagues (Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2008) raise reasonable concerns with the interpretation and consistency of 
proactive inhibition in such tasks. For instance, while many studies demonstrate a change in 
response strategy following an error, some show that Go RT slows after a failure of reactive 
inhibition, indicative of proactive inhibition, whereas many others show the opposite (see 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008; 2009). Moreover, the authors highlight an issue not present in 
the SART, whereby repetition of the target stimulus increases PES via some associative 
learning process; whereas, in the SART, however, all Go and No-Go stimuli are equally 
frequent, thus mitigating this confound. Our findings, therefore, highlight the importance of 
integrating a method for measuring proactive inhibition, or for testing and controlling for the 
effect of proactive inhibition on reactive inhibition (e.g., the Stop-Signal Reaction Time), in 
such tasks. Moreover, we suggest that future research instantiate such a measure in both the 
Stop-Signal Task and Go/No-Go paradigm with minimal semantic information or repetition 
in order to offset potential learning and familiarity effects, or exogenous reinforcement. It has 
been consistently demonstrated that pathological populations, older adults, and indeed young 
children, perform differently in tasks of response inhibition to healthy young-to-middle-aged 
adults, and that this may be a function of these effects and the capacity to maintain attention 
rather than the cognitive processes of interest. 
Given the neuromodulatory function of dopamine in this system, it may be that 
following cortical activation of the hyperdirect pathway, dopaminergic neurons in substantia 
nigra pars reticulata prime poststriatal excitation of the internal segment of globus pallidus 
and/or substantia nigra pars compacta by modulating membrane potential in preparation for 
rapid hyperdirect depolarisation and downstream lateralised relative refractory membrane 
threshold, which may result in a strengthened inhibitory hold over the thalamus, and therefore 
indirectly priming reactive inhibition. Although this contention should be interpreted 
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cautiously because our methodology does not allow us to isolate the effect to only one of the 
direct or hyperdirect pathways. 
Our uGRS method effectively represents a ratio of D1:D2 receptors, and as shown in 
Figure 8, D1 receptors are preferentially expressed in the direct and hyperdirect pathways, 
and D2 receptors in the indirect pathway. It is possible that proactive processes recruit the 
hyperdirect pathway due to the rapid transduction speed of this pathway relative to the direct 
and indirect pathways, which, unlike the hyperdirect pathway, do not bypass the striatum. 
This hyperdirect pathway represents an optimal physiological route between frontal and pre- 
motor regions of the cortex and output basal ganglia structures (the external portion of globus 
pallidus and the substantia nigra pars reticulata) for motor inhibition insofar as it relies 
primarily on only dopaminergic and glutamatergic innervation, and requires fewer synaptic 
volleys than its indirect counterpart that is considerably more complex, requiring not only 
excitatory glutamatergic and dopaminergic neurotransmission, but also striatal inhibitory 
GABAergic neurotransmission. It should be reiterated here that our approach cannot 
distinguish between influences from the direct and hyperdirect pathway, given that each 
express dopamine D1 receptors. Because neither of our single-SNP analyses reached 
significance (rs686: p = .062; rs1800497: p = .271), and our uGRS method yielded highly 
significant results, it seems likely that both SNPs contribute to proactive inhibition, despite 
the strength of evidence favouring a role of rs686 in our sample, but which is likely explained 
by the rarity of the T allele in rs1800497 (2.6% homozygosity here; see Figure 12). 
This conclusion could potentially strengthen the provision of treatment of disorders of 
the dopaminergic system and may be useful as an early cognitive marker of 
neurodegeneration. Given the genetic underpinnings of proactive inhibition reported here, we 
strengthen the body of evidence supporting the use of disturbed proactive inhibition as an 
endophenotype for heritable diseases such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, rather 
than simply response inhibition in general as has been proposed (Slaats-Willemse, Swaab- 
Barnevald, de Sonneville, van der Meulen, & Buitelaar, 2003). 
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2.8 General Discussion of the Foregoing Manuscript 
The method of generating a genetic risk score that we used here (the uGRS) is novel 
and proved quite fruitful in determining the necessary role of dopamine in proactive 
inhibition and allowing us to establish that, as a function of relative levels of dopaminergic 
neurotransmission, proactive inhibition appears to emerge as a natural compensatory 
mechanism whose role is to self-regulate behavioural control. The questions that arise from 
these conclusions, in my view, should be related to the principles of learning and 
reinforcement, since dopamine is central to these functions, and since it is likely that they are 
conjointly involved in serving response inhibition. 
As far as I am aware, there has been little explicit investigation into the role of the 
reward system in reinforcing proactive inhibition explicitly via dopamine or, indeed, whether 
reactive inhibition is subject to the same mechanisms, although there is some early indirect 
evidence that one of the mechanisms by which reinforcement may affect response inhibition 
is mediated via affecting the strategy with which participants approach the task. Some data 
seems to suggest that manipulating participants’ speed-accuracy trade-off in a SST by 
conditionally reinforcing either speed or accuracy affects overall SSRT (Leotti & Wager, 
2010). Furthermore, a recent experiment, which included a “selective stopping” element to a 
SST in which participants were instructed to ignore Stop signals that were overlaid with an 
ignore cue, reported that polymorphisms in a COMT and a DRD2 gene are involved 
somehow in the strategy with which they approach the task (Rincón-Pérez et al., 2020). The 
authors used an additive GRS method, similar to but not the same as the method that we used 
to derive our uGRS, with two SNPs that globally regulate dopaminergic production and 
clearance such that a higher GRS is associated with higher levels of dopamine. They found 
that the highest and the lowest GRS categories tended to favour the adoption of a “Stop then 
Discriminate” strategy, whereby participants would Stop their response under any Stop signal 
condition, regardless of whether an ignore cue was presented, and then determine whether it 
should be ignored, whereas GRS categories that spanned the middle of the spectrum tended 
to favour an “Independent Stop then Discriminate” strategy, in which the discrimination 
between Stop and ignore-Stop was made prior to the motor stopping process (Rincón-Pérez et 
al., 2020). These strategies are not directly comparable to reactive and proactive inhibition, 
but they resemble them to some degree. 
There has been some very interesting work using associative learning principles to 
account for variance on response inhibition tasks (e.g., much of Verbruggen’s work; see, 
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Bowditch, Verbruggen, & McLaren, 2016; Verbruggen, Chambers, Lawrence, & McLaren, 
2017; Verbruggen & McLaren, 2018), but considering the influence of learning on response 
inhibition in sufficient detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is nevertheless a critical 
consideration for future work, given the computational advances in the neurogenetics of 
learning and using such models to predict decline of these functions associated with age and 
pathology. I think that a manifest limitation to this thesis is that no meaningful, in-depth 
consideration is given to the principles of reinforcement learning from reward (i.e., a correct 
response to Go trials or a correct inhibition to No-Go trials) or from punishment (i.e., 
responding to No-Go trials), and to the role of prediction error in different types of proactive 
inhibition. In my view, this absence does not diminish the body of work presented here, it 
would simply have provided an alternative interpretation of the data that would require a 
dedicated thesis in itself. It is unfortunate, though, since such principles lend themselves well 
to being investigated through the lens of the dopaminergic hypothesis presented here, their 
link to the basal ganglia, and especially to EEG data. Response inhibition tasks were not 
designed to measure learning abilities, and many of the conclusions here could not have been 
possible using such an interpretative lens; on the other hand, using a reinforcement learning 
framework to complement the data here could provide invaluable insight into the processes 
under investigation. 
In the editorial review process when submitting this manuscript for publication in the 
European Journal of Neuroscience, a valuable discussion was engaged in with one reviewer 
that I think is worth repeating here. At the data analysis stage, we attempted to use various 
mathematical models and computational methods to extract further data from the individual 
RT distributions on the SART. This stage of the process coincided with my visiting the lab of 
Michael J Frank at Brown University in Providence, where I was presenting some of these 
data and discussing a new task that we were in the early stages of validating (see Chapter 5). 
While there, an early PhD student of this lab, Daniel Scott, was working on a Bayesian 
Hierarchical Drift Diffusion Model (HDDM) and applying it to some reaction time data from 
a learning task. We talked about applying such principles to my RT data and its potential 
theoretical incompatibilities. Previously, it had occurred to me to take a computational 
approach to these data. As I discussed in the literature review, fitting models to data allows us 
to substantiate the very foundational algorithms underlying behaviour. For the purely 
behavioural data in the other three chapters of this thesis, such model fitting could be useful 
in providing insights into the specific psychological processes that account for individual 
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differences in performance or, indeed, could differentiate the same outcome measure by two 
participants in, say, error rate, by parameterising the differences in their response time 
distribution characteristics to different trial types and suggest that Participant A made eight 
errors because her evidence accumulation drift rate was slower than Participant B, but 
Participant B made eight errors because his decision boundaries to either respond or to 
withhold were farther apart. But the data reflected here contains an additional biological 
measure which could, if integrated into a well-grounded mathematical model, yield insights 
unimaginable even a decade ago. 
In the previous experiments, and indeed in most behavioural experiments, a trial can 
yield only two pieces of data: the response that was made, and the speed with which it was 
made. Using every trial in a given task, sequential sampling models (i.e., the models 
previously mentioned) make available a richer dataset. But undoubtedly, the apotheosis of the 
endeavour is to integrate extant mathematical models and computational simulations with the 
natural constraints of neural data and their mechanical physics. In the literature review, I 
discussed in brief the difficulty in adjudicating between alternative models because, while 
they differ fundamentally in their algorithmic elements, they sometimes provide cognate 
predictions for behaviour. By bridging these models with the mechanistic constraints of 
neurobiology, the dynamics of cognition not only can illuminate what has long-since been 
referred to as a black box, but can formalise the complete structural architecture of behaviour; 
as Logan himself and his colleagues asseverate, “the idea that mind and brain are the 
computers that produce behaviour, and the computation is one and the same” (Logan, Schall, 
& Palmeri, 2015, p. 305). 
Mathematical and computational models assume a system of equations to characterise 
a cognitive or behavioural process that we assume takes place in the brain, and mathematical 
psychologists formally test their hypotheses by fitting those models to data and assessing 
their fit (Roberts & Pashler, 2000; Turner, Forstmann, Love, Palmeri, & van Maanen, 2017). 
Such approaches have indeed delivered explicit and precise descriptions of the cognitive 
processes that lead to behaviour, allowing us to infer the mechanisms that underlie these 
cognitive processes by observing that very behaviour; and, furthermore, these approaches 
withstand empirical testing and are able to account for conditional manipulations so 
successfully that such modelling is now commonplace (Logan, Schall, & Palmeri, 2015, 
Purcell & Palmeri, 2017). Given the success of mathematical and computational models in 
accounting for behaviour, it is imperative to establish whether, and how, model processes are 
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instantiated in the brain. On the other hand, from the neural perspective of cognition, 
cognitive neuroscientists rely on statistical methods to show us how the neural processes that 
give rise to behaviour develop in increasingly impressive temporal and spatial resolution. 
These statistical methods are often carried out as a purely descriptive venture, with little 
effort given to considering the neural dynamics in connexion to hypothesised cognitive 
computations underlying the behaviours that they account for. The most obvious examples of 
this, to me, are fMRI experiments that lack a computational analysis, the fundamental 
approach of which are to establish the brain region in which activity predicts some 
behavioural outcome, but be unable to conclude either how or why that brain region produced 
that behavioural outcome. We know now the time course of information processing within 
single neurons by analysing spike trains and local field potentials from neuronal groups, 
likewise, we know the networks and pathways of neurons that process this information thanks 
to anatomical demarcation, lesion studies, and imaging techniques. But while such 
neurophysiological techniques reveal the multileveled neural architecture for implementing 
said behavioural outcome, or even the most elementary sensorimotor processes, they do not 
reveal the computations that occur at each level (Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, & Palmeri et al., 
2015; O’Connell, Shadlen, Wong-Lin, & Kelly, 2018; Turner et al., 2017). Separately, 
mathematical and computational approaches and cognitive neuroscientific approaches are 
descriptive, and while each can produce developments in their respective endeavour, each 
suffers from critical limitations; so, while they do indeed draw on theory to satisfy 
hypotheses, only in their integration can they be truly explanatory (Love, 2015; Marr, 1982). 
Model-based cognitive neuroscience attempts to solve the inherent limitations in these 
approaches by integration of neural and behavioural measures. Potential linking propositions 
between the core computations specified by sequential sampling models (SSMs) and 
measures of brain activity have been identified in some recent EEG and fMRI experiments in 
rat (Hanks et al., 2015), monkey (de Lafuente, Jazayeri, & Shadlen, 2015; Gold & Shadlen, 
2007; Shadlen et al., 2016), and even human (Kelly & O’Connell, 2015) studies (see also, 
O’Connell et al., 2018; Purcell & Palmeri, 2017; Turner et al., 2017). Hanes and Schall 
(1996) trained rhesus monkeys to perform a SST and reported confluence between activity in 
sensorimotor neurons and rate of evidence accumulation, and that stochastic variability in the 
rate at which those neurons depolarised toward potential threshold resulted in RT 
distributions. What is particularly interesting is that the “the accumulating sensory evidence 
that will ultimately support one choice or the other has been shown to flow continuously to 
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motor structures in the human brain as much as it does in monkeys” (de Lafuente, Jazayeri, & 
Shadlen, 2015). And while these findings are remarkable in themselves, they apply to motor 
behaviour in this case, which is at face value more mechanistic in nature than is cognitive 
behaviour, so they may not generalise to the cognitive domain. To address this, Liu and 
Pleskac (2011) administered a stimulus intensity detection threshold paradigm to human 
participants in an MRI scanner. By manipulating the quality of perceptual evidence, which 
they reasoned translates to the drift rate parameter in SSMs, they found evidence for the 
neural mechanism for evidence accumulation that is not specific to effectors (i.e., not only in 
sensorimotor regions), but also in the anterior insula and inferior frontal sulcus, each of which 
play critical roles in making decisions under uncertainty and in attention and salience 
processing (Uddin, Nomi, Hébert-Seropian, Ghaziri, & Boucher, 2017). The observations of 
these experiments show that the gradual formation of a decision is reflected by graduated 
firing rates; that is, moment-to-moment evidence is transformed from a perceptual system to 
a decision to act (de Lafuente, Jazayeri, & Shadlen, 2015). 
The purpose of this digression is to point out that an integrative approach moving 
forward will yield the most practical data; that, as Purcell and Palmeri (2017) state, “decision- 
making mechanisms can be directly inferred from [neural] dynamics, allowing us to 
distinguish between models that make identical behavioural predictions. In other cases, 
however, different parameterized mechanisms produce surprisingly similar dynamics, 
limiting the inferences that can be made based on measuring dynamics alone simultaneous 
modelling of behaviour and neural dynamics provides the most powerful approach to 
understand… cognition and perception.” (p. 156). There is, of course, no simple way forward 
even with a clear sight of the apotheosis. In an interesting article published recently in the 
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Turner and colleagues (Turner, Forstmann, Love, 
Palmeri, & van Maanen, 2017), illustrate the three primary approaches for achieving 
synthesis ([1] neural data constraining the behavioural model; [2] the behavioural model 
predicting the neural data; and, [3] jointly integrative simultaneous modelling) and they 
compare the utility of each approach under different experimental conditions, providing 
guidelines for appropriate approach selection. 
To the extent that I described SSMs and what is known of the dynamics of the basal 
ganglia in the literature review, it may seem fitting to use such methods to tap into the 
dynamics of evidence accumulation, or to simulate the effect of varying response bias based 
on trial distance or temporal proximity (and therefore presumed increased probability of) the 
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previous No-Go trial in order to predict overall inhibition or identify whether a parameter of 
the model could account for proactive inhibition. I spent a good amount of time attempting 
these with simple mathematical models (e.g., the ex-Gaussian, as well as its nascent Bayesian 
parametric approach, designed specifically for Stop-Signal data (Matzke et al., 2016), but 
which we made several attempts to modify for use with Go/No-Go data), basic computational 
models (e.g., Wagenmakers, van der Maas, & Grasman’s (2007) EZ-Diffusion Model), and 
more novel computational methods (e.g., DDMs, LBAs, and Linear Deterministic 
Accumulator Models (see Heathcote, 2012)). I was nevertheless unable to reconcile the 
underlying data structure with the assumptions of these models in a cognitively or 
theoretically logical way. 
The reviewer commented that the data would benefit from extracting a coefficient 
associated with drift and evidence accumulation. Indeed, DDMs seem to be most appropriate 
for two-choice tasks (e.g., word/non-word), rather than single-response tasks such as the 
SART, but a few recent papers postulate that they could potentially be applied because the 
authors suggest that deciding not to respond is a choice. However, this work is not yet 
entirely convincing, and the view that intentionally responding, not responding, and 
erroneously responding are only two choices that could be represented by two parallel 
decision thresholds seems atheoretical. This notwithstanding, the critical comparison we were 
making in this paper was responding before an error vs after an error, which, while 
psychometrically distinct, are not alternative choices. 
The reviewer commented that Ratcliff and van Dongen (2011) used a single-boundary 
DDM in a single-choice task. However, it is pertinent here to distinguish between single- 
choice paradigms and single-response paradigms. The SART is a single-response paradigm 
(clicking a mouse), but not a single-choice paradigm (respond, not respond); it is a 
continuous task with two separate and cognitively distinct trial types (Go, No-Go) which are 
two opposing choices, as opposed to a continuous task with one trial type, such as a Simple 
Reaction Time task. The number of types of responses in the SART (responding, not 
responding, pre-error responses, post-error responses) reduces the number of trials to such an 
extent that modelling is not tenable, or at least very unreliable. For our purposes, the critical 
analysis was comparing RT before an error to RT after an error. So few errors are committed 
in the SART that each participant would have only, on average, 26-27 trials before and after 
an error, which could not be modelled using either DDMs, shifted Wald distributions, or the 
ex-Gaussian interpretation. Whether we use two separate single-boundary DDMs to compare 
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pre-error RT to post-error RT, or even correct Go RT to erroneous No-Go RT, participants do 
not have sufficient trials to yield stable or precise parameter estimates. Lerche, Voss, and 
Nagler (2017) show that even with very clean data, 60 trials are needed to yield “low 
precision” parameter estimates, and 160 to yield “high precision” parameter estimates in 
single-boundary DDMs. Some previous research has pooled data from participants for 
modelling purposes because each had few data points. While such a model allows 
comparison of different conditions (e.g., pre- vs post-error trials), we could nevertheless not 
run any individual differences analyses, which was the main aim of our paper. We considered 
this possibility, but because it would not help us to understand the individual differences that 
we investigated (e.g., the relationships between PES, g, and SNPs), we felt as though it does 
not add anything meaningful to the paper or to the broader body of work. 
So, while I agree that it may have been useful to model these data even using only 
SSMs, and even potentially using what we know about basal ganglia dynamics and the 
inferences we can draw about dopaminergic function in this dataset to achieve what Turner 
and colleagues (Turner, Forstmann, Love, Palmeri, & van Maanen, 2017) would refer to as a 
behavioural model constrained by neural data, this approach is logically unjustifiable using 
the task that we used. But this could be explored in the future using more appropriate task 
designs, particularly because it is plausible that such models may better guide us toward a 
firm conclusion about the pathway involved in proactive inhibition. 
Although with the evidence yielded by our experimental protocol here, we are unable 
to conclusively determine that the hyperdirect pathway serves proactive inhibition, it 
nonetheless seems apt given the anatomy of the system. Since reactive inhibition seems most 
likely to rely on the indirect pathway, and that the dopaminergic activity associated with this 
seems to be the obverse of that associated with proactive inhibition, then proactive inhibition 
likely relies on either the direct or hyperdirect pathway. It seems plausible that this structural 
distinction of function is the reason that stopping an initiated, prepared, or expected action is 
difficult; the indirect pathway has relatively slow signal conduction compared to the direct 
pathway due to its GABAergic synapses (Lanciego, Luquin, & Obeso, 2012; Schroll, 2013). 
So, the direct pathway transmitting a Go command is much more rapid than the indirect 
pathway transmitting the Stop command to countermand it. With this in mind, it seems 
sensible to imagine that a quicker non-striatal route for cortical inputs to reach the basal 
ganglia (BG) would be useful in complementing a structurally inadequate form. Rapid 
activation of such a pathway could thus generate an early increase in inhibitory output from 
the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) (DeLong & 
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Wichmann, 2010). Hypothetically though, this results in facilitation of an action via the direct 
pathway, but, importantly, according to the centre-surround model the hyperdirect pathway 
could momentarily disrupt all motor programs via focused disinhibition (DeLong & 
Wichmann, 2009; Nambu 2004; Schroll & Hamker, 2013). This disruption has been 
hypothesised to enable temporally precise response initiation, according to which, after an 
appropriate action is selected by the cortex, a corollary signal is transmitted to the hyperdirect 
pathway, which globally inhibits all motor programs, thereby allowing a second corollary 
signal to be transmitted to the direct pathway for the specific response to be initiated at an 
appropriate point in time. Evidence in favour of this account comes from Parkinson’s 
patients, whose pathology is characterised by decreased direct activation and increased 
indirect activation (Kravitz et al., 2010; Kita and Kita, 2011), and who have impairments to 
the initiation stage but not the completion stage of a movement (Bloxham et al., 1984; Carli 
et al., 1985; Hikosaka et al., 1993). 
We propose that our data here most likely point toward the hyperdirect pathway being 
involved in post-error slowing (PES), which we have used as an index of proactive 
inhibition. 
There are four alternative, but not incompatible, accounts of hyperdirect function. 
 
Based on the fast and global excitation of the GPi by hyperdirect collaterals, it has 
been hypothesised that the function of the hyperdirect pathway is to globally inhibit a 
premature response until the multiple potential responses have been organised and the 
appropriate response selected (Frank, 2006; Stocco et al., 2010). Following this logic, Frank 
(Frank 2006) proposed that when multiple simultaneous conflicting response options are 
active in premotor areas, the hyperdirect pathway is particularly important, a finding 
supported by an experiment using deep-brain stimulation (DBS) to the subthalamic nucleus 
(STN; Frank et al., 2007), and later by intracranial EEG (Cavanagh et al., 2011). Somewhat 
similar to this account, the hyperdirect pathway has also been hypothesised to globally inhibit 
a prepared response if a stop signal is displayed before the response is executed (Aron, 2011; 
Wiecki and Frank, 2013). These two accounts may appear incompatible, but since both 
functions require the rapid global motor program inhibition facilitated by the hyperdirect 
pathway’s conduction velocity and global effect on GPi, it is plausible that the pathway 
adapts to the required context and flexibly switches between these functions. Aron and 
Poldrack (2006) provided support for this account using fMRI, in which they demonstrated 
higher activity in STN on Stop trials compared to Go trials, and higher activity in STN in 
participants with better reactive inhibition (i.e., a shorter SSRT). This is interesting because 
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STN is a node in both the hyperdirect pathway and the indirect pathway, which we have 
presumed to be more implicated in reactive inhibition. On the other hand, this account is 
inconsistent with data from Parkinson’s patients who tend to have increased activity in STN, 
but who have slow reactive processes (Gauggel, et al., 2004); the extent to which this could 
be accounted for by proactive processes remains unknown. 
A third account was proposed by Chersi and colleagues (Chersi et al., 2013), who 
suggest that the activity of GPi and SNr is decreased by prefrontal connections to the 
hyperdirect pathway in order to suppress the influence of BG over the motor cortex, thereby 
allowing for top-down control of motor programs by the prefrontal cortex (PFC). By 
equalising the activity of GPi and SNr via inhibitory interneurons, response activation by the 
direct pathway is overridden, preventing BG output to the motor cortex, which, according to 
this account, allows PFC to control the motor cortex. Schroll and Hamker (2013) consider 
this account to be implausible since it is thought that the effect of the hyperdirect pathway on 
GPi and SNr is an excitatory one, but they note that it is nevertheless possible that increase in 
GPi activity may just as well suppress the output of BG to the motor cortex. 
The fourth account relies on the centre-surround inhibition model. According to the 
centre-surround hypothesis (Nambu, Tokuno, & Takada, 2002; see also Mink, 1996; Mink & 
Thach, 1993; Nambu, 2004), when the decision to execute an action is initiated by the cortex, 
a corollary signal is conveyed via the hyperdirect pathway that inhibits large areas of the 
thalamus and cortex that are associated with not only the intended action, but also competing 
motor programs. A second corollary signal disinhibits their target areas via the direct 
pathway, thereby releasing only the selected motor program. A third and final signal, perhaps 
deployed via the indirect pathway, extensively inhibits the selected motor program when its 
action is completed. That is, the hyperdirect pathway may inhibit all actions, including the 
intended action, but the intended action is strengthened by additional direct pathway 
activation, and is thus initiated (Gurney et al., 2001a; Humphries et al., 2006). An alternative 
account in which the hyperdirect pathway acts in concert with the direct pathway to inhibit 
actions that are competing for execution with the intended action and to facilitate the intended 
action, respectively, was put forth by Schroll, Vitay, and Hamker (2013). In both cases, it is 
thought that during a response period the hyperdirect pathway establishes surround-inhibition 
of inappropriate or unwanted motor programs (Figure 15). These two primary accounts, as 




Figure 15. A comparison of Nambu, Tokuno and Takada’s (2004) and Schroll, Vitay, and 
Hamker’s (2013) hypotheses of centre-surround inhibition and the role of the hyperdirect 
pathway. 3-D Gaussians depicting neural activity (z-axis) for central and surrounding cortical 
representations (x- and y- axes). Pointed arrows represent excitatory effects and rounded 
arrows represent inhibitory effects. The direct pathway is represented by red, indirect by blue, 
and hyperdirect by green. The left panel represents Nambu et al., model centre-surround 
cooperation in which the direct pathway activates specific cortical representations while the 
hyperdirect pathway globally inhibits them. The direct pathway is assumed to be more 
powerful, and thus centre-surround activation occurs. The right panel represents Schroll et 
al.’s strict centre-surround cooperation hypothesis, in which, like the previous, the direct 
pathway activates specific cortical representations, while the hyperdirect pathway inhibits 
only competing representations, but not the activated representation. Adapted from 
“Computational models of basal-ganglia pathway functions: focus on functional 
neuroanatomy”, by Henning Schroll and Fred H. Hamker, 2013, Frontiers of Systems 
Neuroscience, 7, 122. © 2013 Schroll and Hamker. 
So, in addition to post-error slowing (PES), there is good experimental evidence 
implicating the hyperdirect pathway in preventing premature responses, stopping a prepared 
response before it is executed, suppressing BG to allow top-down control of motor cortex by 
PFC, and centre-surround activation-inhibition of competing motor programs. It is plausible 
that these four mechanisms reflect different proactive elements of response inhibition that 
work alongside PES. In fact, this discussion has given rise to a more flexible interpretation of 
proactive inhibition than the one that I started with (i.e., post-error slowing). 
I think that this paper evoked a line of speculation that was strengthened somewhat by 
the findings of the next chapter. Since the main conclusion here about proactive inhibition 
was that it seems like a naturally-occurring compensatory mechanism that, while it is to some 
small degree under the active control of an agent by explicitly elicited motivation and implicit 
bias to some strategy, may in fact be a necessary biological occurrence. This idea implies, to 
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me at least, that with the exception of what amount of strategy is indeed under agentive 
control, proactive inhibition is passive; that it is, a protective process that operates by some of 
the same automatic principles of, say, the immune system, and therefore is a noncognitive 
biological process and must confer a selective advantage. In providing some insight into the 
neurochemical substrate of proactive inhibition here, I think that it is important moving 
forward to evaluate its cognitive architecture using alternative methods, namely, 
electroencephalography (EEG). 
Using EEG to capture cortical activity following what we have learned from 
subcortical pathways may allow a richer analysis. Furthermore, since many event-related 
potentials are linked so closely with dopaminergic activity because they tend to best be 









Now, we can make some strong conclusions about the neural substrate of PES, and 
we have tentative support for its mapping to a pathway that connects the basal ganglia to the 
prefrontal cortex. Indeed, to truly strengthen these tentative conclusions, further investigation 
is warranted. Electrode microarrays and high-resolution fMRI certainly have a pivotal role 
for the field in moving forward to establish this, but these are unavailable to me. It is 
nevertheless equally important to make inferences about the cognitive architecture of PES 
that is based on data observed from physiological means. Theoretical mathematical and 
cognitive models are indeed exciting, but it is important that they be biologically plausible. It 
is my opinion that in moving forward, the field has overlooked the necessity of biological 
plausibility of behaviour and cognition. As such, in this chapter I use electrophysiological 
methods to investigate PES. 
One of the first questions I asked in this thesis was the one posed by Rabbitt in his 
formative works in the psychometrics surrounding errors: “What does a man do after he 
makes an error?” One answer could be the same thing that a woman does. But what is that? 
In the previous section, I discussed the limitations in applying traditional Drift Diffusion 
Models to response time data in inhibition tasks that may otherwise allow us to parameterise 
fluxes in response time distributions and compute coefficients associated with implicit 
cognition such as response caution, evidence accumulation, bias toward one response or 
decision threshold over another, and so on. So without the aid of such models, if we are to 
question the rapid cognition that co-occurs with PES, one option is to use 
electroencephalographic (EEG) measures. EEG provides fine temporal resolution to assist in 
answering such questions with reasonably well-accepted theory. Despite my disinclination to 
accept such theory at face value – regardless of several decades of robust experiments 
supporting it – it is difficult to deny its validity with the results in mind. In EEG, data are 
captured by a voltage differential between one base electrode and some number of reference 
electrodes placed on the scalp. These data reflect the electrical activity associated with 
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postsynaptic potentials. Based on a long tradition of experimental psychology it is assumed 
that this activity relates to underlying active and passive cognitive processes. 
In conceptualising this study, we had to consider the task that was to be used. To 
maintain the central theme of this project, we needed to move forward with the SART in 
order to ensure we measure the same cognitive processes since the inferences we want to be 
able to make overall require a continuous logic throughout. The traditional SART 
incorporates an 89/11 ratio of Go to No-Go trials which, in the previous experiment, elicited 
an average of only 11 errors which would be insufficient for robust within-participant 
analysis of different ERPs and trial types. A traditional Stop-Signal Task tends to generate 
many errors, which might be useful for an EEG experiment of this nature, but the Stop signal 
is presented immediately after a Go signal, rather than on separate trials as in the SART, 
which would confound ERPs locked to the onset of the Stop signal. So, instead, we chose to 
continue using the SART in which Go and No-Go signals occur on separate trials as this is 
preferable when comparing ERPs generated by different signals. To achieve a higher number 
of trials of each type, we extended the SART from 225 trials to 800 trials, and incorporated a 
75/25 ratio of Go to No-Go trials which also required standardising the number of Go digits 
to 3, so that they would be presented proportionately to the No-Go digit, which, for no 
particular reason, remained the ‘3’. Thus every individual Go signal and the No-Go signals 
occurred with equal probability, avoiding confounds related to familiarity effects that are 
known to influence ERPs. Although this task design might reduce the proportionate number 
of errors since the likelihood of encountering a No-Go signal is increased, it would 
nevertheless produce a greater number of errors overall, since instead of 25 No-Go trials, 
there would be 200. 
To the extent that behavioural inferences from postsynaptic electrical activity in the 
cortex is valid, here, we ask ‘what is proactive inhibition?’ It remains unclear whether post- 
error slowing truly confers any overall advantage to response inhibition, but it is nevertheless 
reliably engaged presumably as a means to do so. What is the purpose or the source of the 
commonly observed 30-msec delay in response after an error? There are multiple accounts 
described below. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether patterns or single units of 
behaviour can be mapped onto patterns or single units of electrophysiological data. In the 
previous chapter we demonstrated that the basal ganglia seem to support the elicitation or 
recruitment of PES, but we did not demonstrate the degree to which it is an active process. It 
may be possible to do that using EEG methods. Furthermore, we will explore the interesting 
85  
relationships that we established in the previous chapter with g and age in PES, which 
provide additional insight into the neurocognitive networks that mediate the relationship 
between these variables and behaviour. 
 
Statement of Authorship 
 
Title of Paper 
 
Electrophysiological evidence favours a disorienting account of post-error slowing 
Publication Status 
 Published   Accepted for Publication 
 
Unpublished and Unsubmitted w ork w ritten in 





Name of Principal Author (Candidate) Nathan Beu 
Contribution to the Paper Research design, data collection, statistical analysis, wrote manuscript 
Overall percentage (%) 
 
Certification: This paper reports on original research I conducted during the period of my Higher Degree by 
Research candidature and is not subject to any obligations or contractual agreements with a third 






By signing the Statement of Authorship, each author certifies that: 
i. the candidate’s stated contribution to the publication is accurate (as detailed above); 
ii. permission is granted for the candidate in include the publication in the thesis; and 
iii. the sum of all co-author contributions is equal to 100% less the candidate’s stated contribution. 
 
 
Name of Co-Author Nicholas Burns 






Name of Co-Author Irina Baetu 





Please cut and paste additional co-author panels here as required. 
31/7/2020 
86  
3.2 Electrophysiological evidence favours a disorienting account of post-error 
slowing. 
Beu, N. D., Burns, N. R., & Baetu, I. 
 
The School of Psychology, University of Adelaide, North Terrace Campus, Hughes Building, 
Level 5, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia 
 
 
Statement of authorship 
 
All authors contributed to conceptualisation of experiment. NDB collected and analysed data 





This work was supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career 





The slowing down of a response after committing an error in speeded response tasks has been 
reliably observed over the last 60 years, but no explanation has yet been articulated to 
account for it. Post-error slowing (PES) is thought to reflect a proactive mechanism to 
improve one’s chances of successfully inhibiting a response or selecting the correct response 
from an array of possibilities. Recently, Dutilh and colleagues (2012a) used computational 
modelling to compare how well several accounts of PES fit real and simulated data. They 
concluded that PES is the result of participants widening their response boundaries, which 
they assumed corresponds to increased caution. This explanation supports a proactive account 
of PES. We used EEG to test the same four accounts modelled by Dutilh and colleagues to 
provide direct neural evidence to supplement their simulated data. In a Go/NoGo task 
administered to N = 100 healthy young adults (24.3 ± 4.8 yrs), we mapped ERP parameters to 
the theoretical drift parameters established by Dutilh and colleagues. Their hypothesis would 
predict larger N2 after errors and that the amplitude of the N2 should correlate with 
magnitude of PES. Our results did not support these predictions (N2 amplitude was smaller 
after errors, p = .015, and there was no correlation between N2 amplitude and PES, p = .523). 
Our findings support another common account of PES, a disorienting account, that supposes 
87  
errors disrupt attentional processing. The post-error anterior N1 was significantly disrupted 
by errors (p = .020) and was correlated with the magnitude of PES (p = .016). We, therefore, 
suggest that PES is not completely proactive, but rather is partially the consequence of 
disruptions to attentional processing that only incidentally improve response inhibition by 
offsetting the initiation of response execution. Interestingly, the post-error N1 in older adults 
was diminished (p = .0008), but higher general intelligence rescued such disruptions to 
attention (p < .0001), indicating a partial compensatory mechanism in ageing that is 




In order to achieve one’s goals, the ability to respond flexibly when faced with 
unexpected changes to one’s environment is often required. Such flexibility, in turn, requires 
the capacity to control the process by which the intended behaviour is selected and generated. 
The automaticity of simple behaviours and actions generally allows productive engagement 
with simple situations. However, when environmental demands render these actions 
maladaptive, they need to be rapidly countermanded. There is a large body of experimental 
literature documenting substantial individual differences in successfully engaging this 
mechanism (e.g., Aron, 2011; Avila & Parcet, 2001; Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2007). It is 
not altogether surprising that response inhibition is difficult, and this is perhaps even 
advantageous since some circumstances will favour the engagement of automatic responding 
while others will favour the engagement of controlled behaviour, hence most environments 
will require a balance between the two types of behaviour. 
Response inhibition is a critically important executive mechanism, disturbances to 
which characterise a broad array of psychopathological profiles (Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010; 
Wright, Lipszyc, Dupuis, Thayapararajah, & Schachar, 2014). Despite its importance, 
response inhibition remains poorly understood and inconsistently conceptualised and 
measured. It is nevertheless now known that such adaptive control of behaviour requires 
more than the overt capacity to withhold an inappropriate action (commonly called reactive 
inhibition); it also requires covert regulation by way of performance monitoring, error 
recognition, and ex ante adaptation (Aron, 2011; Braver, 2012; Kenemans, 2015). These 
three processes likely contribute to proactive inhibition, a behavioural adaptation mechanism 
that increases the likelihood of future successful response inhibition but their contribution to 
proactive inhibition remains an open question. Both reactive and proactive inhibition seem to 
contribute to successful behavioural control, with proactive inhibition potentially 
compensating for poor reactive inhibition (e.g., strategic slowing down of one’s response 
speed after a failure to inhibit a prepotent response seems to be accentuated in individuals 
with a poorer ability to exert reactive inhibition; Beu, Burns, & Baetu, 2019; Bloemendaal et 
al., 2016; Laar et al., 2011). 
There is a large body of data that attempts to account for or predict individual 
differences in response inhibition using some instantiation of either the Stop-Signal Task 
(SST) or the Go/No-Go paradigm (GNG) using various imaging and computational 
techniques (Amos, 2000; Becker & Lim, 2003; Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff, 
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2003; Liddle, Kiehl, & Smith, 2001; Mostofsky et al., 2003; Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 
2008; Wager et al., 2005). While nevertheless useful, such accounts often misrepresent the 
response inhibition network given what we now know about a dual control mechanism of 
inhibition and are thus limited in their utility, specifically for explaining pathological 
symptomatology. The principal measure yielded by the SST, Stop-Signal Reaction Time 
(SSRT; i.e., the time required to stop a response, or, interrupting the preparation of a 
repetitive action) is a measure of reactive inhibition, not overall response inhibition (Zandbelt 
& Vink, 2010). On the other hand, the principal measure yielded by the GNG paradigm, 
errors of commission (i.e., failures to withhold a response to a No-Go stimulus, or, inhibiting 
a prepared and initiated action) is a measure of overall response inhibition because under 
some conditions it is confounded by proactive inhibition, and is, therefore, unable to 
explicitly assess critical individual differences in the reactive process (Beu et al., 2019). 
Importantly, in each case, these measures are impure and incomplete representations of the 
critical processes under investigation, which may account for at least some of the 
incompatibility between empirical findings and clinical outcomes. 
Reactive inhibition supposes a race between stop and go processes to account for 
appropriate response inhibition or erroneous response execution (Band, van der Molen, & 
Logan, 2003; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008, 2009), and proactive inhibition is the strategic 
preparation for a presumed upcoming need to inhibit a response, which may be instantiated 
following stimulus cueing or behavioural adaptation following an error (Stuphorn, 2015). 
Proactive inhibition in response inhibition tasks can be operationalised as post-error slowing 
(PES), a commonly-observed phenomenon in which correct responses to Go stimuli after 
committing an error are roughly ten per cent slower than those preceding that error (Dutilh et 
al., 2012). It has been assumed that proactive inhibition contributes to successful response 
inhibition, but this assumption is often left untested and when it is tested, it not always 
supported by experimental data (e.g., Fiehler et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 2003; Hajcak & 
Simons, 2008; King et al., 2010; Núñez Castellar et al., 2010; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; 
Rabbitt, 1966; Rabbit & Rodgers, 1977; but see Van der Borght, Desmet, & Notebaert, 2015 
for alternative explanation). Whether or not proactive inhibition truly exerts an explicit 
positive effect on response inhibition in the trials immediately following the adaptation is not 
critically important, because it was recently proposed that it acts as an implicit compensatory 
strategy in adults whose overt reactive process may be compromised or deficient due to age 
or lower cognitive abilities (Beu, Burns, & Baetu, 2019). That is, it may be compensatory, 
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but not in the sense of improving performance, but rather protecting against poorer 
performance. PES may be a compensatory mechanism that takes the form of improving 
performance or protecting against further decrements in performance, but it may also reflect 
other processes, such as an emotional reaction to having committed an error (e.g., Rabbitt & 
Rodgers, 1977), and, as such, may not necessarily contribute to successful inhibition. 
It is pertinent to understand precisely how PES is engaged; that is, what is the 
cognitive process that offsets the implementation of post-error responses, and does it do so by 
auxiliary processing of the error, prolonging post-error stimulus processing, or some other 
mechanism? Whichever mechanism is responsible for the additional time associated with 
post-error responses is the mechanism deemed critical for the inhibitory network to 
implement in instances of deficient reactive inhibition. Articulating precisely the disturbed 
processes, and those processes which seem enhanced to compensate for them, is clearly 
important for understanding which processes are disturbed in different pathologies since an 
overall reduction in response inhibition ability may be caused by different disturbances in the 
processes contributing to overall performance. 
Using Drift Diffusion Models, Dutilh and colleagues (2012) concluded that post-error 
slowing is the result of shifting internal decision boundaries so that more stimulus-specific 
information is required before a subject is willing to make a decision to respond. Considering 
the conflicting evidence that performance directly improves following an error when PES is 
engaged (see Van der Borght, Desmet, & Notebaert, 2015), this explanation seems less likely 
unless greater evidence accumulation before a decision threshold is reached does not lead to 
improved performance. Error-associated responses are often characterised by shorter RTs 
than correct-associated ones, so post-error adjustments may partially reflect simple regression 
toward the mean. Generally, though, immediate post-error corrected trials that are themselves 
correct responses tend, in fact, to be slower than the mean RT of correct trials across the 
whole task, so true post-error adjustments probably reflect this additional latency (which may 
indeed reflect the upward shifted decision boundary proposed by Dutilh et al. (2012a)). 
Furthermore, data suggest that only those post-error responses that feature true PES are 
correct, whereas those post-error responses that are adjusted only to the mean RT level often 
are still incorrect in those segments of the task that include a no-go trial followed by another 
no-go trial. 
An alternative hypothesis is that performance is disrupted by the arousal, distraction, 
frustration, or loss of interest in task demands elicited by errors, and, as a function of this 
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disruption, response initiation is offset (Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Given that it seems clear 
that PES partially relies on personal motivational investment in good task performance, this 
may indeed account for some variance in PES, but at face value it seems unlikely that this is 
the only plausible explanation for it. This explanation makes no assumption of improved 
performance resulting from PES. Evidence in favour of this account was provided by 
Compton and colleagues (Compton, Heaton, & Gaines, 2018), who failed to observe the 
requisite behavioural or electrophysiological conditions of the alternative account (i.e., no 
performance improvement following an error despite recognition of that error). 
A widely-accepted account of PES put forth by Notebaert and colleagues (Notebaert 
et al., 2009) proposes that delayed initiation of post-error responses is the consequence of 
attention being oriented away from the task at hand and assumes that this is because errors 
are infrequent events that are distracting as a result of their relative novelty. This account is 
generally consistent with behavioural observations, but the derivation method that the authors 
used to compute PES was unsatisfactory (see Dutilh et al., 2012b). 
While these explanations may fit data, they do not provide direct neural evidence of 
the processing that occurs in this timeframe. Whatever the case, it seems likely that proactive 
inhibition is a strategic mechanism engaged by individuals in whom it is most necessary (Beu 
et al., 2019; Bloemendaal et al., 2016). What remains to be understood is the cognitive 
processing with which it is associated, which may potentially be inferred from 
electrophysiological data. If PES is a compensatory mechanism in those for whom it is more 
necessary, then what is the underlying process that is engaged to drive that compensation? 
Using imaging techniques to inform empirical interpretations of behavioural data may 
shed light on the mechanisms that underlie performance. There have been very few attempts 
to fit drift parameters estimated by drift diffusion models to EEG data (see Frank et al., 2015 
Meuller, White, & Kuchinke, 2017; Turner, van Maanen, & Forstmann, 2015). The nature of 
such models relies on the assumption of sequential sampling, which is necessarily 
incompatible with response inhibition tasks where trial-by-trial response processing is 
differentiated on the basis of two things: the trial type (i.e., Go or No-Go), and its relative 
point to surrounding responses (i.e., relative to a prior error, a subsequent error, a prior 
correct response, or a subsequent correct response). It is unclear how, or whether, such 
models can reconcile these theoretical issues. 
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Several PET, near-infrared spectroscopy, and fMRI studies have indicated that 
activation of inferior frontal areas is associated with inhibition of behaviour, and more 
recently that the anterior cingulate is a critical locus in the network. Given the poor temporal 
resolution of the haemodynamic response, such techniques have limited utility in revealing 
the role of these putative neural generators in engaging distinct inhibitory processes. Yet, a 
good deal of empirical data have been generated pertaining to the source location and neural 
generators of event-related potential (ERP) components, but the cognitive processing that 
elicits this electrical activity have not yet been fully described. These are exhaustively 
outlined in many reviews and elsewhere which do not account for proactive inhibition (e.g., 
Band & van Boxtel, 1999; Huster, Enriquez-Geppert, Lavalle, Falkenstein, & Herrmann, 
2013; Huster, Westerhausen, Pantev, & Konrad, 2010; Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Kiefer, 
Marzinzik, Weisbrod, Scherg, & Spitzer, 1998; Luitjen et al., 2014; Menon, Adleman, White, 
Glover, & Reiss, 2001). What is more important, though, is the time course of this activity, 
and whether it is sensible to surmise the cognitive processes as a function of the ERP 
component based on its latency and the latency of processes that they are thought to reflect. 
The ERP profile of response inhibition has been extensively reviewed elsewhere, 
especially for aggregated stimulus-locked components (i.e., ignoring likely pre- and post- 
error differences; see Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashiu, 2001; Jodo & Kayama, 1992; 
Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). Briefly, neither the P1 nor the N1 tend to be distinguishable between 
Go and No-Go conditions in latency, amplitude, scalp topography, or source localisation. 
Because an N2 is generally elicited only by No-Go stimuli, it is commonly known as the No- 
Go N2, and appears to be generated in the right cingulate cortex, consistent with the fMRI 
literature implicating this region in stopping and inhibiting responses (e.g., Jodo & Kayama, 
1992). Likewise, P3 amplitude is reliably larger with a longer tail (i.e., a similar deflection 
onset, but longer duration) on No-Go trials, and tends to be more anteriorly localised than the 
Go-P3. It has been reported that the P3 component for Go trials can be divided into two 
subcomponents, the early (P3e) and the late (P3l), whereas the No-Go P3 shows only one 
peak (e.g., Bokura et al., 2001). This bimodal P3 structure probably reflects the onset of 
intentional action because in those experiments in which it is observed, the error rate is very 
low, so the No-Go P3 is therefore successfully inhibited, eliminating this possible confound. 
In a Go/No-Go paradigm with two conditions, one in which participants were 
instructed to favour speed over accuracy, and the other in which participants were given no 
such instruction, the No-Go N2 was significantly larger in amplitude when greater effort was 
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required to inhibit a response (i.e., when speed was favoured over accuracy; Jodo & Kayama, 
1992). Donkers and van Boxtel (2004) proposed an alternative hypothesis to the ‘No-Go’ 
classification of the N2 by eliciting it in a “Go/GO” paradigm in which the “GO” signal 
required participants to respond with maximal force and the “Go” signal required a response 
with force consistent with normal key-pressing. They therefore concluded that the N2 reflects 
conflict monitoring, not response inhibition. These accounts do not appear incompatible if 
one considers the N2 to simply reflect mismatch detection or stimulus discrimination (e.g., 
Go vs No-Go, or Go vs GO in these two examples), as was suggested by the researchers who 
first observed the component (Sutton, Braren, & Zubin, 1965), and later supported by Smith 
and colleagues (Smith, Johnstone, & Barry, 2007). 
Sehlmeyer and colleagues (Sehlmeyer et al., 2010) showed that the No-Go N2 and the 
No-Go P3 are not solely the result of identifying an upcoming need to inhibit a response. 
They showed that the No-Go N2 was significantly larger in high compared to low trait 
anxiety (i.e., nonspecific, or general, anxiety) and that there was no such effect in high 
compared to low anxiety sensitivity (i.e., anxiety elicited by a specific cue), and that the No- 
Go P3 was significantly larger in high compared to low anxiety sensitivity but not high 
compared to low trait anxiety. This indicates that the manner in which different people 
encode the same stimulus, and thus the directive which that stimulus involves, can be 
distinguished by these components. In particular, that the need to inhibit a response is not a 
unitary process in the mind, but one that is an intended outcome that is reached by different 
paths in different people. The implication of these findings is that there may be a common 
neural network underlying response inhibition and anxiety, and also that it may be possible to 
categorise those who favour reactive processes or proactive processes by such an index. 
Interestingly, Bengson, Mangun, and Mazaheri (2012) suggest even that anti-correlations 
between beta-band activity in the motor cortex and theta-band activity in prefrontal regions 
predict subsequent failed inhibitions in a Go/No-Go task and, based on these findings, claim 
that independent perceptual and motor mechanisms operate separately, but in parallel, to 
influence success or failure of response inhibition. In all, this evidence gives a clear 
indication of a dual motor and cognitive process of response inhibition. In support of this, 
Vallessi (2011) administered a Go/No-Go task to a sample with a broad age range and found 
that although older participants responded slower, they did not make more errors (see also 
Beu et al, 2019). Critically, though, both the Go and the No-Go P3 differed in latency and 
amplitude (were longer and larger) in older adults only at prefrontal sites and not at central 
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sites, but its amplitude was highly correlated with quicker response times at central sites at all 
ages. These results suggest that more intensive stimulus evaluation processes lead to quicker 
responses, and that older adults seem to engage in more frontal stimulus evaluation 
processing that appears to equalise their inhibitory success with younger people. 
There has not been much investigation into differences in stimulus-locked ERPs 
between inhibited and uninhibited responses on Stop or No-Go trials in response inhibition 
tasks. Some authors have reported a larger N2 and P3 on No-Go trials compared to Go trials, 
with correctly-inhibited No-Go N2 and P3 being even larger than their failed inhibition 
counterparts (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 2002; Smith, Johnstone, & Barry, 2008). 
Smith and colleagues (2008) assume this to reflect appreciation of the need for inhibition. 
The plausibility of this hypothesis is questionable, since a common temporal window for the 
N2 is 200 – 500 msec, the majority of which is after a response is executed, therefore the 
temporal window does not coincide with processes presumably involved in response 
preparation. Using a Flanker task, Groom and Cragg (2015) likewise suggest that the P3 is 
associated somehow with inhibition, reporting a larger P3 on correctly inhibited No-Go trials. 
They found no such effect reflected in the N2, though, rather suggesting that the N2 is 
associated with response conflict, but not inhibition. Roche et al. (Roche, Garavan, Foxe, & 
O’Mara, 2005), on the other hand, observed no differences in amplitude in either the N2 or 
the P3 between correct and incorrect inhibitions, but that N2 (especially at left posterior 
temporal region), frontocentral P3e, and parietal P3l all arose earlier on correctly-inhibited 
No-Go trials compared to errors. The authors did not report comparisons to latencies on Go 
trials. 
On the other hand, a considerable number of studies have compared response-locked 
ERPs to correct and incorrect responses. The error-related negativity (ERN) is elicited when 
an error is committed and is observed in humans and monkeys at frontocentral sites within 
100 msec of the electromyographic activity associated with the error. There is some evidence 
that the ERN is elicited even outside of error awareness in a combination Go/No-Go/Stroop 
task (Hester, Foxe, Molholm, Shpaner, & Garavan, 2005). Interestingly, in this task, not only 
was PES not observed, but an opposite effect was—participants sped up after errors and 
slowed down after correct responses. So, the interpretability and generalisability of this 
conclusion is questionable. Nevertheless, in this experiment as well as in others using more 
standard response inhibition tasks, converging dipole source modelling and fMRI evidence 
localise the ERN to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Hester et al., 2005), and dorsolateral 
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prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; Roche, Garavan, Foxe, & O’Mara, 2005), both critical loci in the 
response inhibition network commonly assumed to reflect error recognition and to support 
inhibition, respectively. In fact, Roche and colleagues (Roche et al., 2005) reported data that 
seem to indicate that the DLPFC may strengthen or support the ERN during periods of 
“absent-mindedness”. That is, in those who less frequently recognise errors in their response 
patterns, which is a behaviour associated with blunted ERN, the DLPFC is activated 
alongside the ACC following an error. The presence of the ERN even in the absence of error 
awareness may be contradicted by data from young people. Ladouceur and colleagues 
(Ladouceur et al., 2004) measured PES in a flanker task, and separated their sample into early 
and late adolescence groups. They found that both age groups slowed down after committing 
an error, but that the ERN arose only in older adolescents. So, in some experiments, there is 
behavioural evidence of post-error behavioural adaption in the absence of neural evidence, 
whereas in others, the opposite is observed. 
In patients with lesions to the medial PFC, including the ACC and the rostral 
cingulate zone (RCZ), Stemmer et al. (Stemmer, Segalowitz, Witzke, & Schonle, 2003) 
showed that even with conscious awareness of errors, no ERN was elicited. This is 
inconsistent either with findings that ERN is elicited by response monitoring or that the ERN 
originates in these neural regions. It is possible that damage to the ACC may interrupt the 
relay of synaptic volleys that produce the ERN, suggesting that error detection or response 
monitoring is potentially supported by circuits outside the ACC. 
Even correct responses give rise to a negative-going deflection under some conditions 
(e.g., Olvet & Hajcak, 2009), which has been termed the correct response negativity. Given 
that the ERN can be elicited without conscious awareness of an error, and the presence of 
somewhat similar component after correct responses, it seems plausible that the so-called 
error-related negativity reflects a comparison process between the executed response and the 
intended response. That is, it may reflect processing a response, but not processing an error, 
especially since it is not related to PES (Niewenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok., 
2001). In other tasks, in accordance with basic reinforcement learning principles, the ERN 
appears to be associated with improving task performance (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Here, 
the ERN was localised to the RCZ, not the ACC. The RCZ is often implicated in monitoring 
response conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), and is activated by the 
need for behavioural adjustments when the probability of obtaining a reward is reduced, 
which differs from errors, which signify the loss of anticipated reward (Ridderinkhof, 
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Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). It seems plausible then that the neural origin of the 
ERN and the task conditions in which it is being elicited determine its meaning. 
When an error is committed, the ERN is usually followed by a waveform whose 
morphology and scalp topography is commensurate to the P3, the error positivity (Pe). Since 
the P3 is thought to reflect the processing associated with evaluation or categorisation of an 
event (Bokura et al., 2011), and it is mediated by the subject’s motivational or attributional 
investment in a task (Atshushi et al., 2005; Kleih, Nijboer, Halder, Kübler, 2010), it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the Pe is associated with the same. However, dipole source 
modelling of the Pe scalp topography implicate alternative neural generators to those which 
generate the P3. This was supported by Hester and his colleagues (Hester et al., 2005) who 
contrasted blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signals associated with conscious and 
nonconscious errors in a Go/No-Go fMRI experiment, and observed differential activation 
between regions associated with the Pe and the P3. It has nevertheless been postulated that 
the Pe might indeed constitute a P3-like response that reflects the motivational significance of 
errors (Overbeek et al., 2005), which is consistent with observations of larger Pe following 
more salient errors (Leuthold & Sommer, 1999), and smaller or absent Pe without conscious 
recognition of the error (Endrass et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 
2007). Furthermore, Davies and colleagues (Davies, Segalowitz, Dywan, & Pailing, 2001) 
reported positive correlations in amplitude between the stimulus-locked P3 on correct 
responses and the response-locked Pe on incorrect responses in a flanker task. 
This evidence supports the idea that the ERN reflects response, but not error, 
monitoring, and that the Pe reflects conscious processing of the error. Interestingly, though, 
both the ERN and the Pe have been elicited in subjects who observe others committing errors, 
and the amplitude of their ERN correlated with their own PES when they themselves perform 
that task (Wang et al., 2015). Others have suggested that the ERN reflects a general error 
signal when the error is initiated, but that the Pe is more closely related to remedial action to 
correct the error (Kieffaber, Hershaw, Sredl, & West, 2016). This is consistent with the 
account of the ERN arising in both aware and unaware errors if only the post-ERN Pe gives 
rise to PES only following conscious errors. 
There is a wealth of data describing differences in amplitude and latency between 
errors to No-Go stimuli and correct responses to Go stimuli for response-locked components, 
but very little that describes the relationship between these differences and PES. Furthermore, 
the efficacy of behavioural adaptation following an error is less understood in 
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psychophysiological terms. The ERN is elicited regardless of conscious awareness of an 
error, whereas the Pe does not appear to be, but can these components tell us anything 
meaningful about post-error behavioural adjustments? If they can, meaning that the error is 
processed in some way and proactive inhibition is engaged, is this translated into post-error 
behavioural improvements? Finally, if it is, what is the mechanism for this according to the 
previously described accounts of PES? 
It stands to reason that error-related processing induces variable patterns in 
subsequent stimulus processing, and that such variations could induce post-error behavioural 
adaptation and/or post-error behavioural performance changes. So, in accordance with the 
four most common hypothetical accounts of PES, we may be able to infer the 
electrophysiological profiles associated with them. 
While it may not be possible to use variations in ERPs on different trial types as 
indices of the theoretical drift parameters proposed by Dutilh and colleagues (2012), it may 
be possible to use them as evidence to evaluate the three primary accounts of PES. According 
to Dutilh and colleagues’ (2012) modelling, PES can be explained by increased response 
caution, the psychometric architecture of which is reflected in outward shifted decision 
boundaries. Since the N2 has been implicated in stimulus discrimination, and the P3 in 
stimulus processing, we might expect these two components to correlate with PES. These 
authors suggest that an alternative explanation that may potentially also fit their data is 
increased attention following an error, which can be simply inferred from increased 
amplitude in the N1 following an error, since the N1 is an ERP typically assumed to represent 
stimulus processing or attention (e.g., Luck, 1995; 2000). On the other hand, Notebaert et al. 
(2009) argue that PES is the consequence of distracted attention, which could be simply 
observed as a smaller N1 following an error. However, this hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that the distraction is caused by the infrequency of errors (the oddball 
hypothesis), and therefore this hypothesis implies that we should also observe a larger P3 on 
error trials compared to correctly withheld inhibitions (i.e., an oddball P3). For our purposes, 
we will refer to the former account as an orienting account, and latter account as a 
disorienting account. Finally, Rabbitt and Rodgers’ (1977) account suggests that PES is 
caused by effective error detection and response processing. A possible neural correlate that 
could provide support for this hypothesis is increased amplitude of error-related components, 
the ERN and/or Pe. With these four hypotheses and their potential electrophysiological 
accounts in mind, we may be able to tease them apart using a measure of general intelligence, 
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which we recently found to influence the engagement of PES alongside age (Beu et al., 
2019). Since in our previous study lower general intelligence scores predicted greater PES, 
we anticipate that whichever ERP better reflects the engagement of PES should also correlate 
with lower general intelligence scores. 




One hundred adults were recruited from a classifieds advertisement website, provided 
written informed consent, and were remunerated for their time at the rate of AU$20 per hour. 
This sample is the third sample used in Experiment 3 in the previous chapter. Four 
participants were excluded from analysis due to inadequate task engagement (two criteria 
were used to assess the adequacy of task engagement: (1) responses to no fewer than 80% 
(⩾480) of Go trials; and, (2) at least 80% (⩾675) of total RTs not being below the threshold 
for a true response, see below; n = 2). Two participants were excluded from response-locked 
but not stimulus-locked ERP analyses due to a coding error that caused a failure to record 
response events. 
The final sample (N = 94, 55 females; age: M = 24.3, SD = 4.8, range 18-40 yrs; 86% 
right-handed, 12% left-handed, and 2% ambidextrous by self-report) comprised healthy, 
adults who self-reported to researchers prior to consenting as having normal or corrected-to- 
normal vision, not taking medications with sedative or stimulant mechanisms, or medications 
indicated for neuropsychiatric dysfunction (e.g., antidepressants, antipsychotics; such 
medications usually operate on dopaminergic, cholinergic, or serotonergic receptors, each of 
which have unknown effects on EEG waveforms (Aiyer, Novakovic, & Barkin, 2016)) for at 
least six months; not suffering from major medical or psychiatric conditions; having no 
history of drug or alcohol dependency; and, not smoking more than five cigarettes per day. 
The experimental protocol was approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research 
Ethics Committee and administered in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki (2013 
revision). 
3.5.2 Testing procedure 
 
Participants were seated 60 cm from a 24-inch, 120Hz computer screen in a sound- 
attenuated room for approximately 60 minutes. Responses were made with a standard 1,000 
dpi computer mouse. Participants completed a series of behavioural tasks, as well as a 
modified Go/No-Go task administered during the EEG recording. The behavioural tasks 
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included a battery of fluid ability tests that assess reasoning ability, working memory, and 
processing speed (see below) in order to investigate any effects of g, a general factor of 
intelligence, on ERP waveforms or response inhibition performance. Stimulus presentation 
for the behavioural tasks was controlled by Xojo software (Xojo Inc., Texas, USA), whereas 
the EEG task was coded in E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA). Prior to administration of behavioural tasks, participants self-reported age and sex. 
3.5.3 Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) 
 
We use a Go/No-Go task in favour of the Stop-Signal Task because, unlike SSTs 
where Going and Stopping processing are confounded since both stimuli are presented on 
No-Go trials, in Go/No-Go tasks the two types of stimulus are presented on separate trials, 
therefore providing the opportunity to assess differences in stimulus processing (the nature of 
this distinction is discussed in Switck, Ashley, & Turken, 2011). We use a modified version 
of the traditional nine-digit SART here, instead presenting participants with four digits. We 
do this to ensure a number of No-Go error trials high enough for ERP analyses. It remains the 
case that only one of these four digits is a No-Go signal, and all digits are presented in 
randomised order with equiprobability to avoid oddball effects (that typically occur in many 
tasks where No-Go stimuli are less frequent than Go stimuli and where all Go stimuli are 
identical) and, where possible, to attenuate the influence of individual differences in learning. 
The SART (Robertson et al., 1997) is a Go/No-Go task in which participants are sequentially 
presented with a single digit (1 – 4) displayed in the centre of the screen in fonts of differing 
sizes (48, 72, 94, 100 and 120 point, ranging from 12 mm to 29 mm on the screen; i.e., 
subtending 1° × 0.75° to 2.4° × 1.8° at the retina). Each digit is displayed for 245 msec, 
immediately followed by a mask for 900 msec, resulting in a response period of 1,145 msec 
from digit onset to mask offset. This masking procedure interrupts residual visual processing 
(Herzog, 2008) and minimises fixational drift (Snodderly, 2016). Participants are instructed 
to rapidly respond by pressing the left mouse button, using their preferred hand, as soon as 
possible after any digit, except the digit ‘3’, is displayed (‘Go trials’; 0.75 probability), and to 
inhibit this response when the digit ‘3’ is displayed (‘No-Go trials’; 0.25 probability). This 
task consists of 800 trials, each digit presented with equiprobability in random order, with 
200 No-Go trials. Participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible without 
sacrificing accuracy. 
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3.5.4 Behavioural analysis 
 
3.5.4.1 Overall response inhibition and proactive inhibition. Despite median 
response time (RT) being commonly-used because it is robust to the influence of skew and 
truncation (Ulrich & Miller, 1994), we use the mean here for two reasons. First, because use 
of the median is more suited to simple tasks that present a single stimulus, and that require 
simple stimulus-response patterns, such as the Simple or Choice RT tasks; whereas the 
Go/No-Go task has two trial-types (Go and No-Go) that are differently processed, and which 
introduce confounding processing and response strategies to even the Go stimulus. Second, 
this task is unlikely to generate large RT outliers and we do not apply an upper bound for RT 
outlier exclusion because this task uses a fixed inter-stimulus interval, imposing a limit on 
responding (1,145 msec), which approximates the acceptable upper bound of most RT 
distributions (Luce, 1991; Miller & Low, 2001; Jensen, 2006). However, we exclude trials 
with RTs shorter than 150 msec (these trials are assumed to reflect anticipatory responses). 
This heuristic resulted in the exclusion of very few trials (1.6%). 
Our measure of overall response inhibition is the proportion of successfully withheld 
responses on No-Go trials; that is, the complement proportion of errors of commission, where 
an error of commission is the failure to inhibit a response to the No-Go stimulus. It is worth 
noting, however, that this traditional measure of response inhibition is potentially confounded 
by proactive inhibition, and therefore might not purely reflect reactive inhibition (the ability 
to stop a prepared response). Our measure of proactive inhibition is post-error slowing (PES). 
In the SART, PES is computed by subtracting the average RT of Go trials within a four-trial 
window before an error of commission from the average RT of Go trials within a four-trial 
window after the error of commission. PES is, therefore, the temporal response pattern 
adjustment that participants make after failing to correctly inhibit a response, which usually 
consists of slowing down responses to Go stimuli after an error. Trials that could be classified 
as both pre- and post-error trials, and No-Go trials that fall within these windows, were 
omitted from the analysis. It has been established that four trials either side of an error are 
sufficient to yield an accurate and computationally efficient estimate of PES; however, this 
conclusion was derived from data using the traditional SART (No-Go probability = 0.11, 
whereas here, No-Go probability = 0.25, resulting in more errors, but relatively fewer 




3.5.4.2 Psychometric analysis. We recently demonstrated that general intelligence, g, 
seems to mediate the relationship between age and proactive inhibition, and that age also 
magnified a dopaminergic polygenic effect on proactive inhibition (Beu et al., 2019). It is 
possible that age, which negatively affects dopamine production and transmission, is a 
predictor of greater PES, as this allows individuals to compensate for natural declines in 
dopamine production. If both age and g appear to moderate a genetic effect on PES, PES may 
therefore be considered a compensatory strategy. So, we will investigate the 
psychophysiological correlates of g in stopping and in proactive stopping, and investigate 
whether g is associated with the ERPs that accompany PES. 
We administered a battery of tests of fluid abilities on the same computing and 
peripheral hardware described above and used structural equation modelling (SEM) to 
calculate a latent general intelligence (g) factor. Our SEM includes additional samples to 
those described in the current paper. These additional samples comprise a larger series of 
experiments with a common theme and similar battery of cognitive tasks, and with identical 
participation inclusion criteria. This method for g derivation allows a more robust population 
estimate due to the larger sample size (N = 569). The model is robust (χ2 (N = 569) = 34.5, P 
= 0.03, CFI = .98, TLI = .97), and includes tasks measuring the following domains: higher- 
order inductive reasoning (Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices short-form, RPM (Raven, 
2000), and the Comprehensive Abilities Battery-Induction, CAB-I (Hakstian et al., 1975)), 
visuospatial ability (Mental Rotation (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978)), visuospatial working 
memory (Dot Matrix (Law et al., 1995)), verbal working memory (Sentence Span 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2010)), visual processing speed (Inspection Time (Vickers et al., 
1972)), and response and decision speed (Simple and Choice Reaction Time (Deary et al., 
2011)). These domains were chosen for their known associations with g (Jensen, 1998). In an 
additive model, the tasks that this sample was tested on, and the proportion of estimated 
individual variance in g that each accounts for were: Simple (standardised β = -.063, p 
= .005) and Choice (standardised β = -.117, p < .0001) Reaction Time, RPM (standardised β 
= .412, p < .0001) and Dot Matrix (standardised β = .609, p < .0001), in a highly significant 
model (R2 = .931, F4,275 = 926.8, p <.0001). This method of estimating SEM with samples 
that share a subset of common measures is described in (Keith & Reynolds, 2012). 
Finally, because we used an unvalidated adaptation of the traditional SART for EEG 
analyses, we also administered the traditional version (which presented digits 1-9 rather than 
1-4, and hence presented No-Go stimuli with a probability of 11%) to ensure that 
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performance was consistent in the EEG task and the traditional, shorter, version (for 
description see Section 2.5.3). 
3.5.5 EEG recording and analysis 
 
Continuous EEG was recorded from tin electrodes embedded in a cap (Electro-Cap 
International, Ohio) from the Fz, F3, F4, Cz, C3, C4, Pz, P3, and P4 scalp sites according to 
the International 10–20 system. An additional active electrode was placed on the right 
earlobe, and all electrodes were referenced to the left earlobe with a ground located at AFz. 
Impedances were generally kept below 5 kΩ, and never exceeded 10 kΩ. A vertical and a 
horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) were recorded from electrodes placed above and below 
the left eye, and at the left and right outer canthi. EEG and EOG were recorded at a sampling 
rate of 1000 Hz and amplified using a BioNomadix wireless system (Biopac Systems Inc., 
Goleta, CA, USA). EEG data were filtered online with a 0.1–100 Hz bandpass filter, and 
EOG data were filtered online with a 0.005–35 Hz bandpass filter. 
The data were further analysed offline using EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) 
and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon and Luck, 2014). EEG data were re-referenced to the 
average of the two earlobes and filtered using a 50-Hz notch filter and a 30-Hz low-pass 
filter (12 dB/octave). The continuous EEG was locked to stimulus-onset or to the motor 
response. 
Stimulus-locked events were segmented into epochs ranging from 100 msec prior to 
stimulus onset to 200 msec post stimulus onset, and baseline corrected using the 100-msec 
pre-stimulus interval for the N1 (note that we used a shorter time window for the N1 to 
increase the number of usable trials from which this small component was estimated), and 
100 msec prior to stimulus onset to 600 msec post stimulus onset, and baseline corrected 
using the same pre-stimulus interval for the N2 and P3. 
Response-locked events were segmented into epochs ranging 100 msec prior to 
response to 500 msec post response, and corrected using the same baseline, or pre-response, 
interval. Response-locked ERPs can be confounded by differences in RT between conditions. 
For example, the faster RTs on incorrect No-Go trials than on Go trials would result in a 
baseline period that would include the onset of the Go or No-Go stimulus at different 
processing stages. Such differences in the baseline periods could confound the response- 
locked ERPs. To control for this potential confound, we selected Go trials with RTs most 
similar to No-Go trials. That is, for each participant we iteratively removed Go trials with the 
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longest RTs until the difference between the average RT for Go trials and the average RT for 
No-Go trials was less than 5 msec. 
Blinks and eye movements were detected using a function in ERPLAB that detects 
step-like artefacts in the vertical and horizontal EOG channels, as recommended by Luck 
(2014). Trials with such artefacts were rejected from further analyses. In order to maintain an 
acceptable signal-to-noise ratio, we included only participants who had more than 25 artefact- 
free trials in both stimulus-locked trial-type for each relevant comparison (i.e., before error 
and after error; error responses and correct Go responses). The number of participants 
excluded based on this rule differed between comparison and ERP and can be deduced by 
degrees of freedom in their respective analyses below. We applied the same criterion for the 
response-locked conditions (before error, after error, error responses and correct Go 
responses). For response-locked pre- and post- error comparisons, 68 participants remained 
after pre-processing, and for the Go and error trial comparisons, 36 remained. Exclusions for 
these ERPs are higher because we required a minimum number of ERPs per participant to 
calculate response ERP amplitude values, and many participants fell under this threshold 
after processing. Additional exclusions here are due to the motor confounds associated with 
responding, and because errors tend to manifest physically in eyeblinks, readjustment, and 
facial expressions, but also because the response-locked analyses were subjected to an 
additional constraint (we included only trials with RTs shorter than 645 msec, see below). 
ERPs were measured as the mean amplitude in their respective time windows, 
averaged across bilateral sites (i.e., 3, 4, and z). We use mean amplitude as our measure 
because, compared to others, it seems less sensitive to differences in the number of trials 
between trial-types (Luck, 2014). The anterior N1 was measured from frontal sites at 80 – 
150 msec, the central N2 was measured from central sites at 180 – 280 msec, and the 
frontocentral P3 was measured from frontal and central sites at 300 – 600 msec, all relative to 
stimulus onset. Response-locked ERPs were also averaged across bilateral sites; the ERN was 
measured from frontal sites at 0 – 150 msec, and the Pe was measured from central sites at 
200 – 500 msec. These time windows were chosen because they are consistent with the 
literature, and they contained the maximal peak of each component except the Pe. The 500- 
msec time window for the Pe abbreviated the full waveform although it still contained the 
peak for most trials. We chose a relatively short 500-msec time window locked to the onset 
of the response because it needed to precede the onset of the subsequent trial. That is, we 
excluded trials with a reaction time that was longer than 645 msec, so that the response- 
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locked epoch of 500 msec did not extend into the subsequent trial. This constraint prevented 
us from using a longer epoch, which would have resulted in the exclusion of a large number 
of trials. Unlike many EEG studies with motor behavioural tasks, we recruited left-handed 
participants despite the unknowns associated with lateralisation of activity and function in 
such tasks between handedness (e.g., Doyle, Yarrow, & Brown, 2005). We allowed left-
handed individuals to participate because ERPs were averaged across bilateral and central 
sites, and did not investigate any lateralised effects. Average amplitude and variability in the 
sample with and without inclusion of left-handed participants were highly concordant in all 
ERPs and all trial and response types. 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
 
3.6.1 Behavioural data 
 
3.6.1.1 Response inhibition. Because we used an unvalidated adaptation of the 
traditional SART for EEG analyses, we also administered the traditional version to ensure 
that performance in the two tasks was consistent. The three measures of each task were all 
correlated: Go RT (r = .68, p < .0001), error rate (r = .67, p < .0001), and PES (r = .42, p 
< .0001). The descriptive data for the traditional SART is reported in the previous chapter. 
 
The average RT on Go trials in the modified SART was 366 (± 67.3) msec and the 
average RT for No-Go trials (i.e., errors) was 304 (± 68.4) msec; consistent with common 
findings, this difference represents a quicker error response than correct Go response (t93 = 
17.86, p < .0001, d = 0.91). Overall, the mean error rate was 28.77% (M = 57.54, SD = 29.94 
errors), and every participant made at least one error, of whom, all but 19 (20.12%) engaged 
PES. The average RT difference before (M = 337 ± 61.2 msec) and after (M = 362 ± 69.0 
msec) errors was 24.74 msec (95%CI: 18.87 – 30.60) and is statistically significant (t93 = 
8.37, p < .0001, d = 0.38), indicating a general recruitment of proactive inhibition. 
For the most part, it remains an open question as to whether PES is an effective 
strategy to enhance successful inhibition to subsequent No-Go stimuli. Here, a t-test indicated 
that those participants who slowed down following an error did not make fewer errors than 
those who did not slow down (M = 58.20, SD = 29.82 errors, and M = 54.47, SD = 34.22 
errors, respectively), p = .666. Furthermore, magnitude of proactive inhibition was not 
indicative of greater overall response inhibition (r = -.10, p = .35), seeming to indicate that, 
on the whole, PES may not contribute to overall inhibition of action as a general principle 
across all people (i.e., it may not operate in the same way between individuals). It is possible 
that single-trial analysis could yield more precision in answering this question (i.e., whether 
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PES after one error increased the probability of inhibition on closely-following No-Go trials, 
and the absence of PES after another error had no effect on, or decreased probability of, 
inhibition of closely-following No-Go trials), but our task contained too high a proportion of 
No-Go to Go trials to be able to run such analyses. 
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There was no effect of sex on any measure of SART performance (all p > .75). Older 
age, however, was associated with more successful response inhibition (i.e., fewer errors; r92 
= -.28, p = .006), but not RT (r92 = .15, p = .136) and only marginally with more proactive 
inhibition (r92 = .19, p = .071). Those correlations that are significant remain so after 
correcting α for multiple comparisons using the highly conservative Bonferroni’s method. 
Given our previous evidence that PES appears to be a compensatory mechanism (Beu 
et al., 2019), we wanted to pinpoint the source of the effect of PES and age on error rate by 
running a regression model with an interaction term alongside a simple additive model. In the 
additive model, age was a significant predictor of fewer errors (β = -1.72, p = .008) but PES 
was not (β = -0.05, p = .661), F2,91 = 4.09, p = .020, R
2 = .08, consistent with the notion that 
PES may not, in itself, improve response inhibition. The inclusion of an interaction term 
captured much of the previous effect of age, which was no longer significant (p = .777), 
allowing PES to predict more errors (β = 1.04, p = .047), and, consistent with a compensatory 
account of PES, the interaction was significant (β = -0.05, p = .034), such that more PES 
when it accompanies older age predicts fewer errors. This model (F3,90 = 4.38, p = .006) 
accounted for an additional 4.5% of variance in errors (R2 = .13). This pattern of data 
replicates our previous findings (Beu et al., 2019). Since the relationship between age and 
outcome behavioural measures relies on its interaction with other variables, and because for 
the most part age was not associated with ERP measures, neither it, nor sex, were included as 
covariates in any subsequent models. 
3.6.1.2 Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off. Since overall response time confounds the overall 
commission of errors (r92 = -.72, p < .0001) – most likely due to proactive inhibition 
processes like post-error slowing – we computed a measure of speed-accuracy trade-off 
(SAT) which is a relatively clean measure of performance that controls for strategic slowing 
down of response time to achieve a higher successful inhibition rate. Here, our measure of 
SAT was calculated by dividing the number of correct inhibitions (200 – nErrors; i.e., 
accuracy) by the mean response time on correct Go trials (i.e., speed). It is possible that the 
significant effects of ERP measures predicting overall response inhibition reported above 
may be partially accounted for by an intermediary effect of SAT. Importantly, though, SAT 
differs from PES insofar as it reflects an overall implicit bias that is less prone to rapid 
dynamic fluctuation. To that end, we are interested in whether SAT is associated with PES, 
whether SAT accounts for any of the variance in models where ERPs predict overall 
inhibition, and, indeed, whether ERPs singularly predict SAT but not PES or overall 
inhibition. 
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SAT may be a distinct process to PES: they are uncorrelated (r92 = -.18, p 
3.6.1.3 = .091), and those participants in whom PES was observed did not differ in their 
SAT from those in whom it was not (t92 = 0.52, p = .604). Like PES, though, SAT is somewhat 
associated with older age, but not significantly so (r92 = .19, p = .071). In an additive model, both 
PES (standardised β = 2.26, p =.026) and SAT (standardised β = 2.38, p = .020) remain significant 
predictors of age, in the same direction, with highly similar standardised effects, and no interaction 
effect (p = .226).A general factor of intelligence. We recently demonstrated that a general 
factor of intelligence, g, seemed to influence the magnitude of post-error slowing, and the 
extent to which it resulted in greater response inhibition. Age was not associated with general 
intelligence, g (r92 = .10, p = .331), nor was g associated with RT (r92 = -.13, p = .219), or 
errors (r92 = -.09, p = .355), but g was negatively associated with magnitude of proactive 
inhibition (r92 = -.25, p =.015), such that PES is engaged more so by those with lower g. 
Consistent with our previous results (Beu et al., 2019), here, in a model including both error 
rate and PES, g is not predicted by error rate (p = .231), but PES does account for a small 
amount of variance in g (β = -0.01, p = .011), F2,91 = 3.84, p = .025, R
2 = .078), meaning that 
participants with lower estimates of g utilise a proactive strategy and in so doing make 
roughly the same number of errors as those with higher estimated g. 
Additional evidence for SAT being distinct from PES comes from its correlations 
with g. While PES was negatively correlated with g, SAT was positively correlated with g 
(r92 = .29, p = .005). In a model including both as predictors, both SAT (standardised β = 
0.25, p = .013) and PES (standardised β = -0.21, p = .040) were significant (F2,91 = 6.52, p 
= .002) and accounted for 12.53% of its variance, indicating that a stronger SAT and less 
recruitment of PES predicts higher g. Standardised β coefficients are reported because SAT 
values are not inherently interpretable. There was no interaction (p = .102). 
3.6.2 ERP Analyses 
 
The average amplitudes for each ERP are plotted in Figures 16 and 17 for relevant 
trial and response types. Consistent with literature, the temporal ranges we chose for each 
component included their maximal amplitude, with the exception of the Pe (as discussed 
above). We sought to investigate the extent to which ERP amplitude was affected by the 
commission of errors, and by No-Go stimuli; so, for stimulus-locked components, we 
compare the amplitude to Go stimuli on pre-error trials to post-error trials, and to No-Go 
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stimuli on correctly-inhibited trials to failed inhibition (i.e., error) trials; and, for response- 
locked components, we report the same pre-/post- error comparison, but we compare Go 
responses to Error responses, seeing as correct inhibitions yield no response. 
While it is generally agreed that No-Go stimuli elicit a larger N2 and P3 compared to 
Go stimuli, there is disagreement concerning whether these components differ in amplitude to 
No-Go stimuli based on whether the response is executed (i.e., an error) or is correctly 
inhibited. Our data support the common observation of a No-Go N2 and No-Go P3 (see 
Figure 16). According to Groom and Cragg (2015), who reported that the N2 was larger on 
response conflict trials (i.e., where the executed response was incongruent with task rules or 
planned actions) but was not modulated by inhibition, we should observe equivalent N2 on 
Go and correctly inhibited No-Go trials which should be smaller in amplitude than error 
responses. Our data do not support this conclusion; we see a clear pattern favouring the 
accounts of others (see Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 2002; Smith, Johnstone, & 
Barry, 2008), observing a larger N2 and P3 on No-Go trials compared to Go trials, and on 
correctly-inhibited No-Go trials compared to error No-Go trials (see Figure 16). Consistent 
with these data, No-Go trials that resulted in an error elicited a smaller N2 than did those that 
were correctly inhibited, t61 = 2.46, p = .017, d = 0.20. Likewise, the No-Go P3 on correctly- 
inhibited No-Go trials was significantly larger than on failed inhibition No-Go trials (i.e., 
errors), t61 = 4.15, p = .0001, d = 0.48. That is, both the N2 and the P3 were each larger when 
participants successfully inhibited their response to No-Go stimuli. 





Figure 17. Average amplitude of response-locked ERPs for correct Go trials, incorrect No- 
Go trials (Errors), and Go trials pre and post errors (error bars represent the standard error). 
3.6.3 Testing the accounts of PES 
 
3.6.3.1 The discrimination and processing account. Dutilh and colleagues’ (2012) 
drift-diffusion models support the hypothesis that PES is the result of a participant 
broadening their response boundaries such that more information is required following an 
error for a response to be made. Since the N2 is elicited in stimulus discrimination (i.e., Is 
this a Go stimulus or a No-Go stimulus?) and the P3 is elicited in semantic and higher-order 
stimulus processing (i.e., This is the stimulus, what do I do with it?), we would expect to see 
a larger N2 and potentially larger P3 following an error. 
Contrary to what would be expected under this account of PES, supposing that the N2 
could operate as an index of discrimination that is analogous to a response boundary 
parameter, the amplitude of the N2 was not larger after an error. Indeed, the opposite effect 
was observed. The N2 to Go stimuli before errors were significantly more negative than after 
errors (t77 = 2.49, p = .015, d = 0.27). On the other hand, this account might suggest that the 
P3, as an index of a prolonged evidence accumulation process in a DDM, ought to be larger 
following an error. We observed this in our data (t77 = 2.54, p = .013, d = 0.29), such that the 
post-error P3 was larger than its pre-error counterpart. 
The critical error-related recovery of these components (i.e., the magnitude of the pre- 
error to post-error difference, that we denote Δ) is not correlated with PES (ΔN2 p = .704; 
ΔP3 p = .438), nor is the post-error N2 (p = .523) or P3 (p = .536). They may nevertheless 
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have some association with overall response inhibition. Indeed, the magnitude of the 
differences in amplitude of both the N2 and the P3 before and after an error were both 
negatively correlated with overall response inhibition (r72 = -.26, p = .024, and r72 = -.31, p 
= .007, respectively). That is, the more the N2 and P3 were enhanced after errors, the fewer 
overall errors were committed. This means that a more negative post-error N2 compared to 
the pre-error N2, and a larger P3 post- compared to pre- error, are associated with fewer 
overall errors committed. Given the role of these components and their relative size, it seems 
possible that the N2 effect reported here is confounded by the onset of a large P3 post-error in 
those who commit fewer errors. This is confirmed by a simple additive regression model with 
the magnitude of this difference in the N2 and the P3 as predictors of overall errors (F2,71 = 
4.49, R2 = .112, p = .015), in which the N2 is not significant (p = .291) but the P3 shows 
some trend (p = .067). 
Our data do not support this account outright. They show that the N2 and the P3 are 
largest when a No-Go response is successfully inhibited in accordance with previous 
findings, but that the N2 is blunted following errors, whereas the P3 is enhanced. 
Furthermore, while the degree to which these components are altered following errors 
(especially the P3) predicts successful overall inhibition, but not PES. 
3.6.3.2 Attentional accounts. Dutilh and colleagues (2012) offered an orienting 
account as an alternative to the above account, according to which, additional attention 
resources might be recruited to the processing of stimuli following an error, which may 
contribute to PES by offsetting the commencement of response-associated actions. This 
account is based on the same diffusion models as the previous account, and evidence in 
favour of it will come from a larger N1, a component known to reflect attentional processes, 
after errors. On the other hand, Notebaert and colleagues (2009) offer an opposing account 
that relies on other criteria, namely, an oddball effect to errors which would be observed in 
the P3. The authors hypothesise that disorientation of attention occurs as the result of the 
surprise caused by an error, so not only is an oddball effect required, but participants who 
commit fewer errors should exhibit a larger effect in this regard. 
Although the attentional accounts do not necessarily make predictions regarding the 
amplitude of the N1 on No-Go trials, we nevertheless compared the amplitude of the N1 on 
successfully inhibited No-Go trials to unsuccessful No-Go trials (errors). It is reasonable to 
expect that correctly inhibiting a prepotent response requires cognitive effort or attention, and 
therefore the N1 should be larger on correctly inhibited trials if it really reflects attention in 
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this task, however, this has not been reflected in the literature (see Bokura, Yamaguchi, & 
Kobayashiu, 2001; Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). Contrary to these reviews 
reporting no reliable difference in N1 between error responses and successful inhibitions on 
No-Go trials, we observed a more negative N1 on correctly inhibited No-Go trials than on 
failed inhibition No-Go trials, t92 = 3.35, p = .001, d = 0.32. 
We tested whether PES could be accounted for by the amplitude of the N1, which 
seems to reflect attention. An orienting account of PES should yield data that satisfy the 
following three criteria: (1) there must be a pre-error to post-error difference in N1 amplitude, 
in particular, a larger N1 to Go stimuli that follow an error compared to those that precede an 
error indicating an increase in attention after an error; (2) either the post-error N1 should be 
larger or the change in amplitude surrounding the error (i.e., the pre- to post- error change, 
henceforth ΔN1) should deflect more negatively in those who did exhibit PES compared to 
those who did not; and, (3) either the post-error N1 or ΔN1should be correlated with the 
magnitude of PES. Our data do not provide support for the first criterion: the N1 is, in fact, 
less negative after an error than before an error, t92 = 2.30, p = .024, d = 0.21. Likewise, there 
is no evidence allowing us to accept the second criterion. The post-error N1 was not larger in 
those participants who did engage PES (M = 0.33, SD = 1.53) than in those who did not (M = 
-0.18, SD = 1.89), t87 = 1.17, p = .243. Furthermore, the N1 refracted more negatively in 
those who did not exhibit PES, and more positively in those who did, but ΔN1 was not 
significantly different between these two groups, t87 =1.57, p = .121. Nor can we accept the 
third criterion: post-error N1 amplitude was positively correlated with the extent to which 
proactive inhibition was engaged (i.e., more PES was characterised by a smaller, or less 
negative, N1 at post-error stimulus onset), r87 = .24, p = .026. In light of a general effect of 
the post-error N1, it is noteworthy that the pre-error N1 was not associated with either PES (p 
= .345) or errors (p = .400), nor was the change in amplitude surrounding the error (i.e., the 
pre- to post- error change, henceforth ΔN1), ΔN1, associated with errors (p = .879). 
To investigate the claim suggesting that PES can be explained as the time it takes to 
reorient attention, we ran three regression models. The first included the N1 for Go trials 
after an error, the second included N1 amplitude before an error and after an error separately, 
and the third included the pre-/post- error amplitude difference in the N1 (ΔN1). If PES can 
be accounted for by increased time associated with the recruitment of additional attention to 
Go stimuli following an error, we would expect to see an effect primarily isolated to the post- 
error N1, and not necessarily in the dynamic alterations to it captured by the difference wave. 
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Indeed, these models yielded a significant effect, but in the opposite direction to the orienting 
account. The first model that included only the post-error N1 was significant (F1,87 = 5.122, p 
= .026, R2 = .056), with less negative N1 predicting PES (β = 4.20). In the second model, the 
post-error N1 remained significant when accounting for the pre-error N1 (p = .039, p = .623, 
respectively), and the difference measure (ΔN1) was not significant in the third model (p 
= .105). Taken together, these findings suggest that PES is not associated with an increase in 
attention following an error. Instead, errors seem to be associated with blunting of attention 
on subsequent trials, and this predicts the amount of PES. 
Our data seem therefore to satisfy the first criterion of a disorienting account, which 
relies on further criteria being met, in particular, the disorienting account requires disruption 
of attentional resources that occur because of the oddball effect on error trials. That is, we 
should observe a larger P3 on error trials compared to correctly withheld No-Go trials. 
However, the oddball account may be inconsistent with the well-established Inhibition P3, 
which we provided evidence in support of in the previous section (a larger ‘Inhibition’ P3 on 
correctly withheld No-Go trials). However, according to Notebaert and colleagues’ (2009) 
account, slowing occurs due to infrequent events. They describe not only post-error slowing 
when errors are infrequent but also post-correct slowing when correct trials are infrequent. 
This provides two sources of activity reflected in the P3: one from the relative frequency of 
errors, and the other from the relative frequency of the No-Go stimulus itself. So, we do 
indeed see a larger P3 on No-Go trials overall compared to Go trials, partially supporting an 
Oddball account, but we see an additionally large P3 on correctly inhibited No-Go trials. 
Since both No-Go stimuli and errors are infrequent compared to Go trials in this task4, it is 
plausible that the Inhibition P3 partially reflects the infrequency of the No-Go stimulus 
alongside the additional processing presumably required for successful inhibition. The 
confluence of processes that combine to form an ERP component cannot be disambiguated, 
so this is speculative. In any case, we cannot accept or reject this second Oddball criterion of 
Notebaert and colleagues’ disorienting account of PES, but our data do support its disruption 
of attention criterion. Whether or not the N1 is disrupted by infrequency (partially captured 
by the P3) is not entirely necessary to accept the general principle of this account in any case; 
that is, if an error disrupts attentional processing of a stimulus, then disorientation has 
occurred regardless of the source of that disorientation. Our data do not allow us to make any 
 
4 Note that the stimulus features of No-Go stimuli are not more infrequent than those of Go stimuli in our 
task since all digits are equiprobable, but the response demands associated with No-Go stimuli are more 
infrequent. 
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claims about its source, but they do allow us to argue in favour of a disorientating effect of 
errors. 
3.6.3.3 Error detection and processing account. This account supposes that increased 
error-associated processing, which can be indexed by the ERN/Pe complex, leads to PES. 
The ERN/Pe complex likely reflects some kind of response monitoring and response conflict 
process where the actual response is compared to optimal response and, if there is a conflict 
between these alternatives, activity is increased in frontal and parietal regions, which is 
reflected in the ERN and Pe amplitudes, respectively. The increased activity is thought to 
delay processing of the immediately subsequent stimulus. Behavioural data do not support 
this account, since it is known that errors affect the response time pattern for at least four 
post-error trials, and this account, prima facie at least, seems to suggest that only the first 
post-error trial would be affected. Nevertheless, electrophysiological data may yield some 
interesting insights into this account. 
Since the negativity of the ERN and the positivity of the Pe for error-associated 
responses are only meaningfully interpretable relative to their amplitude on non-error trials 
(i.e., correct Go responses), we first used paired-samples t-tests to compare mean amplitude 
on correct Go trials to error responses. These tests yielded confirmatory results for both the 
ERN (t35 = 7.02, p < .0001, d = 1.80) and the Pe (t35 = 4.011, p = .0003, d = 0.69), such that 
committing an error elicited a larger ERN (i.e., more negative-going) and Pe (i.e., more 
positive-going) than did a correct Go response. Unlike stimulus-locked components, these 
‘error’-associated components were not meaningfully affected by an error; that is, processing 
of correct pre-error responses did not significantly differ from processing of correct post-error 
responses, though there was a small trend for smaller amplitudes following an error (ERN: t65 
= 1.60, p = .116; Pe: t65 = 1.80, p = .077). In and of themselves, neither of these components 
on any trial type was associated with either the rate of errors (smallest p =.720), or the 
magnitude of PES (smallest p = .290). Further, neither ΔERN nor ΔPe were correlated with 
either of these measures (smallest p = .179), nor was the magnitude of difference in either 
component on correct Go compared to failed No-Go trials (smallest p = .519). 
We ran two regression models to test whether the magnitude of the ERN on error 
trials and the magnitude of the difference in ERN on error trials compared to correct go trials, 
predicted PES. Neither model supported this hypothesis (p = .795, and p = .891, 
respectively). Because of our criteria for excluding participant-wise data, these analyses 
contained only 36 participants; however, even with a considerably larger sample, it is not 
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likely that such patterns of data would reach statistical significance. We also performed 
similar analyses for the Pe. Despite the remaining sample being small, the mean amplitude 
difference in the Pe on error responses and correct Go responses may suggest some effect (F1, 
33 = 3.506, p = .070, R
2 = .096, β = -2.19), whereby a larger Pe on Go responses compared to 
the Pe on error responses predicts more PES; that is, diminished error processing, predicts 
PES. To test whether response monitoring on error trials predicted overall rate of errors, we 
regressed the ERN and the Pe, separately and together, for both error trials and the amplitude 
difference between Go and error responses, onto error rate. None of these models yielded any 
evidence of simple effects or interactions (all p > .271). 
Our data do not provide support for this account: neither component of the ERN/Pe 
complex predicted engagement of PES. Interestingly, the somewhat diminished ERN/Pe 
complex after errors may provide additional support for the disorienting account. 
3.6.4 The role of intelligence in these accounts 
 
Recently, we reported a relationship between proactive inhibition and two variables 
that appear to negatively affect reactive inhibition, older age and g (Beu et al., 2019). We 
showed that PES is recruited more strongly in those individuals with lower estimated g and 
older age. So, here we tested whether the ERP component that seems to best reflect PES, the 
N1, would also be predicted by age and g. 
The data seem to point toward a relationship between higher g and a more negative 
N1 on most trial types (before, r91 = -.23, p = .029, and after, r91 = -.28, p = .006, an error; 
error trials, r91 = -.18, p = .087; correct inhibitions, r91 = -.16, p = .121), but not either of the 
error associated amplitude differences (p > .891). On all trial types, the N1 was significantly 
positively correlated with age, such that older participants tended to produce less negative 
deflections at stimulus onset (Before error: r91 = .34, p = .0008; After error: r91 = .31, p 
= .002; Error: r91 = .27, p = .010; Correct inhibition: r91 = .22, p = .031). So, g appears to 
support the elicitation of the N1 or is associated at least with attention, whereas age is 
associated with a reduced N1. To test whether age and g predict post-error-associated 
disturbances to attentional processing, reflected in the post-error N1, we ran a regression 
model with age and g as predictors. Older age (β = 0.09, p = .007) and lower g (β = -0.24, p 
= .018) predict a smaller post-error N1 (F2,90 = 8.03, p = .0006) and accounted for 15.14% of 
its variance. Since this pattern replicated the general trend of the effect of age and g on PES 
we reported previously, we wanted to test whether the same interaction effect was present in 
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our current data. A model that included an interaction term (β = 0.06, p = .0002) supported 
this relationship (F3,89 = 10.96, p < .0001; see Figure 18), and accounted for an additional 
11.84% of variance (R2 = .270), with both variables remaining significant predictors of post- 
error attentional processing (age: p = .001; g: p < .0001). That is, older age and lower g 
independently and interactively predict a smaller post-error N1, which appears to be the 
critical indicator of PES, such that young age was associated with a more negative post- error 
N1, especially in those with higher estimated g. 
 
Figure 18. The interaction effect of g and age on the amplitude of the post-error N1. Shading 
around each line represents 95% confidence intervals. 
3.7 General Conclusions 
 
We administered a Go/No-Go task to a large, healthy sample to investigate alternative 
accounts of post-error slowing (PES) using electrophysiological evidence. Our data lead us to 
reject the commonly held assumption that PES is associated with the recruitment of 
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additional attentional resources, indexed by the N1 component, or with additional stimulus 
discrimination or response caution, indexed by the N2 component. Likewise, we reject the 
account that PES is associated with error-associated response processing, since it is known 
that PES affects at least four post-error trials, and that the ERN/Pe is observed only on one 
trial, whereas disturbances to post-error stimulus processing are sustained. Likewise there is 
no evidence that the ERN/Pe is associated with PES or response inhibition, or with other 
variables known to influence these variables (e.g., age and g). Such disturbances are observed 
mainly in the N1; that is, attentional processing of post-error stimuli, indexed by the N1, is 
significantly diminished. Our data, therefore, support a disorienting account of PES 
hypothesised by Notebaert and colleagues (2009), where errors appear to disrupt the 
contiguity of thought that is evoked by continuous tasks. Indeed, such contiguity of thought 
may well underlie the commonly-observed phenomenon of serial responses generally getting 
quicker until an error is committed (see Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). 
In addition to the blunting of the N1, the N2 is likewise negatively affected by an 
error, whereas the P3 appears to be facilitated. One plausible explanation for this is that 
neural resources are ‘redirected’ from basal processes reflected in the early ERPs to higher- 
order cognitive processes reflected in the P3, to allow top-down processing to guide 
responding for a short time (the order of a few trials). Such an account may be consistent with 
a similar account of the hyperdirect pathway of the basal ganglia which has been implicated 
in supporting PES (e.g., Frank, 2006). According to this account (Chersi et al., 2013), activity 
in the basal ganglia is downregulated by the prefrontal efferents of the hyperdirect pathway. 
If Frank’s hypothesis is true, that is, that PES relies on the hyperdirect pathway, then Chersi 
and colleagues’ explanation of the hyperdirect pathway recruiting prefrontal top-down 
control, which may be reflected in the P3, in favour of stimulus processing processes, which 
may be reflected in the N1 and N2, appears conceptually consistent with our findings. An 
alternative explanation that accounts for our data and is more in line with the reasoning 
behind a disorienting account is that rather than PES operating as a compensatory mechanism 
in individuals whose reactive process might be negatively affected by older age or lower g (as 
we have reasoned elsewhere; see Beu et al., 2019), it may be the case that these individuals 
are more affected by PES as the result of a poorer ability to reorient or exert top-down control 
over post-error attentional resources, and that the additional time to respond allows for more 
successful response inhibition as an outcome rather than a strategy. That is, PES is not so 
much strategic or proactive as it is a consequence of erring that may incidentally improve 
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response inhibition by virtue of the effect that it has on immediately subsequent response 
patterns. 
Precisely what is reflected by the ERN/Pe complex is not known, but it is generally 
assumed that it is reorienting to task demands (e.g., Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & 
Hohnsbein, 2000), or meaningful and introspective consideration of the error (e.g., Botvinick, 
Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005; but see also Boksem,Tops, 
Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Gehring et al., 1993; Senderecka, Grabowska, Szeczykk, 
Gerc, & Chymlak, 2012; Stemmer, Segalowitz, Witzke, & Schönle, 2004). Whereas it is 
commonly assumed that these deflections reflect the presence, rather than the absence or 
disruption, of such processing, taken alongside our evidence of disruptions to attentional 
processing on post-error trials, we might assume that errors disrupt response monitoring 
processes rather than reflecting them. Indeed, the small but nonsignificant blunting of the 
ERN/Pe complex on post-error responses may further support a disorienting account to the 
extent that the ERN/Pe exerts a persistent effect on other processes, which has not been 
investigated here or elsewhere, and required a more complex task design. 
Our data do not allow us to make any conclusions about whether PES is proactive, 
either an intentional strategy or an implicit compensatory mechanism, or is a consequence of 
disruptions to processing, despite such disruptions being observed. They do, however, allow 
us to accept a disorienting account of PES. Not only is attentional processing of post-error 
stimuli significantly attenuated by an error, the magnitude to which it is correlated with the 
duration of PES. Taken alongside our previous findings (Beu et al., 2019) and others like it 
(e.g., Bloemendaal et al., 2016), our findings here that older age and lower g are associated 
with the post-error N1 that is disrupted by errors and predicts PES are not altogether 
unsurprising and might indicate that the protective mechanism we previously suggested PES 
confers against possible deficits in the response inhibition network may, in fact, be an 
incidental consequence of PES. 
Whatever the nature of PES, our data support a disorienting account in which errors 
disrupt processing, thereby offsetting the processing of post-error stimuli in such a way that 
the subsequent responses are slowed. If PES simply disrupts post-error processing in such a 
way that it is an incidental consequence of PES, rather than a proactive compensatory 
mechanism that endures for some time, we should expect to observe the effect only on those 
trials immediately following an error. Since the effect is maintained for some trials, we can 
confidently conclude that errors disrupt processing, and in so doing, slow down subsequent 
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Go responses, which may inadvertently increase the probability of successfully inhibiting a 
response to an unexpected No-Go trial. 
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3.8 General Discussion of the Foregoing Manuscript 
In the preamble to this chapter I highlighted that this line of enquiry required task 
modifications. The overall moderate-to-strong correlations between this adapted task and the 
original task notwithstanding, I had reservations about using the overall performance of this 
task for its 800-trial duration. There was no defensible a priori basis on which to justify 
segmenting these data into chunks which were acceptable for use, so we moved forward with 
the entire dataset. These potential limitations were only realised post hoc, but perhaps could 
have been envisaged in the design phase. The original task is 225 trials, so, roughly one 
quarter of the length of this task, and it is not well-received by participants. It is taxing, and, 
my own interpretation of observing many hundreds of participants completing this task over 
the years is that motivation, effort, and interest all wax and wane throughout. That fluctuation 
is borne out in these data to an extreme, which are clearly illustrated by segmenting the data 
into 200-trial quantiles and plotting various measures against those quantiles (see Figure 19, 
next page). Interestingly, PES appears to remain relatively stable, while most other variables 
fluctuate substantially, suggesting that PES may be robust to fluctuations in whatever 
underpins variability in other measures. What can be seen in these figures does not 
substantially affect the EEG data, since ERPs are locked to the trials; that is, the processing 
indexed by neural activity in later quantiles still reflects the performance in those quantiles, 
whether it be good or bad. But, behaviourally and perhaps motivationally, performance is 













I was interested in attempting to identify some underlying inhibitory process across 
the ERP data. I thought it more plausible to search for some factor structure that could yield 
an overall inhibitory process or, more likely, a reactive process factor and a proactive process 
factor by performing factor analysis or principal component analysis (PCA) as has been done 
in a few EEG experiments of attentional or learning processes. This was largely exploratory, 
so I attempted the method with various combinations of ERP data, including one model with 
only the difference waves, but none yielded any meaningful results5. 
 
5 Miwakeichi and colleagues (2004; see also Mørup, Hansen, Herrmann, Parnas, & Arnfred, 2006) 
recently proposed an alternative method to the PCA and ICA which create only space/time 
decompositions. They suggest the use of Parallel Factor Analysis (PARAFAC) instead, which they argue 
overcomes the “lack of uniqueness” yielded by PCA and ICA by imposing constraints of orthogonality or 
independence of atoms. PARAFAC frames the data structure as a three-way array indexed by channel, 
frequency, and time, which allows for the identification of component modes by creating a 
space/frequency/time atomic decomposition of the time-varying spectrum of multi-channel EEG 
recordings, thereby including the spatial aspects of the EEG, and yielding a data structure in which “each 
atom is the tri-linear decomposition into a spatial, spectral, and temporal signature”. The additional spatial 
signature provided by this method may prove valuable in distinguishing rapid but spatially ambiguous 
discrete inhibition processes. Learning such a method would take considerable time, so it has not yet been 
feasible to explore this avenue but it will become possible in the future. It seems that such a method might 






Figure 19. Fluctuations in performance in various parameters plotted by 200-trial quantiles in 
the 800-trial SART used in the previous experiment. 
In this chapter, we establish three things. First, we provide empirical support for Notebaert 
and colleagues’ (2009) disorienting account of post-error slowing, where errors appear to 
disturb ongoing processing of stimuli and, therefore, disrupt task performance which 
manifests as slowed response initiation. Second, we see that the post-error N1 in those with 
higher g diminishes with age, but that in those with lower g there is no such effect. Since PES 
is most strongly predicted by the post-error N1, and since it is thought that the N1 naturally 
diminishes with age (see Anderer, Pascual-Marqui, Semlitsch, & Saleti, 1998; Anderer, 
Semlitsch, & Saletu, 1996; Beck, Swanson, & Dustman, 1980), this is therefore consistent 
with our reasoning in the previous chapter that combined with age, lower g appears to 
support or permit the response fluctuations that characterise the proactive mechanism, and in 
so doing, protect against deficits in the reactive inhibition associated with age.”. Third, we 
















































































observe some data that may indicate that PES is a consequence rather than an adaptive 
strategy or implicit mechanism whose goal is productive (i.e., to improve performance). This 
is not altogether inconsistent with the previous reasoning about age and g, and may in fact 
rationalise it more realistically. If older age and lower g do not somehow protect against 
failures in the reactive inhibitory process by some unknown mechanism, it seems equally if 
not more so sensible to suppose that older age and lower g are simply more vulnerable to 
disruptive effect of PES on processing. Whether or not this confers an advantage in the 
inhibitory process remains unknown and, in theoretical terms, unimportant in terms of these 
two alternative accounts. On one hand, PES could improve performance by mitigating further 
deficiencies that would otherwise be observed, and it might do so incidentally by offsetting 
response initiation or execution. On the other hand, PES might not improve performance. 
This is the problem of measuring an invisible variable; response inhibition is the absence of 
something to measure, so we can only make inferences guided by logic and data. 
The first paper in this thesis investigated subcortical circuitry using genetic analysis, 
and this second paper used EEG to capture cortical activity. Both of these approaches yielded 
important data that helps us fill out a picture of PES. So far, we can conclude with some 
confidence that PES is supported by dopamine in the basal ganglia, and that it recruits 
separate pathways to reactive inhibition. Further, we can be confident that it is in some way 
compensatory (even if incidentally), and is engaged to a greater degree in older people and 
those with lower estimates of g. Our EEG data seem to indicate that PES may not be under 
intentional control, and in fact appears to result from or be accompanied by disrupted 
cognitive processing. So, PES being compensatory, but perhaps not agentive, provides us 
with an opportunity to use novel neurostimulation techniques to modulate it. That is to say, 









The goal of this thesis has been to investigate the neurocognitive architecture of 
response inhibition and, in particular, proactive inhibition. In the first experiment, we 
established that the two processes can be distinguished at the neurophysiological level by 
using genetic analysis. In the second experiment, we used psychophysiology to demonstrate 
that errors disrupt processing and this is reflected in PES. This finding suggests that if PES 
improves overall successful inhibition, this improvement may be at least partially the 
incidental result of additional time between perceiving the stimulus and executing the 
response. Using these indirect methods, we provided insight into the neurocognitive 
architecture of response inhibition, and how it is deployed in the healthy human brain. In the 
introduction to this thesis, I highlighted the clinical importance of dysfunctional response 
inhibition, so practical intervention applications are essential. 
So, with this in mind, in this third study we investigate whether manipulation of 
neural activity using electrical stimulation to the motor cortex affects the selection, initiation, 
or inhibition of a motor program. To achieve this, we administer a neuromodulatory 
intervention between two behavioural testing sessions and investigate its effect on 
performance on a battery of simple cognitive tasks that assess reaction time and response 
inhibition. We select this specific battery of tasks in order to provide a complete profile of the 
discrete processes involved in motoric response initiation and inhibition which could, in turn, 
allow us to make inferences about the origin of any potential effect. 
In the previous sections, I have described the logic supporting the hypothesis that 
action selection, initiation, and inhibition probably rely on the motor cortex, and, certainly, on 
the connections between the motor cortex and basal ganglia. So, the target for our 
neuromodulatory intervention is the motor cortex. In particular, primary motor area M1. The 
intention to perform a movement is likely generated in frontal cortex, with varying 
recruitment from visual and parietal cortices depending on the demands and context of the 
intended movement. Within milliseconds, signals of intent have been communicated between 
frontal cortex and the appropriate association areas and M1, and between M1 and the basal 
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ganglia. The neural computations that occur in this incredibly short timeframe have 
hierarchically organised and planned the action, and then send the directive through 
cerebellum, a small but highly dense area containing around half of all of the neurons of the 
nervous system for fine-tuning and deployment through the spinal cord to the required 
muscles. 
If we modify activity in the critical node of this network, M1, and observe changes to 
behaviour in a way that is theoretically explanatory, then we should be able to make some 
inferences about the architecture of the function. Two exciting and reasonably novel methods 
for modulating and measuring neural activation were available to us: transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which each have 
different uses in cognitive and clinical neuroscience, but which can be used in conjunction 
with one another in some experimental designs. These methods were beyond my 
undergraduate training, but presented a unique opportunity to broaden my knowledge, and, 
indeed, it was particularly motivating to be able to use such methods in this context. To have 
access to the cortex in this way offered excellent potential for the experiment; to potentially 
be able to directly modulate brain activation patterns in humans and observe differences in 
behaviour as the result of that modulation could help us answer some very interesting 
questions and provide a sound direction moving forward for targets for intervention or focus. 
The purpose of this chapter is to build on the foundation formed in the previous 
chapters to gather a more direct sense of the neurophysiology of response inhibition and its 
constituent processes. This may provide some insight into individual differences in this 
ability in healthy, ageing, and pathological brains, and into the extent to which they can be 
explained by individual differences in neurophysiology. We intend to contribute further 
empirical support to the hypothesis that different aspect of motor function rely on separate 
neural substrates, which can in turn allow us to meaningfully think about response inhibition 
in a more biologically grounded framework than what is currently provided by the literature 
and, in so doing, allow us to home in on those differences in future experiments using 
different approaches, and potentially in clinical contexts. 
This chapter is separated into two studies because they use similar methods to answer 
different questions. The first study investigates whether tDCS, a neuromodulatory 
intervention, is able to modulate cognitive functions in a predictable way. The second study is 
motivated by the question of whether the effects of tDCS can be attributed to long-term 
potentiation-like effects measured by differences in the amplitude of TMS-induced reflexes 
in muscles of the hand. That is, the intention is (i) to determine whether tDCS produces an 
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effect on motor performance including action generation, selection and inhibition, and (ii) to 
use TMS to establish the neural basis of a potential effect. 
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Goal-directed motor control is disrupted in certain disorders. Transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) is a promising neurostimulatory technique that may enhance 
executive functioning, which is critical for goal-directed motor control; however, the 
evidence for this is mixed. In a single-blind experiment, we investigated the effect of tDCS 
on three aspects of motor control and hypothesized that motor cortical anodal stimulation 
would facilitate performance. Motor response generation (Simple Reaction Time; SRT), 
action selection (Choice Reaction Time; CRT), and inhibition (Sustained Attention to 
Response Task; SART) were assessed in 54 healthy participants in three sessions: a baseline 
session, a sham tDCS session and an anodal tDCS session. Anodal tDCS had no effect on 
SRT (p = .163) or CRT (p = .642). In the SART, the ability to inhibit a response was 
diminished following anodal stimulation 
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compared to sham (p = .026). Participants responded somewhat faster following anodal 
stimulation (p = .070), and this could be due to the disruption of a critical error-correction 
mechanism, Post-error slowing (PES): instead of slowing their responses after failing to 
inhibit a response as they did during the baseline (p = .034) and sham (p = .002) sessions, 
participants made no such adjustment following anodal stimulation (p = .964). Contrary to 
our hypotheses, anodal tDCS had no effect on response selection and generation, and a 
negative impact on response inhibition, possibly by disrupting proactive inhibition which is 
generated in prefrontal regions. Our findings highlight the importance of systematic 




Executive function not only underpins effective psychosocial, emotional, and 
behavioural control, but it also contributes to intelligence via cognitive flexibility and 
reasoning ability. Deficits in the cognitive abilities that are taken to reflect the executive 
functions, for example response inhibition and selective attention, are clinically significant 
diagnostic criteria for psychosocial dysfunctions such as attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Barkley, 1997) and substance use disorder (Nigg et al., 2006), and mental illnesses 
such as schizophrenia (Kiehl, Smith, Hare, & Liddle, 2000). They are also characteristic of 
neurological conditions such as Parkinson’s (Taylor, Saint-cyr, & Lang, 1986) and 
Huntington’s (Lawrence et al., 1996) diseases. Recently, evidence has emerged that describes 
small but reliable effects of noninvasive neurostimulation techniques on the manipulation of 
various motor and cognitive domains, which may lead to novel therapeutic avenues for the 
management of the functional deficits resulting from many conditions (Brunoni et al., 2012; 
Felipe & Alvaro, 2007; Fregni et al., 2005; Freitas, Mondragón-Llorca, & Pascual-Leone, 
2011; Kuo, Paulus, & Nitsche, 2014; Marlow, Bonilha, & Short, 2013; Nitsche, Boggio, 
Fregni, & Pascual-Leone, 2009; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003). 
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) permits painless modulation of cortical 
excitability through the intact skull, making it an attractive neurostimulation technique that is 
well-tolerated, brief and inexpensive (Nitsche et al., 2008; Nitsche et al., 2005). Moreover, it 
is supported by a well-established body of neurophysiological data demonstrating efficacy in 
modulating cortical excitability, which is often used as a marker of neuroplastic change 
(Nitsche, Kuo, Paulus, & Antal, 2015). tDCS stimulates underlying neurons with the 
application of a weak electrical current (usually 0.5 – 2 mA) to the scalp between a 
positively-charged anode and negatively-charged cathode. The mode of action is thought to 
involve subthreshold effects on membrane excitability (Bikson et al., 2004; Paulus, 2011), 
which in turn lead to long-term potentiation-like changes in the cortex with anodal 
stimulation, and long-term depression-like changes with cathodal stimulation (Massey & 
Bashir, 2007; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011). It is thought that anodal-tDCS targeted to a cortical 
region that is recruited during a specific task facilitates performance on that task via transient 
increases in neuronal connectivity and excitability, whereas, on the other hand, cathodal 
tDCS is presumed to have the inverse effect and thus reduces excitability and diminishes task 
performance (Reis & Fritsch, 2011; Reis et al., 2008). In a recent meta-analysis, however, 
Jacobson and colleagues (Jacobson, Koslowsky, & Lavidor, 2012) suggest that this 
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dichotomous anodal-excitation and cathodal-inhibition account of dual-polarity is perhaps too 
simplistic. Their review shows that anodal-cathodal effects from motor cortical stimulation 
do not map cleanly, or uniformly, onto psychomotor and cognitive functional modulation; 
that such straightforward description of complex psychophysiological effects therefore 
trivializes the credible long-term depression-like effects under the cathode (Jacobson et al., 
2012). The authors claim that the commonly-held theory underlying tDCS is one of anodal- 
excitation/cathodal-inhibition (AeCi), and yet this model has scarcely been replicated in 
studies investigating cognitive domains rather than motor ones. Their consequent position is 
that the AeCi dichotomy does not manifest in cognitive tDCS experiments due to the relative 
complexity of neural processing required for the processes commonly investigated in such 
studies (e.g., language, reasoning, and working memory), which occur in multiple brain 
regions, and, often, is mediated by some domain-dependent central region (Jacobson et al., 
2012). So, as a consequence of the interconnectedness of brain regions invoked by common 
behavioral tasks, both the cognitive and cathodal effects of stimulation are nontrivial, 
whereas the neuroplastic induction exerted under the anode is more reliably demonstrated by 
effects on motor task performance. A careful investigation of the effects of a tDCS 
manipulation on several aspects of a cognitive function is therefore needed before concluding 
that it has beneficial effects. 
The gold-standard montage for modulating motor function (applying anodal tDCS to 
the motor cortex, with the cathode placed over the contralateral orbitofrontal cortex) has 
shown promise for enhancing some goal-directed motor control functions, and is being 
considered a potential treatment for disorders that involve executive function deficits 
(Brunoni et al., 2012; DaSilva, Volz, Bikson, & Fregni, 2011; Senco et al., 2015). Previous 
studies, however, have typically investigated only one aspect of goal-directed motor control: 
action selection, or generation, or both of them (Conley, Marquez, Fulham, Parsons, & 
Karayanidis, 2015; Hayduk-Costa, Drummond, & Carlsen, 2013; Hummel et al., 2006; 
Müller, Orosz, Treszl, Schmid, & Sperner, 2008). Our aim is to investigate the effects of this 
montage on several distinct aspects of motor control, including response inhibition, thereby 
providing a more thorough test of its suitability as a therapeutic intervention. 
We investigated the effects of stimulation on tasks of executive function offline; that 
is, we investigated the effects of tDCS in the post-stimulation period. Our aim was to 
investigate the effect of tDCS to the motor cortex on executive functions that involve 
producing, inhibiting, and regulating motor commands. Because of its importance to 
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everyday goal-directed behaviour and the broad clinical implications, executive function has 
been widely examined, commonly by measuring goal-directed motor control and its 
constituent parts (Li, Huang, Sinha, & Constable, 2006; Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008; van 
Velzen, Vriend, de Wit, & van Den Heuvel, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). However, it 
is not yet clear whether tDCS yields reliable, positive effects on these functions. Motor 
control requires both generating task-appropriate responses, as well as the suppression of 
prepotent, but no longer appropriate, responses. Together, these motor control processes 
allow appropriate behavioural adaptation following a change in context or environment. 
Goal-directed motor control is not a unitary construct, comprising the concatenation of both 
motor and cognitive components, the distinction between which has been verified by brain 
imaging studies (Li et al., 2006). Specifically, action selection, motor response generation, 
and inhibition are three contributing individual processes (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2004). The motor response generation and action selection processes can be 
measured by tasks that measure reaction time under two conditions: Simple Reaction Time 
(SRT) involves responding to a single stimulus and measures motor response generation; 
whereas Choice Reaction Time (CRT) involves making the decision to respond to one target 
stimulus among multiple potential stimuli, and thus additionally measures action selection 
(Jahanshahi, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015; Miller & Low, 2001). Response inhibition is 
most commonly tested with the parametric go/no-go paradigm, for example the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART), which involves responding to frequently presented 
stimuli and withholding a response to infrequently presented stimuli (Donders, 1969; 
Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). Performance on Go/No-Go tasks 
such as the SART is likely driven by two theoretical inhibition processes—reactive and 
proactive inhibition. Reactive inhibition refers to the cessation of a planned motor response 
upon presentation of a ‘No-Go’ stimulus, while proactive inhibition refers to preparatory 
processes that lead to a response being withheld before it is initiated (Meyer & Bucci, 2016). 
A well-established strategy recruited by proactive inhibition is post-error slowing (PES). This 
PES process manifests as slower reaction time following an error, which enhances the 
likelihood of successful response inhibition in subsequent trials (Meyer & Bucci, 2016). 
Whereas healthy participants reliably demonstrate this kind of performance monitoring and 
adjustment, it is impaired in certain clinical populations, such as those with traumatic brain 
injury (Robertson et al., 1997). So, in addition to measuring overall response inhibition 
performance on the SART, which presumably measures a combination of reactive and 
proactive inhibition, we will also measure proactive inhibition more specifically via PES. 
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There is some evidence that reaction time and response inhibition can be modulated 
using tDCS under certain stimulation parameters (Cai et al., 2016; Castro-Meneses, Johnson, 
& Sowman, 2016; Ditye, Jacobson, Walsh, & Lavidor, 2012; Hogeveen et al., 2016; 
Jacobson, Javitt, & Lavidor, 2011; Ljubisavljevic, Maxood, Oommen, Szolics, & Filipovic, 
2015; Spieser, van den Wildenberg, Hasbroucq, Ridderinkhof, & Burle, 2015; Stramaccia et 
al., 2015). Current observations suggest that performance on tasks that invoke response 
inhibition processes relies on a frontal-motor neural network, and therefore can potentially be 
modulated by stimulation over either frontal or motor cortical sites. However, recent 
reinterpretation of existing data indicates that the effects of tDCS on cognitive functions in 
healthy individuals may not be as potent as previously reported due to, among other things, 
the large number of potential stimulation configuration parameters (see Woods et al., 2016), 
and small effect and sample sizes, or large interindividual variability in response to tDCS 
(Horvath, Carter, & Forte, 2014; Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 2015a, 2015b). On the other hand, 
these mixed results may be explained by differential effects on the three discrete component 
parts of motor control (Nieratschker, Kiefer, Giel, Krüger, & Plewnia, 2015). 
To our knowledge, no previous studies have investigated modulation of all three 
individual processes that comprise goal-directed motor control. The advantage of the present 
study is that by delineating and individually measuring these specific processes, we can 
isolate subtle modulation of distinct processes resulting from stimulation. In the present 
study, we apply excitatory anodal-tDCS to the primary motor area, M1, to investigate 
differential effects on the three components that comprise motor control. The motor cortex 
was chosen as a suitable candidate for stimulation because it has a role in all three 
components, and additionally this electrode montage—the M1/CO montage—is considered 
the gold-standard for improving motor function (Miller & Low, 2001; Nitsche & Paulus, 
2000, 2001). 
Consistent with previously described physiological data, we posit that targeting M1 with 
anodal stimulation will enhance performance on two tasks that measure action generation and 
selection—namely, SRT (measuring psychomotor processing speed), and CRT (measuring 
psychomotor and executive decision making speed). It is unclear, however, whether this 
montage will benefit performance on the SART (measuring response inhibition and sustained 
attention, which are cognitive domains said to underpin executive function, and the 
cumulative components of goal-directed motor control; Robertson et al., 1997). Bikson and 
Rahman (2013) claim that the relative mechanistic simplicity of tDCS and complexity of 
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brain function gives rise to problematic inference of the functional anatomical specificity of 
those cortical regions targeted by tDCS. And given the previously described paucity in our 
explanatory power of the AeCi account of stimulation, the position of the cathode at the 
orbitofrontal cortex may therefore generate differential modulation of the components of 
motor control that require higher processing (i.e., response inhibition) compared to those that 
rely more on basic motor processing (action selection and generation). That is, the effects on 
all three components might not be facilitatory effects; we may observe quicker reaction times 
in all three tasks, but diminished response inhibition. This is because response inhibition is 
more likely to recruit the prefrontal cortex than the other two components, and the location of 






Fifty-four right-handed (27 females) participants aged between 18 and 38 years (M = 
24.9, SD = 5.2 years) participated in this study after providing written informed consent. The 
experimental procedure was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Adelaide in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants met the 
safety criteria according to a modified TMS/tDCS Adult Safety Screen (Butts, Kolar, & 
Newman-Norlund, 2014; Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 2009, 2011), had no 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorder, were non-smokers with no drug or alcohol 
dependencies, and were not using medications known to affect neurological or psychological 
functioning. The sample was recruited via online advertisement and participants were 
financially compensated for their time and incidental costs at the rate of AU$20 per hour. 
Experiment 1 
 
4.6 Materials and design 
 
4.6.1 Experimental design and procedure 
 
This study used two counterbalanced within-subjects experimental conditions (anodal 
and sham control). Because the within-subjects design required participants to complete the 
behavioural tasks more than once, we chose tasks that can be administered repeatedly with 
negligible practice effects (Burns & Nettelbeck, 2003). The experiment comprised three 
testing sessions, which took place at the same time on each day. In the first session, 
participants familiarized themselves with the behavioural tasks. The purpose of this session 
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was to minimize practice effects, if any, on the behavioural tasks, before testing the effect of 
tDCS on performance. In the second and third sessions, participants completed the tasks 
again, but tDCS (real/sham) was administered prior to testing. The first and second sessions 
were separated by 24 hours, whereas the second and third sessions were separated by a 72- 
hour washout period to minimize potential carryover effects (Vannorsdall et al., 2012). The 
order in which participants were administered each stimulation condition was randomly 
determined. 
In stimulation sessions, participants were seated in a comfortable chair. Transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to determine the ‘hotspot’ (the location on the scalp 
that elicited a maximal response in a target muscle) using a previously reported procedure 
(see Bastani & Jaberzadeh, 2012; Rothwell et al., 1999). The motor cortical hotspot for the 
first dorsal interosseous was marked with a surgical marker and used as the anodal site for the 
subsequent tDCS (see further detail, below). This ensured that the placement of the anodal 
electrode was consistent in the two tDCS sessions. Following the TMS procedure, anodal or 
sham tDCS was applied for 20 minutes, during which time participants were instructed to 
remain still. Fifteen minutes after completion of the stimulation, participants completed the 
behavioural tasks, which took approximately 20 minutes to complete. After the third session, 
participants were apprised of the two stimulation conditions to determine whether they were 
aware of the order of the sham and anodal conditions. 
4.6.2 Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) 
 
tDCS was administered using a battery-driven constant-current stimulator (Eldith DC; 
NeuroConn GmbH, Germany) via two conductive rubber surface electrodes (35 cm2) encased 
in saline-soaked sponges. The anode was affixed to the left-hemispheric M1 region 
associated with the FDI generator because responses were made with the right hand, and the 
cathode do the right supraorbital region. To locate the hotspot with TMS, we used a 
monophasic Magstim 2002 with a figure-of-eight Alpha Remote Control Coil (external 
diameter of 90 mm per wing; Magstim Co., Whitland, UK) in a conventional single-stimulus 
paradigm to elicit motor evoked potentials (MEPs) according to a relative method (Pitcher et 
al., 2015). MEPs were recorded via surface electromyography (EMG) using disposable 
circular Ag/AgCl electrodes with a 9.1 cm2 skin-contact area arranged in a belly-tendon 
montage on the right hand. Cambridge Electronic Design (CED, Cambridge, UK) Power1401 
mark-III and 1902 Quad-system hardware were used to convert (5 kHz), filter (20 Hz – 1 
kHz), and amplify (× 1000) the electromyogram, which was recorded using CED Signal 
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v4.09 software. The cathode was positioned over the contralateral (right) supraorbital ridge, 
providing sufficient inter- electrode distance to minimize current shunting (Bortoletto, 
Pellicciari, Rodella, & Miniussi, 2015). The electrodes were affixed with tubular retention net 
bandages and electrode impedance was maintained below 55 kΩs. Anodal stimulation 
comprised 20 minutes of constant 1 mA current, with 30-second ramp-up and ramp-down 
phases at onset and offset, resulting in a current density under the electrode of 0.029 cm2. 
The sham protocol included the same current slope and output parameters for the first 60 
seconds, but then was followed by a 30-second ramp-down and no current for 18.5 minutes. 
This sham protocol produces good blinding of the stimulation condition to participants, and 
does not have sustained effects on cortical excitability (Gandiga, Hummel, & Cohen, 2006; 
Nieratschker et al., 2015). For the duration of stimulation, participants remained seated 
silently, with their eyes opened, in the room in which behavioral tasks were undertaken. They 
were advised to notify the researcher if the discomfort of stimulation became intolerable, in 
which case stimulation would have been terminated. None of the participants did so. 
4.6.3 Behavioural tasks 
 
4.6.3.1 Reaction time tasks 
 
Simple Reaction Time (SRT) presents participants with the white outline of a square 
on a black background displayed on a computer screen, and participants are instructed to 
fixate it. The stimulus (the square becoming solid white) appears with randomized inter- 
stimulus interval (ISI) between two and eight seconds (Figure 20). Participants press the [g] 
key on a standard keyboard as quickly as possible following stimulus presentation, which 
remains on the screen until the response. If the stimulus is anticipated and [g] is pressed prior 
to stimulus presentation, the square remains solid until the response is made again. The task 









Figure 20. An example of an SRT trial. The orienting stimulus is followed by the target 
stimulus to which participants respond. 
Choice Reaction Time (CRT) is similar to SRT; however, four white square outlines 
are displayed on the screen, and the target stimulus is randomly presented in one of those four 
squares with equiprobability. Again, the target stimulus is the square filling from black to 
white in 40 trials. Participants press the [a], [s], [k], or [l] key ([a] and [s] are pressed with the 
left hand and [k] and [l] with the right) spatially corresponding to the box in which the 
stimulus appears (see Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21. An example of two complete CRT trials with varying ISI. Participants fixate the 




4.6.3.2 Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). Participants are presented 
with random single digits (1 – 9) displayed in the centre of the screen in fonts of differing 
sizes (48, 72, 94, 100 and 120 point, ranging from 12 mm to 29 mm on the computer screen). 
Each digit is displayed for 245 msec, immediately followed by a mask for 900 msec, 
resulting in a response period of 1,145 msec from digit onset to mask offset (see Figure 22). 
Participants press the left mouse button as soon as possible after any digit except the digit ‘3’ 
is displayed (referred to as “go trials”; 0.89 probability). For this task, participants must 
inhibit their response when the digit ‘3’ is displayed (referred to as “no-go trials”; 0.11 
probability). The task consists of 225 trials, including 25 no-go trials presented at random. An 
error of commission occurs when the participant does not inhibit a response when the digit ‘3’ 
is presented. Outcome variables were proportion of commission errors, median reaction time (RT) in 
go trials, and fluctuations in RT before and after no-go trials. 
 
 
Figure 22. An example of two complete SART trials. The first trial is a go trial in which 
participants respond to the stimulus (any digit other than 3, the digit 7 in this example), 
followed by a no-go trial (the digit 3) in which participants are instructed to inhibit their 
response. 
Tasks were programmed using Xojo software (Xojo Inc., Austin, Texas, USA) and 
installed on Mac OSX 10.8 computers (Apple Inc., Cupertino, USA) with HP keyboard and 
1000 dpi corded mouse (Hewlett-Packard Co., Palo Alto, USA). 
4.7 Results 
 
Participants were blinded to their stimulation condition order and were naïve to the 
objectives of the study. 35 participants (65%) correctly identified the anodal condition in a 
two-alternative forced-choice question, consistent with previous literature, signifying 
135  
sufficient blinding to condition (see Russo, Wallace, Fitzgerald, & Cooper, 2013). 
Of the 54 participants, one participant was excluded from CRT analyses due to 
missing data from one session. Four participants were excluded from SART analyses due to 
anomalistic or incomplete data; three did not respond to go trials (i.e., executed omission 
errors only), and one produced RTs twice as long in the third session than in the other two 
sessions. Consistent with a recommendation by Jensen (2006), we used a simple truncation 
rule for all three tasks to exclude trials with RTs shorter than 150 msec that likely reflect 
anticipatory responses, and longer than 1500 msec that likely reflect inattention or aberrant 
mechanical processes (note that truncation of long RTs was not necessary for the SART, 
given that participants were given only 1145 msec to respond to each digit). Alongside these 
criteria, we excluded CRT incorrect-selection responses (i.e., pressed a key corresponding to 
an incorrect target). These heuristics resulted in exclusion of only a few trials: 0.19%, 0.09% 
and 0.05% of SRT trials in the baseline, anodal, and sham sessions, respectively; 6.18%, 
7.45% and 7.55% of CRT trials; and 4.00%, 6.97%, and 5.86% of SART trials. We used the 
median as our overall measure of Simple, Choice, and SART RT because it is robust to the 






6 Given the problematic characteristics of the RT distribution, Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Seuss and 
Wittmann (2007) proposed that using information from the whole distribution of RTs may provide better 
estimates than do simple measures of central tendency. One such method is to fit an explicit density 
function, the ex-Gaussian (Hohle, 1965). So, because initial analyses using median RTs revealed no main 
effects, we extracted the three critical parameters of a theoretical ex-Gaussian RT distribution for further 
analysis. The ex-Gaussian demonstrates consistent robust psychometric properties in varying empirical RT 
samples (see Ratcliff, 1993). It is the convolution of two stochastically independent process distributions: a 
Gaussian function whose mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) approximately represent the rise of the 
distribution’s left tail; and an exponential function whose mean (τ) approximately represents the skewed 
tail (Sternberg, 2014). Any given RT trial can be partitioned into a decision component, and a transduction 
component; that is, the perception of a stimulus and decision to respond, and the true physical-motor 
response, respectively (Dawson, 1988; Luce, 1986). The use of the ex-Gaussian assumes that the 
transduction component is Gaussian (represented by the μ and σ parameters), whereas the decision 
component is exponential (represented by the τ parameter; Hohle, 1965). We included this analysis not 
only to potentially identify a source of variation in response, but also because its parameters somewhat 
closely reflect the stages of processing identified a century earlier by Donders. This particular analysis of 
RT could have provided insight into potential differential effects of disparate cortical distribution of 
stimulation current on decision and transduction components; however, it provided no substantive or 
interpretable results. 
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Data from all conditions are summarized in Table 6. Including the order of the anodal 
and sham tDCS sessions in our analyses did not alter the overall results, and so we report 
analyses without this factor. Stimulation condition (anodal, sham) did not affect Simple 
Reaction Time (t53 = 1.42, p = .16) or Choice Reaction Time (t52 = 0.47, p = .64). Participants 
produced a significantly higher proportion of errors of commission on the SART following 
anodal-tDCS than following sham (t49 = 2.30, p = .026, d = 0.22). Moreover, participants 
responded faster following anodal-tDCS than sham, (M = 14.8 msec, SEM = 8.1 msec), 





Figure 23. SART performance in the three sessions. Participants made significantly more 
errors of commission (p = .026; upper panel) and responded faster (p = .073; lower panel) in 
the anodal stimulation condition compared to the sham condition. 
We further analysed the mean reaction times of the four trials immediately before and 
after errors of commission in the SART. This allowed us to examine the error-correction 
mechanism that manifests as longer response latencies in the four trials following failure to 
inhibit a response to target stimulus presentation (Fellows & Farah, 2005; Manly, Robertson, 
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Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999). We investigated whether anodal tDCS influenced proactive 
inhibition, measured by PES, so we could determine whether anodal stimulation decreased 
RT in general, or whether a failure in PES, generated slightly faster RT under anodal 
stimulation. Pre- and post-error RT data for two participants could not be analysed due to 
zero error rates. The interaction term between type of stimulation (anodal vs. sham) and time 
relative to errors (pre- vs. post-errors) approached significance (t47 = 1.83, p = .073). This is 
because RTs before errors were similar in the anodal and sham conditions (t47 = 1.40, p 
= .167), but RTs after errors were significantly slower in the sham condition than the anodal 
condition (t47 = 3.11, p = .003; see Figure 24). Put differently, and depicted in the lower panel 
of Figure 24, participants slowed down after an error under sham stimulation (t47 = 2.18, p 
= .034, d = 0.13) and in the baseline session (t47 = 3.11, p = .002, d = .30), but not under 
anodal stimulation (t47 = .05, p = .964). 
 
 
Figure 24. Mean Reaction Time before and after an error of commission on the SART (upper 
panel) and the change in average Reaction Time following an error of commission (lower 
panel). Participants in both the baseline (p = .002) and sham (p = .034) sessions exhibited an 
increase in RT following an error. This was not evident in the anodal stimulation condition (p 
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= .964), where participants did not alter their response pattern following an error. Error bars 




Descriptive statistics for performance on behavioural measures in the baseline session and anodal and sham tDCS conditions, and pairwise t- 
tests comparing differences between behavioural performance on anodal and sham tDCS conditions. 
  












   
Measures (sample size)   t p d 
 Lower Upper    
SRT (n = 54) 308.14 (6.54) 318.66 (7.96) 312.44 (6.23) 6.22 (4.40) -2.59 15.04 1.42 .163 .12 
CRT (n = 53) 468.17 (15.00) 452.37 (10.95) 454.87 (10.30) -2.50 (5.34) -13.22 8.22 0.47 .642 .03 
SART RT (n = 50) 338.71 (14.02) 316.78 (11.91) 331.63 (13.23) -14.84 (8.10) -31.12 1.43 1.83 .073 .17 
SART Errors (n = 50) .48 (.04) .52 (.04) .46(.04) .05 (.02) .01 .10 2.30 .026 .22 
SART RTB (n = 48) 313.08 (10.62) 308.7 (9.66) 320.47 (12.41) -11.77 (8.56) -29.10 5.18 1.40 .167 .17 
SART RTA (n = 48) 334.04 (14.70) 307.81 (8.24) 332.34 (12.78) -24.54 (7.14) -37.18 -7.94 3.11 .003 .33 
SART RTA – RTB (n = 48) 22.59 (6.82) 0.02 (5.36) 10.84 (4.98) -10.60 (5.78) -22.23 1.03 1.83 .073 .26 
Abbreviations: SRT: Simple Reaction Time; CRT: Choice Reaction Time; SART: Sustained Attention to Response Task; SART RTB: mean RT 
of 4 go trials immediately before (B) commission error; SART RTA: mean RT of 4 go trials immediately after (A) commission error. RTs are 
measured in milliseconds, and thus lower scores reflect faster reaction times. The t value, significance p-value, effect size (Cohen’s d) and 95% 




Effective modulation of higher cognitive functions, particularly those involved in 
executive functioning, requires an understanding of their neural bases. Indeed, this is one of 
the most exciting challenges faced by contemporary cognitive neuroscience, the outcomes of 
which may benefit both pathological and healthy populations. Where clinical application 
shows promise, it is common to investigate the effects of novel putative treatments on 
separable components of any given cognitive ability in healthy individuals. The capacity to 
select, generate, or withhold an action due to a change in environmental demands is critical 
for day-to-day functioning, and deficits in this ability characterize myriad neuropsychiatric 
illnesses and conditions of impaired cognition (Barkley, 1997; Kiehl et al., 2000; Lawrence et 
al., 1996; Nigg et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 1986). 
Although online stimulation has been posited as more appropriate in some 
experimental paradigms designed to enhance cognitive functions (Hogeveen, et al., 2016; 
Stagg, et al., 2011), we investigated offline effects of stimulation. This is because a tDCS 
intervention whose cognitive after-effects last for a period of time would provide a practical 
treatment from which benefits can be experienced with minimal imposition. Moreover, it is 
possible for a tDCS intervention to generate negative after-effects, which should also be well 
documented. So, although both online and offline stimulation seems to generate significant 
effects on various cognitive abilities, developing effective offline stimulation should be the 
goal of such research. 
4.8.1 tDCS effects on action selection and generation 
 
Contrary to our predictions, we found no evidence of an effect of tDCS on basic 
psychomotor response generation or action selection. Our findings do not support previous 
findings describing effects of tDCS on elementary psychomotor tasks such as SRT and CRT 
(Conley et al., 2015; Hayduk-Costa et al., 2013; Hummel et al., 2006; Ljubisavljevic et al., 
2015; Müller et al., 2008). This may reflect differences in procedures and stimulation 
parameters. While neither Jacobson et al. (2011), nor Hsu et al. (2011) found an effect of 
stimulation on reaction times in either correct go trials or incorrect no-go trials, SRT seems 
amenable to modulation under some stimulation conditions. For instance, cathodal 
stimulation of the left temporal cortex has improved RT in both stroke patients (Hummel et 
al., 2006), and healthy populations (Müller et al., 2008). Müller and colleagues (2008) noted, 
however, that stimulation of the opposite polarity did not elicit the opposite effect on RT, 
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rather, no modulation was observed. Effects of stimulation on CRT are even less clear. For 
example, whereas both Hayduk-Costa et al. (2013) and Conley et al. (2015) reported 
facilitation of CRT in limbs contralateral to anodal stimulation of M1, Lindenberg and 
colleagues (2013) found that anodal stimulation to the same cortical region did not. 
Interestingly, Karok and colleagues reported reduction in lower limb SRT in an experimental 
condition that applied online, unilateral anodal-tDCS to M1 (Karok, Fletcher, & Witney, 
2015). Karok et al., however, also reported that no such effect was found in either bilateral 
(current flow from right M1 to left M1), or offline stimulation conditions similar to those 
used here, which also failed to produce a positive result. Horvath and colleagues (2015a) 
highlighted that, taken together, this body of research seems to report both inconsistent and 
irreproducible data, suggesting that this may be due to small sample sizes. Of the 79 studies 
included in their meta-analysis, the average sample size was less than twelve. Our sample 
size of 54, therefore, confers substantially greater statistical power, giving rise to a greater 
likelihood of detecting the presence of reliable effects. 
4.8.2 tDCS effects on response inhibition 
 
We provide evidence for the modulation of a discrete cognitive component recruited 
by response inhibition processes, specifically, an error-correction mechanism. Performance in 
the baseline and sham conditions of the SART was consistent with research documenting 
errors of commission on sustained attention go/no-go tasks resulting in slowing subsequent 
responses to maximize ensuing response inhibition (Fellows & Farah, 2005; Manly et al., 
1999; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001; Roebuck, Guo, & Bourke, 2015). 
This effect is generally accepted to reflect the recognition of errors, followed by increased 
response latency so that prolonged processing times enable subsequent accurate responses. 
This cognitive strategy has been described as ‘proactive’ inhibition (in contrast to stimulus- 
driven ‘reactive’ inhibition), and seems to recruit the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Jahanshahi et al., 2015). We found that anodal stimulation negatively affected these 
monitoring and/or adjustment processes following an error: in contrast to the baseline and 
sham sessions, participants in our study did not slow down their response time in the anodal- 
tDCS condition, and this lack of behavioural adjustment was accompanied by an overall 
increase in the proportion of errors. It is therefore likely that the modest reduction in overall 
RT on the SART following anodal-tDCS reflects the absence of slowing down following an 
error of commission, and is not due to anodal-tDCS eliciting quicker responses overall in the 
task. This is especially likely given that anodal stimulation had no effect on SRT or CRT, or 
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on RTs in the SART before an error. We suggest that this result could be the consequence of 
(i) effects under the cathode due to its placement over the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which may 
have disturbed the efficacy of prefrontal networks recruited by response inhibition and 
executive function, and which has been proposed as a potential neurocognitive processing 
hub (Cole, Yarkoni, Repovs, Anticevic, & Braver, 2012; Neubauer & Fink, 2009); or, (ii) 
disturbance in the prefrontal-motor network due to the diffuse effects under the anode. 
Numerous brain regions are associated with error-correction neural systems, several of which 
are known to be involved in go/no-go tasks (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 
2000; Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Mesulam, 1990; Nobre et al., 1997). Some of these 
systems reside in the PFC, approximately at the location of our cathode (Meyer, Weinberg, 
Klein, & Hajcak, 2012; Turken & Swick, 2008). Operating under the assumption of a PFC 
network “hub” theory (see Cole et al., 2012), it is possible that excitability changes in the 
region of the anode or the cathode might have disturbed the communicative efficacy of this 
network. This may indicate that our anodal-tDCS protocol disrupted prefrontal functioning, 
which, in turn, disrupted the higher-order cognitive functioning required for effective 
response inhibition. This disruption could have happened in the two ways previously 
described, and is supported by the absence of an effect on performance in other tasks. 
Consistent with our interpretation, Nieratschker et al. (2015) reported similar 
disturbances following cathodal-tDCS to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in a 
parametric go/no-go task similar to that used here. Chambers et al. (2006) have shown 
comparable reductions in inhibition accuracy alongside improvements in RT in a stop-signal 
reaction time (a paradigm like SART that also measures goal-directed motor control) using 
repetitive TMS (rTMS) to inhibit the right inferior frontal gyrus, which is seated near the 
PFC. Although rTMS and tDCS differ in their physiological effects within the cortex, the 
consequent changes are known to be markedly similar; namely, the modulation of cortical 
excitability via changes in synaptic transmission (Priori, Hallett, & Rothwell, 2009). Notably, 
the cortical regions stimulated by Nieratschker et al. (2015) and Chambers et al. (2006) were 
both in the right hemisphere. However, these authors did not analyze RTs before and after 
errors to test for stimulation effects on behavioural adaptation following errors, which might 
have explained the reduction in inhibition accuracy. Others, however, have found neither 
facilitation nor impairment of response inhibition in a similar task under identical stimulation 
parameters as those used here (Conley et al., 2015); though, those results were observed in a 
smaller sample. 
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Although Jacobson and colleagues did not report shorter RTs in their stop-signal task 
following anodal stimulation to the right inferior frontal gyrus, there was an increase in 
response inhibition accuracy (Jacobson et al., 2011). Likewise, similar results have been 
reported following anodal stimulation to the pre-supplementary motor area, while cathodal 
stimulation has been associated with impaired response inhibition on a go/no-go task 
(Ljubisavljevic et al., 2015). These results of motor region stimulation may support the 
second explanation of our results: that the effects of this “anodal” electrode montage are 
diffuse due to the interconnectedness of the motor network with frontal regions; however, 
given the diffuse nature of tDCS it is difficult to isolate the origin of observed effects. 
4.8.3 Potential mechanisms explaining the different effects of tDCS on action 
selection, generation, and inhibition 
It is important to highlight that the motor cortex has a critical role in generating SRT 
responses because this task requires little complex cognitive function (Huang, Edwards, 
Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005) while the CRT task engages motor areas and additionally 
frontal regions, which support the action selection component (Miller & Low, 2001; 
Romaiguère, Possamaı̈, & Hasbroucq, 1997). On the other hand, fMRI and EEG evidence 
suggests that much of the neural processing required to produce the various cognitive 
processes invoked by the go/no-go paradigm takes place in inferior and dorsolateral 
prefrontal areas, as well as motor areas (Menon et al., 2001; Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 
2008). So, whereas inhibitory cathodal stimulation of the PFC appears responsible for the 
decrements in response inhibition that we observed, performance on measures of 
psychomotor function were not affected by excitatory anodal stimulation of the motor cortex 
in the present study. The inconsistent effects we report may be explained by a discrepancy 
between the magnitude and temporal disparities of the effects of anodal and cathodal 
stimulation. That is, we observed an effect that may potentially be due to inhibitory effects 
under the cathode, but no modulation of cognitive functions that are likely to be critically 
dependent on cortical networks under the anodal site. The after-effects of anodal stimulation 
and cathodal stimulation are not isochronal; cathodal inhibition outlasts anodal excitation, but 
may be weaker overall (Batsikadze, Moliadze, Paulus, Kuo, & Nitsche, 2013; Isaacson & 
Scanziani, 2011; Kidgell et al., 2013; Lang, Nitsche, Paulus, Rothwell, & Lemon, 2004; 
Santarnecchi et al., 2014). As the behavioural tests were administered following tDCS, it is 
possible that the after-effects of cathodal inhibition of the prefrontal cortex (resulting in 
impaired response inhibition processes) were stronger than the after-effects of anodal 
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excitation of the motor cortex (resulting in negligible effects on SRT and CRT) at the time of 
testing. This might explain why we found impaired performance on the SART and no 
significant change in performance on the SRT or CRT. A more thorough investigation of the 
cognitive after-effects of tDCS at different time points is needed in order to shed light on the 
time course of modulation of cognitive functions by tDCS. 
4.8.4 Limitations 
 
Given our unexpected results, this study may have been strengthened by the inclusion 
of an active control condition. Some recent evidence brings sham-control designs into 
question, highlighting some compelling limitations of the procedure (see Parkin, Ekhtiari, & 
Walsh, 2015). The inclusion of an active control montage, for instance placing the cathode 
extracephalically (see Vandermeeren, Jamart, & Ossemann, 2010), may allow us to identify 
whether the cathode was indeed responsible for the effects on inhibition by having a 
condition with no direct stimulation of prefrontal areas. However, Noestcher and colleagues 
(Noetscher, Yanamadala, Makarov, & Pascual-Leone, 2014), demonstrated that extracephalic 
reference montages deepen anodal stimulation; that is, while the horizontal current diffusion 
does not change, vertical current penetrates deeper, potentially reaching, and modulating the 
activity of, deeper neural architecture. In our case, more vertical stimulation of the motor 
cortex may artificially enhance motor functions by way of pyramidal tract modulation. 
Indeed our results support the position of Parkin and colleagues (2015) insofar as the 
application of a simple push/pull of pure excitation/inhibition under, respectively, the anode 
and cathode—with no behavioural interaction between the two cortical regions—clearly does 
not fit our data. Indeed, cognitive functions such as response inhibition involve pathways that 
include frontal cortices, motor areas and subcortical regions (e.g., the indirect and hyperdirect 
pathways described by Jahanshahi et al., 2015), all of which likely contribute to performance 
on tasks such as the SART. A more thorough investigation of the influence of various anode 
and cathode locations would help shed light on the relative contributions of these brain 
regions to task performance. 
4.9 Conclusions 
 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the modulation of discrete 
component parts of goal-directed motor control using a hitherto overlooked task (i.e., the 
SART), alongside individually well-researched tasks (i.e., SRT and CRT). Given that deficits 
in such functions have broad clinical implications, identifying their sensitivity to modulation 
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and neurobiological substrates is necessary before innovative clinical applications are 
introduced. Experimental investigation into the efficacy of tDCS in treatment and 
management of such conditions is of critical importance given the potential for increased 
quality of life and amelioration of symptomatology, particularly for diseases such as 
Huntington’s, where precise motor control is negatively affected. 
Here, we investigated whether anodal-tDCS applied to M1 affects response 
generation, action selection, and response inhibition. Our findings demonstrate that discrete 
component parts of motor control can be individually modulated using tDCS: anodal-tDCS 
did not affect Simple or Choice RT, but negatively affected response inhibition, possibly by 
disrupting a prefrontal error-correction mechanism. Further, we suggest that the location of 
both the anode and the cathode should be given serious consideration in experimental design, 
with researchers operating under an assumption of intracortical connectivity between a 
number of brain regions recruited by even elementary cognitive tasks. Finally, we stress the 
importance of systematically testing the effects of various combinations of electrode montage 
configurations, as well as stimulation parameters such as current intensity and duration, for 
different cognitive functions in healthy populations before the implementation of these 





In this second experiment, we asked whether the tDCS effects observed in the 
previous section can be attributed to LTP- like effects. That is, whether the physiological 
mechanism underlying the effect of tDCS can be attributed to long-term potentiation-like 
neuroplastic changes. We tested this here using a second neurostimulatory technique, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in the same sample as that described in the 
previous section. This experiment can, therefore, be considered supplementary to the 
previous as the data we describe here were collected in the same experimental sessions. 
Additionally, we included a latent measure of intelligence which we refer to as general 
intellectual ability (GIA), computed using a principal components analysis of scores on 
three abilities tests described below, because there is some evidence leading us to 
hypothesise that this may modulate either the potential for neuroplastic induction or the 
magnitude of the effect on cognitive abilities produced by neuroplastic induction (e.g., 
Garlick, 2002), although this evidence is mixed (e.g., Park & Bischof, 2013; Thatcher, 
Palmero-Soler, North, & Biver, 2016), may be mediated by cognitive reserve, (Vance, 
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Roberson, McGuinness, & Fazeli, 2010; Whalley, Deary, Appleton, & Starr, 2004), or may 
be explained by the domains of cognition recruited by different GIA-associated task 
demands (Neubauer, 2012). 
Many studies seem to indicate that a brain with better connectivity appears capable of 
better cognitive outcomes (Cole, Yarkoni, Repovš, Anticevic & Braver, 2012; Hampson, 
Driesen, Skudlarski, Gore & Constable, 200) and, since neuroplasticity can be thought of the 
brain’s capacity to respond to environmental experiences and insult by effecting structural 
changes to the connectivity of the brain (Fuchs & Flügge, 2014; Münte, Altenmüller, & 
Jäncke, 2002), then it stands to reason that neuroplastic induction may by a physiological 
candidate to explain the supposed effect of tDCS on cognitive abilities. According to this 
hypothesis, we expected to observe changes in performance on various cognitive tasks, and 
that those changes could be accounted for by the modulation of cortical excitability (i.e., 
TMS-induced neuroplastic induction). 
Interest in neurostimulation paradigms has departed from invasive techniques such as 
deep brain and vagal nerve stimulation toward noninvasive techniques largely because non- 
invasive techniques are well-tolerated and have fewer risks and side effects (Stagg & Nitsche, 
2011; Kuo, Paulus & Antal, 2015). The development of magnetic stimulation has allowed 
less reliance on electrical stimulation, although each occupies a unique position in cognitive 
neuroscience and complement one another (Tanaka & Watanabe, 2009). Not only is the 
experimental potential of using tDCS and TMS unique in that their effects can imitate 
ablation and lesion experiments and can be used to modulate activity at the synapse, with 
further development, they may indeed prove effective in clinical applications. In fact, theta 
burst stimulation, a TMS technique, has already demonstrated notable utility in various motor 
disorders; moreover, both TMS and tDCS have been used with varying efficacy for the 
management of major depressive disorder and chronic pain, treatment of symptoms related to 
neuropathy and stroke, and therapy for neuropsychiatric diseases and psychopathology such 
as dementia and schizophrenia (Boggio et al., 2008; Edwardson, Lucas, Carey & Fetz, 2013; 
Kuo, Paulus & Nitsche, 2014; O’Connell, Wand, Marston, Spencer & DeSouza, 2014; 
O’Neill, Sacco & Nurmikko, 2015). 
Neuroplasticity exerts effects over both the structural and functional connectedness of 
the brain. It is likely that the structural mechanisms that seem to protect against the cognitive 
sequelae of neuropathology can be attributed to the amelioration of diminished functional 
connectedness associated with the pathology. Cognitive aptitude depends on the physical 
integrity of the brain, that is, the efficacy with which neurons communicate. A brain with 
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better connectivity is able to efficiently and effectively transfer information within and 
between brain regions and, as such, greater connectivity is associated with better cognitive 
control and higher intelligence (Cole, Yarkoni, Repovš, Anticevic & Braver, 2012; 
Hampson, Driesen, Skudlarski, Gore & Constable, 2006). Because the integrity and efficacy 
of neural connectivity is at least partially responsible for cognitive outcomes, then artificially 
modulating that cortical connectivity should plausibly modulate cognition. The brain 
functionally recovers and remodels in response to injury and disease in amazing ways. In 
extreme cases such as brain region ablation, a functionally intact neighbouring neural pool 
often carries out the functions of the ablated region (Fancher & Rutherford, 2012). 
Furthermore, the human nervous system has the fascinating ability to undergo structural and 
functional reorganisation in response to the stimulation of learning and experience. Expertise 
in some area often manifests at a gross neurophysiological level. For example, studies have 
shown larger hippocampi (involved in forming and accessing complex memories and spatial 
navigation) in taxi drivers, more complex parietal lobes in bilinguals, and higher cortical 
volume in musicians (Gaser & Schlaug, 2003; Maguire, Woollett & Spiers, 2006; Mechelli et 
al., 2004). 
The mechanisms via which these neuroplastic changes occur are synaptic and 
nonsynaptic, and activity-dependent, including processes of neuronal growth, synaptogenesis, 
dendritic spine formation, and synaptic pruning (Singh & Garg, 2014). In two experiments in 
which rats were trained to reach for a biscuit using either their dominant, nondominant, or 
both forepaws, Greenough, Larson, and Withers (1985; see also Withers & Greenough, 1989) 
observed larger apical dendritic fields, in terms of total dendritic length, number of oblique 
branches from the apical shaft, and length of terminal branches in contralateral Layer V 
pyramidal neurons, and selective alterations in size and complexity to the forked apical 
pyramids in basilar dendrites within layers II and III in the contralateral motor-sensory cortex 
of the forelimb. Using a similar reach training task, Xu et al. (2009), extended these findings, 
demonstrating immediate and permanent cortical rewiring in mice following motor skill 
repetition. Taken together, these results show an interaction between structural and functional 
connectedness which, following activity, results first in strengthening of neural connectivity, 
and second, in turn, in greater cognitive performance as a function thereof. Neuroplasticity 
also encompasses changes in the communicative efficacy of existing pathways—that is, the 
increase and decrease in efficacy of synaptic connectivity via long-term potentiation (LTP) 
and long-term depression (LTD) respectively, thereby either strengthening or weakening 
signal transmission potential as a function of use (Massey & Bashir, 2007). LTP and LTD are 
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the cellular and molecular substrates of long-term memory. LTP is a long-lasting 
enhancement (upregulation) in signal transmission between two neurons after repeated 
stimulation via increased neurotransmitter release and AMPA receptor site formation on post- 
synaptic cell membranes (Henley & Wilkinson, 2013). As a result of post-synaptic calcium 
influx and NMDA receptor (GluN2B-NMDAR) lateral diffusion, LTP also involves dendritic 
spine formation through intracellular CaMKII redistribution (Dupuis et al., 2014). Moreover, 
an increase in transcription factors via gene expression, which results in increased synthesis 
of growth factor proteins that are involved in formation of new synapses, further underpins 
LTP. These mechanisms lead to greater depolarisation events in post-synaptic terminals. 
Conversely, LTD reflects AMPA receptor internalisation and phosphorylation making them 
inaccessible to calcium ions, and decreases in neurotransmitter release and NMDA receptor 
density, thus downregulating signal transmission efficacy in the post-synaptic neuron (Dudek 
& Bear, 1992; Ogasawara, Doi & Kawato, 2008). 
Recent evidence using imaging techniques such as voxel-based morphometry and 
diffusion tensor imaging have revealed significant individual differences in the capacity one 
has for neuroplastic cortical excitability change, which varies as a function of genetic, 
physiologic, and environmental factors, among many others not yet known (Kanai & Rees, 
2011; Park & Bischof, 2013; Westerhausen et al., 2006). An objective indicator of baseline 
cortical excitability can be derived using a measure of sensory threshold (D’Ostilio et al., in 
press), where threshold refers to a membrane’s absolute capacity to react to stimuli and 
consequently enact the synaptic cascade. With TMS we can obtain such a measure from the 
motor cortex, which is the brain region from which neural impulses involved in planning, 
execution and control of voluntary movements originate. So, with a known threshold value, 
we are able to measure relative change in response to stimulus administration held at a 
constant suprathreshold intensity. Resting motor threshold (rMT) is the minimum stimulus 
intensity required to evoke a liminal response in the target muscle in response to transcranial 
stimulation of motor cortex (Qi, Wu & Schweighofer, 2011). rMT is defined as the lowest 
machine stimulus intensity that can evoke a small (≥50 µV) motor evoked potential (MEP) in 
at least half of a consecutive series of ten trials. rMT simply reflects the excitability and 
synaptic efficacy of the entire corticospinal projection from motor cortex to some target 
muscle. Schneider et al. (2014; see also Pitcher, Schneider, Drysdale, Ridding & Owens, 
2011) reported that lower rMT (i.e., higher excitability) is associated with higher processing 
speed, working memory, and general intellectual ability in adolescents. Although these 
abilities may not require the motor cortex, it is suggested that the relationship between rMT 
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and cognitive performance exists because rMT might be an index of cortical excitability 
throughout the brain (Pitcher et al., 2011). 
tDCS is thought to induce LTD- and LTP-like neuroplastic changes via subthreshold 
manipulation of membrane potential and modulation of spontaneous firing rates via alteration 
of excitatory thresholds and displacement of the depolarisation event initiation from the 
neuron’s soma to its dendrites, thereby synchronising neural oscillations (Bikson et al., 2004; 
Paulus, 2011). Using tDCS, Liebetanz et al. (2006) modulated cortical spreading depression 
propagation in anaesthetised rats by altering ion homeostasis such that neurons underwent 
electrical hyperactivity followed by a wave of inhibition as a consequence of high voltage 
tDCS. These changes are polarity-dependent, meaning that electrode polarity determines the 
direction of effect (Paulus, 2011). Anodal tDCS consists of a positively charged, facilitatory 
electrode (anode) over a cortical region of interest, and results in depolarisation of neuronal 
resting membrane potential between the anode and the negatively charged, inhibitory 
reference electrode (cathode) at a remote site. Current diffusion and depolarisation magnitude 
depend on a number of factors such as electrode size and individual differences in cortical 
anatomy. Anodal tDCS (a-tDCS) is used to increase neural excitability in the cortical region 
of interest, the focality of which depends on the location of the cathode (Bikson, Datta & 
Elwassif, 2009). Alternatively, cathodal stimulation reverses this electrode montage, 
positioning the cathode over the cortical region of interest. It is important to note that an 
anode and cathode are used in both anodal and cathodal tDCS and, therefore, both excitatory 
and inhibitory responses are elicited. Thus, a-tDCS produces bimodal polarisation by 
increasing excitability at the target site, and decreasing excitability at the reference site 
(Bikson, Datta, Rahman & Scaturro, 2010). 
The physical mechanisms of tDCS and TMS differ insofar as TMS induces an 
electromagnetic field parallel to the brain surface whereas the electric field elicited by tDCS 
has components that are both parallel and perpendicular to the brain surface (Roth, 1994), and 
as a consequence of this, net effects on excitability are further subject to direction of current 
flow along the neuron in regard to its physical orientation in white matter, as well as axonal 
and somatic polarisation (Antal, Paulus & Nitsche, 2010). 
When investigating changes in the motor cortex, the effect of tDCS on neuronal 
excitability can be measured by determining whether a session of tDCS applied over the 
motor cortex alters the amplitude of TMS-induced motor evoked potentials (Di Lazzarro & 
Rothwell, 2014). Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) are neuroelectrical responses in muscles 
that can be elicited by single pulse TMS, which via electromagnetic induction produces a 
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small, targeted electrical current in cortex directly underneath the magnetic field generating 
coil. A change in MEP amplitude is a marker for neuroplastic change, and reflects 
modulation of peripheral motor pathway and corticospinal neuron membrane excitability, 
intracortical synaptic strength, and neuromuscular junction health (Kobayashi & Pascual- 
Leone, 2003). Thus, if a-tDCS induces LTP-like neuroplasticity (i.e., an increase in synaptic 
strength), then one would expect MEP amplitude to increase in response to a set stimulus 
intensity following a session of a-tDCS, and, indeed, this is what we expected to observe. 
An MEP is a waveform with well-defined deflections; shortly after the TMS pulse, 
there is a dip followed by a peak. MEP amplitude is taken to be the difference between the 
two largest voltage peaks of opposite polarity (Rossini et al., 1999). Nitsche and Paulus 
(2000; 2001) demonstrated an increase in MEP amplitude of 150% above baseline following 
a short session of 1 mA a-tDCS to the motor cortex. The effect lasted 90 minutes, and was the 
first demonstration of sustained tDCS-induced elevations of cortical excitability (Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2001). 
Threshold measures of cortical excitability in motor cortex are correlated with those 
in visual cortex—thus, using the motor cortex as a proxy of cortical excitability throughout 
the brain seems to be valid. The primary motor region M1 is a suitable candidate for 
manipulation not only because its plasticity can be quantified (unlike other brain regions) but 
also because, in addition to its principal role in muscular control, Hammond (1956; 1960) 
reported that the magnitude of some voluntary components of motor cortical muscular output 
(e.g., stretch reflexes) can be modulated by prior, related experimental instructions. Using 
fMRI and MEG, Pulvermüller (2005; see also Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin & Ilmoniemi, 
2005) demonstrated increased activity in M1 200 msec after reading or hearing action terms 
associated with movement (e.g., “sit”). More specifically, verbs for arm-, head- and leg- 
related actions produced activity in their respective motor cortical areas. That is, the motor 
cortex is crucial in processing cognitive information related to sensorimotor function and its 
complex interconnections are in part associated with cognitive functions and skill learning 
(Barsalou, 2008; Sanes & Donoghue, 2000). Simply stated, plasticity can be measured in 
M1, and activity in M1 also appears to be associated with cognition. 
For long-lasting modification of cognitive abilities, an intervention must induce long- 
term physiological changes in cortex. To date, the only such reliable change in underlying 
neural mechanisms is the apparent strengthening of synaptic connectivity (Stagg & Nitsche, 
2011). Nevertheless, neuroplasticity has hitherto been overlooked as an independent measure 
against which tDCS-induced cognitive change can be modelled. Cognitive change following 
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tDCS may be the result of, for example, transient mood change (Nitsche, Boggio, Fregni & 
Pascual-Leone, 2009), or increased regional cortical blood flow (Zheng, Alsop & Schlaug, 
2011). So, in addition to the protocol reported in the previous experiment, we aimed to 
determine whether neuroplasticity, as measured by change in TMS-induced MEP amplitude 
before and after the administration of tDCS was related to change in cognitive performance. 
With this in mind, we were in the exciting position to ask whether we were able to, via 
induction of neuroplasticity, simulate natural learning and memory processes, and thereby 
enhance cognition. So, the question was: could we mimic neural processes and instantiate the 
potentiation of cognitive abilities via an external source? 
Consistent with Nitsche and Paulus (2001), we expect an increase in MEP amplitude 
following a-tDCS produced by LTP-like effects, which would provide a measure of 
neuroplasticity to use as an index against which changes in performance on cognitive tasks 
performed could be compared. That is, changes in MEPs could be used to provide a short- 
term measure of neuroplasticity, which may help us explain why the cognitive performance 
of some individuals improves after a-tDCS (presumably because this type of stimulation 
effectively induced neuroplasticity), whereas the performance of others does not (presumably 
because this type of stimulation was not effective in inducing neuroplasticity in these 
individuals). Given the position that cognitive performance is at least partially attributable to 
brain connectivity, we further hypothesise that the expected difference in cognitive 
performance between anodal and sham stimulation sessions within individuals will be 
positively correlated with their MEP difference between anodal and sham stimulation (i.e., 
changes in cognitive performance will correlate with the extent to which tDCS induced 
neuroplasticity). 
Finally, numerous researchers have suggested that the degree to which individuals’ 
cognitive abilities can be enhanced are significantly variable (Graham & Fisher, 2013; Moser, 
Schroder, Heeter, Moran & Lee, 2011) and that the efficacy of any intervention may be 
moderated by an individual’s initial abilities. It follows that the efficacy of tDCS to facilitate 
enhancement on cognitive tasks related to intelligence may be similarly moderated. As such, 
we used performance on three cognitive tasks to establish a baseline cognitive profile of 
general intellectual ability before any neurostimulation, against which changes in MEPs and 
cognitive performance in a second set of tasks were modelled, with the expectation that 
participants with a higher baseline general intellectual ability (GIA) would be more receptive 
to plasticity induction, illustrated by larger increases in MEPs and cognitive performance 
following a-tDCS. GIA was estimated from scores on three tests administered in Session 1: 
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Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RPM), the Dot Matrix test (DM), and the Mental 
Rotation test (MRT). 
4.11 Materials and design 
Since this experiment is a continuation of the previous, the sample comprised the same 
participants as those described in the previous Experiment (refer to 4.5.1). 
4.11.1 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
 
MEPs were induced using TMS from a monophasic Magstim 2002 with a figure-of- 
eight Alpha Remote Control Coil with an external diameter of 90mm per wing (Magstim Co., 
Whitland, UK). Single stimuli were applied every six seconds ±10% according to a 
randomised variable interval scale. MEPs were recorded via surface electromyography 
(EMG) using disposable, circular Ag/AgCl electrodes with a 9.1 cm2 skin-contact area 
arranged in a belly-tendon montage on the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle of the right 
hand. Each TMS pulse elicits an involuntary response displayed on a computer screen and 
measured in millivolts (mV; see Figure 25). The sample was right-handed to minimise inter- 
individual MEP variability (Balvin, Song & Slimp, 2010). A CED Power1401 mark-III 
(Cambridge Electronic Design [CED]; Cambridge, UK) was used for analogue to digital 
conversion and band-pass filtering (20Hz-1kHz) in parallel with either a CED 1902 Quad- 
system or Digitimer D360 (CED; Digitimer, Welwyn Garden City) for isolated amplification 
(×1000). Digitised MEPs were analysed and recorded onto hard-drive for offline analysis 
using Signal v4.09 software (CED) installed on Windows XP (Microsoft Corporation, 
Redmond, USA). Signal software was also used to control stimulation parameters (e.g., 
trigger timing) and for online 50 hertz (Hz) rejection algorithm which acts as a computational 
band stop filter to attenuate signal contamination from ambient electrical noise produced by 




Figure 25. An example of a recorded motor evoked potential. TMS stimulus artefact is 
highlighted in blue at 200 msec, followed by a stimulus response latency of approximately 20 
msec, and then the MEP waveform that occurs between 220 and 240 msec, which is followed 
by a silent period. Each MEP frame displays 300 msec. 
4.11.2 Experimental procedure 
Three general cognitive ability (GIA) tasks were administered in the baseline session 
that did not include any neurostimulatory intervention. 
At the beginning of the second session, participants were seated in a chair with their 
right forearm pronated, resting on a pillow. The chair was oriented away from screens to 
prevent potential desirability or anticipatory effects via biofeedback. The right hand was 
prepared with 70% ethanol solution and abrasive gel to ensure good skin conductance. Two 
electrodes were affixed transdermal to the FDI (located by placing downward force on the 
index finger and having participants abduct the digit against it), from which MEPs were 
measured via EMG and a grounding strap was fastened around the arm superficial to the 
interosseous membrane of the forearm along the transverse. The Magstim unit was first set to a 
subthreshold intensity (30% maximum stimulator output [MSO]) to familiarise participants to 
the sensation of TMS. The coil was applied to C3 according to The International 10-20 System 
(Jasper, 1958), above left-hemispheric M1, and held at an angle 45° to the sagittal midline 
with posterior-facing handle. This orientation results in a posterior-to-anterior current flow that 
is roughly perpendicular to the central sulcus. The coil was moved anterior-to-posterior, and 
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lateral-to-medial, with intensity increasing in 5%MSO increments, until the strongest response 
was evoked in the relaxed contralateral FDI. The optimal site for stimulation (the hotspot) is 
the location of the coil on the scalp where the strongest response is evoked (Bastani & 
Jaberzadeh, 2012). 
The hotspot was marked with a surgical marker to ensure consistent pre-to-post TMS 
localisation. Stimulus intensity was incrementally decreased until resting motor threshold 
(rMT) was determined, according to the convention outlined by the International Federation of 
Clinical Neurophysiology (Rothwell et al., 1999). At present, this procedure is considered 
most effective in deriving hotspot and rMT, and least likely to induce physiological change 
due to multiple pulses. For TMS intensity, we used a “relative method”, whereby intensity is 
set to 120%MSO, relative to participants’ rMT, as is conventional in single-pulse paradigms 
(see Pitcher et al., in press). This method normalises intraindividual responses and minimises 
interindividual variability (Rossini et al., 1994) and attempts to prevent floor and ceiling 
effects in MEPs by setting the stimulation intensity to a medium value. TMS intensity was 
adjusted according to each participant’s rMT at the beginning of each TMS session. 
Two blocks of 20 MEPs were collected prior to tDCS and their amplitudes recorded. 
MEPs were visually assessed at the end of each stimulation session, and contaminated trials 
(i.e., muscle activity, for example, flexion articulations, and arm readjustments, or other 
artefacts) were excluded. Where this resulted in a block comprised of fewer than 12 MEPs, an 
additional block was taken to ensure adequate data for statistical analyses (in rare cases, two 
additional blocks were taken). Each block took 120 seconds, and blocks were separated by five 
minutes to minimise synaptic fatigue which may diminish MEP amplitude (Gandevia, 1996). 
Following these baseline MEP measurements, tDCS was administered according to the 
protocol described previously, and following this tDCS intervention, the same TMS procedure 
was repeated to collect a post-tDCS measure of excitability. 
4.11.3 Behavioural tasks 
4.11.3.1. We used a computerised, abbreviated version of Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1958; Raven, Raven & Court, 2003) to measure higher-order 
general reasoning ability. It comprises a series of 12 items of progressively increasing 
difficulty that require participants to select which element best completes a 3×3 matrix pattern 
series. The matrix contains eight target images which form a pattern sequence along each row 
or column. The bottom-right grid piece is blank. Participants are instructed to deduce which 
one of eight numbered test images best fits the blank grid piece by inferring a pattern between 
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target images and typing the corresponding number and confirming their selection. 
Participants must complete two practice questions before beginning the task proper, which 
they have 15 minutes to complete. Remaining time is displayed in the bottom-right corner of 
the screen. Participants are instructed to guess if they are unable to deduce a pattern. The 
measure for this task is the number of correct selections. Bors and Stokes (1998) reported high 
test-retest reliability (.82), and a strong correlation with the full-length version (r = .86, p 
< .001), as well as a strong relationship with IQ. 
4.11.3.2. To measure working memory we used a computerised form of Law, Morrin 
and Pellegrino’s (1995) Dot Matrix task. This task measures simultaneous storage and 
processing in the spatial modality. Participants are required to verify a set of matrix equations 
while simultaneously remembering dot locations on a 5x5 grid. Equations are addition or 
subtraction equations displayed as two line matrices which correctly or incorrectly form a 
third. In each matrix either 2 or 3 dots are connected by either 1 or 2 lines, respectively. 
Participants must verify equations by using a mouse to click “True” or “False”. If allocated 
response time (4 seconds) expires before a response, a warning is displayed on the screen 
indicating that a response is required. If the incorrect response is selected, “No, look again 
closely” is displayed. Following a correct response, a 5x5 grid appears with a blue dot in one 
of its 25 squares for 1500 msec. After each level-dependent number of equation-grid pairs 
have been presented and verified, a blank 5x5 grid is presented and participants indicate the 
spaces which contained the dots by clicking them with the mouse. Participants may select 
fewer grid spaces than required, but not more, and have the opportunity to deselect grid spaces 
if they enter an unintended grid space. Participants confirm their selection before finalising 
their response. This task has four levels: the first level is comprised of trials with 2 equation- 
grid pairs and 2 dot locations to remember, the second level is comprised of 3 equation-grid 
pairs and 3 dot locations, and so on to level 4, with 5 matrices and dot locations. Levels 
contain four questions. The task is comprised of 16 questions in total. Prior to commencement, 
three practice level 1 questions must be successfully completed. The measure for the task is 
total number of dot positions correctly recalled, with no penalty for incorrect selections. 
4.11.3.3. A computerised version of Vandenberg and Kuse’s (1978) Mental Rotation 
Task (MRT) was used to measure visuospatial ability. In each trial participants are presented 
with a target drawing and four test drawings. Target drawings are two-dimensional images of 
three-dimensional objects. Participants must select which two test drawings depict the target in 
a rotated position. To make their selection, participants use a mouse to select a radio button 
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below the test image. After the selection is made, response is finalised by clicking an “OK” 
button displayed at the bottom of the screen. Participants have the option to select no items and 
continue to the next question by clicking “OK”. There are 20 questions in total, with 10 
minutes to complete as many as possible. Participants are instructed to work quickly while 
maintaining accuracy, and advised that correct and incorrect responses are reflected in their 
score, so it will be disadvantageous to guess. Participants must successfully complete three 
practice questions before beginning the task proper. Two points are awarded for correct 
selection of both answers, one point is awarded if one answer was selected and was correct, 
and any other possible answer (e.g., selecting one correct and one incorrect answer) was 
scored zero. The final measure for the task is total number of points. This task has a test-retest 
reliability of .83 (Vandenburg & Kuse, 1978). 
4.12 Results 
GIA was assessed via three measures (RPM, DM, and MRT). As expected, these 
measures show a positive manifold, demonstrating positive intercorrelations between all 
measures, and therefore indicating some underlying general factor of intelligence (see Table 7; 
Spearman, 1904; see also Deary, 2000). As recommended by Jensen (1998), the commonality 
of these variables, taken to be GIA, was represented by the unrotated first principal component 
of a principal components analysis (PCA). PCA is a method to fit planes using orthogonal 
least squares which analyses and partitions covariance to capture essential data patterns and 
reduce the dimensionality of several variables to a given number of principal components 
(Flury, 1988; Hotelling, 1933; Jolliffe, 1986; Pearson, 1901). So our measure of GIA is the 
first principal component produced by the PCA, which accounts for 66.4% of variance 
between measures, and the only component to produce an eigenvalue greater than unity. 
Participants were fitted to a distribution, centred on zero, based on their relative GIA. 
Loadings and component fit are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 7 





DM .45 .55 
Notes. N = 56 except for correlations involving the Dot Matrix where data were missing for 
one participant. All p < .001. 
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Table 8 





1 2 3 
Loadings on Measures 
   
RPM .78 .62  
DM .82 -.38 .43 
MRT .84 -.21 -.51 
Eigenvalues and Variance Measures 
SS loadings 1.99 0.56 0.45 
VP explained .64 .19 .15 
Note. VP is proportion of variance accounted for by each component. 
 
We did not apply an exclusion rule to MEP amplitude due to the legitimate 
intraindividual variability within the dataset—that is, MEPs were highly variable, but outlier 
tests revealed that they were within reasonable bounds. This intra- and inter-individual 
variability is common and has yet unknown origins (Kiers, Cros, Chiappa & Fang, 1993). 
Some argue that this lends itself to logarithmic transformation of MEPs (e.g., Ellaway et al., 
1998). As such, natural log transformation was applied to the individual MEP amplitudes that 
were used to calculate ΔMEPA, ΔMEPS, and ΔMEPTotal, which we derived from each 
participant in the following way7: 
ΔMEPTotal = ΔMEPA − ΔMEPS 
 
Where: ΔMEPA = Anodal MEPPost – Anodal MEPPre 
Where: ΔMEPs = Sham MEPPost – Sham MEPPre 
Resultant distributions nonetheless did not follow log-normal distributions. As is shown in 
Tables 9 and 10, log transformed data were less skewed, but retained substantial variability. 
 
 
7  Here and after, the delta notation, Δ, refers to change; so, ΔMEP indicates change in MEP 
amplitude, in most cases throughout this thesis from pre- to post- stimulation. Moreover, subscript in 
these cases (ΔMEPA; ΔMEPS) refers to the MEP change in the stimulation condition of interest, where 
ΔMEPA is MEP change pre- to post- anodal tDCS, and ΔMEPS is MEP change pre- to post- sham. 
ΔMEPTotal refers to the difference between these two measures—that is, it refers to our neuroplasticity 
score. Similarly, cognitive tasks prefixed with Δ indicate the difference in performance therein from 




Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Skewness for Original and Log Transformed MEP Distributions 
tDCS 
Condition 
Original MEP distributions Log MEP distributions 
Skewness Kurtosis W p-value Skewness Kurtosis W p-value 
∆MEPS 3.73 19.59 .66 <.05 0.36 2.72 .94 <.05 
∆MEPA 2.12 7.51 .81 <.05 0.70 0.93 .94 <.05 




Variability in Original and Log Transformed MEP Distributions 
tDCS 
Condition 
Original MEP distributions Log MEP distributions 
M SD SEM M SD SEM 
∆MEPS -0.15 0.48 0.06 -0.11 0.42 0.06 
∆MEPA 0.02 0.49 0.07 -0.12 0.44 0.06 
∆MEPTotal 0.17 0.68 0.09 0.01 0.59 0.08 
 
We, therefore, proceeded with non-transformed data for four reasons. First, sufficient 
skewness and variability remained such that parametric analyses were not additionally robust. 
Second, we wished to retain physiological validity and fidelity. Third, as Feng et al. (2014) 
notes, log transformed data shares little in common with original data and thus does not allow 
statistically appropriate inferences concerning original data using traditional parametric 
analyses. Finally, normalising the data by applying a log transformation did not change our 
results. In the main analysis, MEP data for one participant was excluded due to substantial 
EMG contamination, leaving a sample of 55. On average, 38.8 functional MEPs were 
collected pre-tDCS, and 41.5 post-tDCS, from each participant. Due to EMG contamination, 
39 (70%) of participants required a third, and 4 (14%) required a fourth block. For each 
participant, average MEP amplitude was calculated for remaining responses pre- and post-
administration of tDCS in each condition. MEPs across multiple blocks were aggregated 
because no significant differences were found across time (see Appendix I). 
Table 11 (see also Figure 26) shows that a-tDCS did not have an effect on average 
MEP amplitude (M = 0.02, p = .79, d = 0.02), whereas s-tDCS resulted in a significant 
decrease in MEP amplitude (M = -0.15, p = .02, d = 0.15). We first assumed that this 
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𝑃 
reduction was the result of relaxation. The inhibitory effects of physiological and imagined 
relaxation, and facilitatory effects of state-level physiological anxiety and muscular tension, 
on MEPs are reasonably well-described, and potentially influenced the effect of tDCS 
because participants had been seated in a chair for approximately 45-50 minutes by the time 
post-MEPs were measured (Kato, Watanabe, Muraoka & Kanosue, 2015; Wassermann, 
Greenberg, Nguyen & Murphy, 2001). Because this negative effect of sham was not visible 
in the anodal condition, it appears that a-tDCS counteracted it; so, a potential increase in 
MEPs may therefore have been masked by the apparent effect of relaxation. 
 
Table 11 
Effect of tDCS on average MEP amplitude (in mV) in anodal and sham tDCS conditions pre- 
and post-stimulation (N = 55) 
tDCS 
condition 
M (SEM) MEP amplitude (mV) 95%CI  




d Pre-tDCS Post-tDCS Δ Pre – Post Lower Upper   
Anodal 1.12 (0.10) 1.14 (0.13) 0.02 (0.07) -0.15 0.11 0.26 (54) .79 0.02 
Sham 1.25 (0.16) 1.10 (0.13) -0.15 (0.06) 0.02 0.28 2.32 (54) .02 0.15 
 
 



















Figure 26. Mean MEP amplitude pre- and post-tDCS administration. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
We used a 2 (stimulation condition) × 2 (time pre- vs post-) repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess the relative effect of each tDCS condition on MEPs 
which revealed nonsignificant main effects of time (F1,54 = 2.02, p = .16, η2 = .04), and 
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stimulation (F1,54 = 0.16, p = .69, η2 = .00). An interaction term, which reflects the change 
after anodal compared to the change after sham (the Neuroplasticity score), was not quite 
significant (F1, 54 = 3.19, p = .07, η2 = .06). This interaction term suggests that a-tDCS may 
have had a positive effect on MEP facilitation above and beyond the masked effect of 
relaxation that is evident in the sham condition. That is, it is possible that a-tDCS may have 
successfully induced LTP-like change in M1. This interaction reflects participants’ 
neuroplasticity scores (i.e., ΔMEPTotal), which we derived from each participant as explained 
above. 
4.12.1 Relationships between cognitive measures and neuroplasticity scores 
 
Table 12 describes the relationships between indices of neuroplastic induction 
(∆MEPTotal), rMT, and cognitive performance with uncorrected Pearson’s correlations. The 
stability of rMT over time is well-described (Karabanov, Raffin & Siebner, 2016; Pretalli et 
al., 2012), and confirmed here (r54 = .92, p < .001), with only a 0.1%MSO difference between 
Session 2 (M = 42.4%MSO, SD = 8.40) and Session 3 (M = 42.5%MSO, SD = 9.21), t54 = 
0.20, p .84, 95%CI [-1.10, 0.90]. As such, the measure of rMT is each participant’s average 
rMT across Sessions 2 and 3. There was a slight skewness to the distribution of 
neuroplasticity scores, so we used Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients to describe the 
relationship between these scores and rMT, but we do not report them here because they 
revealed very similar patterns to Pearson correlation coefficients. Our critical aim here was to 
observe a positive relationship between neuroplasticity scores and cognitive performance, but 
since we did not observe any broad trend of an effect of tDCS even on cognitive performance 
(with the exception of a negative effect on proactive inhibition on the SART, the magnitude 
of which was not correlated with strength of neuroplastic induction; see Table 12), further 
analysis was not pursued. 
We expected that general intellectual ability (GIA) would influence the capacity for 
neuroplastic induction such that it would be positively associated with neuroplasticity scores, 
and with change in cognitive performance between stimulation conditions, but no such 
relationships were found (maximum coefficient r = .20, p = .143). Interestingly though, rMT 
was inversely correlated with GIA (r = -.57, p = .04), and approached a significant inverse 
correlation with neuroplasticity score (r = -.24, p = .08). This shows that lower rMT, which 
reflects greater cortical excitability, is associated with a higher neuroplastic induction. 
Although neuroplasticity scores were not associated with GIA, rMT was. So, rMT may be a 
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more sensitive measure of cortical excitability than the neuroplasticity score, or at least a 
more reliable one given that its test-retest reliability was high. 
 
Table 12 





















       
∆SART Errors -.01 .06       
∆SART RT -.12 .00 -.48***      
∆PES .05 -.07 -.11 -.07     
∆SRT -.18 -.13 .00 .19 .07    
∆CRT -.29* -.03 .04 -.04 .12 .24   
∆IT .11 .06 .16 -.48*** .20 -.16 -.08  
GIA .20 -.57*** .06 -.10 .01 -.02 .17 .00 
Note. * p < .05; *** p < .001.        
So while these results demonstrate a moderate effect of a-tDCS on MEPs, implying 
successful, but limited, neuroplastic induction, performance was not globally facilitated on 
any of our cognitive measures as a function of that induction and what minor changes may 
have occurred did not correlate with the magnitude of neuroplastic induction as we expected. 
Furthermore, GIA did not predict the magnitude of effect of a-tDCS on either neuroplastic 
induction or on change in cognitive performance. 
We were able to provide some evidence in support of common findings (e.g., Nitsche 
& Paulus, 2000; 2001), that a 20-minute application of 1 mA a-tDCS to the M1 modulates the 
excitability of cortical neurons, tentatively supporting our hypothesised positive effect of 
tDCS on MEP amplitude. After accounting for the proposed effect of relaxation, the change 
in MEP amplitude following stimulation can be expressed as 115% of baseline, a modest 
effect compared to the 150% reported by Nitsche and Paulus’ (2001). Alternatively, 
considered more simply, when controlling for the effect of relaxation, estimated by the 150- 
µV decrease in MEPs in the s-tDCS condition, average MEP amplitude increased by 170 µV 
in the anodal condition (see Table 11). Although we did not test for biomarkers of 
physiological or psychological relaxation to support our claim that MEP amplitude 
potentially decreased as a result thereof, it is consistent with literature showing that 
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instructing participants to visualise relaxing imagery has an inhibitory effect on the size of 
evoked MEPs (Kato et al., 2015). Our procedures included similar instructions in order to 
limit the number of movement-related artefacts in the MEP recordings. 
To our knowledge, no such studies have included an independent correlate of 
modulation (i.e., MEPs). Because of this, the possibility of metaplastic induction has not been 
considered. Here, it may be pondered in regard to the absence of effect. Metaplasticity is a 
recently reported phenomenon that refers to the homeostatic regulation of neuroplasticity (see 
Abraham, 2008). It is the alteration of neuroplastic induction as a consequence of prior 
change in the related neuronal pool (Müller-Dahlhaus & Ziemann, 2015). Metaplasticity is a 
higher-order form of neural plasticity that, unlike neuroplasticity which is expressed as 
alterations in synaptic efficacy, is instead the change in capacity for subsequent 
neuroplasticity (Abraham & Bear, 1996; Carvalho et al., 2015). By using a neurostimulatory 
technique, TMS, to elicit repeated suprathreshold potentials we may have inadvertently 
induced metaplasticity, and thus inhibited the potential for neuroplastic induction via tDCS 
(Hamada et al., 2009). This potentially explains the absence of effect in elementary RT tasks 
(SRT and CRT) because processing for these tasks takes place substantially in motor cortex, 
the site at which we applied TMS. This may also explain why effects were visible in 
sustained attention (SART), which relies on a complex network of interconnections between 
several brain regions, many of which are located in the prefrontal cortex rather than the motor 
cortex (Blasi et al., 2006; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover & Reiss, 2001). Thus, TMS 
potentially prevented further modulation of the motor cortex by tDCS (explaining the lack of 
effects on SRT and CRT). tDCS may have nevertheless affected other brain areas, such as the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), explaining the effects on SART performance. 
An interesting finding of this line of investigation that warrants further research is that 
lower rMT was associated with higher GIA, and somewhat predicted neuroplastic induction 
(see Table 12). rMT is an indicator of corticospinal excitability and efficacy in the target 
motor pathway, and potentially throughout the rest of the brain (e.g., Li et al., 2004). As such, 
one would expect a lower rMT to be associated with higher neuroplasticity score, a 
relationship that we did observe but is very weak. Given the test-retest reliability of rMT 
across sessions, it might, then, be the case that rMT is a more sensitive measure of cortical 
excitability than is the MEP-based neuroplasticity score (whereas the two rMT estimations in 
sessions 2 and 3 were highly correlated, r = .92; the baseline MEP recordings were only 
moderately correlated, r = .56; suggesting a lower test-retest reliability for MEP 
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measurements). That is, rMT appears then to be a better indicator of trait intelligence than 
neuroplasticity. This line of reasoning has particular importance, given the popularity of 
research investigating neuroplasticity and intelligence. rMT appears to be a greater predictor, 
and a more parsimonious explanation, than does neuroplasticity. The growing body of 
research exploring neural substrate of intelligence, particularly theories implicating neural 
efficacy and connectivity, may benefit significantly from this finding. 
The TMS results are difficult to interpret given the intra- and inter-individual 
variability of MEPs, which makes statistical inference on and interpretation of our results 
difficult. There is no rule for truncation or exclusion of outlier MEP values that is 
theoretically adequate, so we were unable to mitigate this. We noted only a modest trend 
toward increased MEP amplitude as the result of tDCS. While a significant effect of tDCS 
may indeed have been masked by the variability in our sample, there are four more likely 
explanations. First, as previously discussed, relaxation is a probable candidate to have offset 
overall MEP facilitation. 
The second is that amplitude may be too facile a measure of subtle changes in evoked 
responses. Amplitude may not capture all critical parameters of an event-related waveform if 
it has been altered by synaptic excitatory or inhibitory modulation. Excitation and inhibition, 
although necessarily in concert, are not simply symmetrical inverse processes of the same 
neural mechanisms, and they differentially influence conditioned and evoked responses 
(Baker, 1974). Isaacson and Scanziani (2011) highlighted this by showing a distinct 
difference in the peakedness of postsynaptic potentials, with inhibited neurons not simply 
exhibiting, in some cases, less extreme peak-to-peak amplitude, but also narrower widths 
(i.e., shorter durations). Amplitude variability is widely reported; however, few studies report 
MEP width. Amplitude may, then, be an incomplete measure of slight modulation of cortical 
excitability thresholds. 
Third, the after-effects of anodal stimulation and cathodal stimulation are not 
isochronal; cathodal inhibition outlasts anodal excitation (Isaacson & Scanziani, 2011; 
Kidgell et al., 2013; Lang, Nitsche, Paulus, Rothwell & Lemon, 2004). This, coupled with the 
strong temporal component to the effect of tDCS on MEPs (that cathodal inhibition appears 
sooner than excitation) and, that MEP amplitude increases as a function of time following 
stimulation, indicates the considerable importance of the location of the cathode, and relative 
timing of post-stimulation MEP blocks (Batsikadze, Moliadze, Paulus, Kuo & Nitsche, 
2013). These relationships are simulated in Appendix L. Although we separated blocks by 
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five minutes and found no such effect, it has been shown that third, fourth and fifth blocks at 
least, and staggered likewise, yield larger MEPs at each subsequent measurement interval 
(Ellaway, et al., 1998; Santarnecchi et al., 2014). So, our modest effect may reflect the 
relative recency of tDCS on MEPs; however, to ensure maintenance of tDCS after-effects on 
cognitive performance, it was necessary to limit the number of post-stimulation 
measurements. Some experimental paradigms in the field use “online tDCS”, in which 
stimulation is applied simultaneous to cognitive testing (Martin, Liu, Alonzo, Green & Loo, 
2014). Although a novel variation with limited evidence, this protocol appears to instantiate 
better outcomes from tDCS in some cognitive domains, for example explicit motor learning 
(Stagg et al., 2011). However, our primary aim was to assess the relationship between 
cognitive performance and neuroplasticity capacity. This aim required a more controlled 
environment than that required for online tDCS, and would have required a greater 
stimulation duration which, at present, is very rarely reported. 
Finally, while the literature review conducted to inform our experimental protocol 
was extensive, due to the novelty of this field of research, there is no operational consensus 
on stimulation parameters for either TMS or tDCS (see Chipcase et al., 2012; Ziemann et al., 
2008). That is, the most effective protocols for neuroplastic induction via tDCS, and for 
measuring reliable and valid TMS-induced MEPs are still unclear. For example, we 
stimulated at 1 mA current intensity, consistent with a number of studies; however, the 
specific cognitive abilities measured here have not yet been investigated and, as such, 1 mA 
of anodal stimulation, with cathode over the contralateral supraorbital region, may not be 
optimal. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that stimulation at 1 mA may be insufficient to 
induce cortical changes (e.g., Horvath, Carter & Forte, 2014). This is probably due primarily 
to interindividual physiological and anatomical differences, such as cranial thickness and 
physical orientation in white matter (Antal, Paulus & Nitsche, 2010; Kim et al., 2014). Our 
results present an interesting avenue to explore the possibility that baseline excitability (i.e., 
rMT) may mediate the efficacy of tDCS at varying stimulation intensities. This is potentially 
so because tDCS synchronises neural oscillations as a function of its intensity; so, if rMT is 
an indicator of excitability, then it follows that if individual differences in rMT reflect 
differences in baseline excitability, then a stimulation intensity that is held constant will not 
elicit the same effect between people with different rMTs. For example, 1 mA may induce 
LTP-like effects in those with low rMT, but LTD-like effects in those with a higher rMT 
(Masssey & Bashir, 2007). However, Kidgell et al. (2013) report that different current 
164  
intensities do not differentially modulate neuroplastic induction. To substantiate this claim, 
however, particularly cautious stimulation parameters were used (0.8, 1.0, and 1.2 mA), all of 
which fall below the average. Thus, further work in this regard is required. 
Likewise, our TMS parameters were potentially suboptimal. We used a 120% of rMT 
method to evoke MEPs with TMS; however, another method is available. Stimulating at an 
intensity intended to approximate the elicitation of a predetermined MEP amplitude, usually 
1 or 2 mV, may produce less variable responses (Ridding & Rothwell, 1997). This protocol 
usually results in larger MEPs, which provides greater capacity to detect subtle changes. It 
requires undertaking complex computation of sigmoid input/output curves for each 
participant, generally requiring substantially more TMS stimulation, which may thus further 
confound tDCS effects via metaplastic induction. Importantly, Nitsche and Paulus (2000; 
2001) used this method to generate their increase over baseline of 150%, effectively 
stimulating at a substantially higher intensity. To that end, although our stimulation 
parameters were consistent with theory, with the exception of stimulation duration, they may 
have been conservative. 
Future research will benefit from a more complete measure of excitability modulation 
and should, as such, explore the possibility of a composite measure that includes not only 
amplitude but also MEP latency and duration. Our recommendation to consider rMT more 
thoroughly as a sensitive and reliable measure of excitability change ought to be investigated. 
Further, it is necessary to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the differential 
effects of time, duration, and intensity of stimulation on modulation of both excitability and 
performance on cognitive tasks. Our absence of results on RT tasks may be attributable to 
these parameters. Further, due to the disparity between the diffusion of tDCS within cortex, 
and the focality of TMS, our measurement technique was more precise than the effect it 
measures. This buttresses our support of rMT as a measure from which to derive cortex-wide 
measurements of the effect of tDCS. 
With regard to the important implications for rMT, future research may adopt a 
protocol that includes multiple tDCS sessions. Reis et al. (2009) demonstrated the efficacy of 
five tDCS sessions across five days in acquisition of a complex motor task that was 
maintained at a three month follow up. Likewise, 10 tDCS sessions over two weeks appears 
to confer enduring positive effects on major depressive disorder symptomatology (Boggio et 
al., 2008). These sustained increases appear cumulative under some conditions. Daily 
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repeated stimulation was associated with incremental excitability increases over a one-week 
period (Alonzo, Brassil, Taylor, Martin & Loo, 2012; Galvez, Alonzo, Martin & Loo, 2013). 
The additional TMS procedures adopted alongside the tDCS protocol that is described 
above constituted, in my view, a robust but ambitious project. While the full protocol did not 
provide support for the synthesis of TMS and tDCS as we hypothesised, the tDCS findings in 
themselves are nonetheless compelling. Since the time of this experiment, however, evidence 
in favour of the reliability of tDCS has become at best mixed, and indeed much of the field 
appears to have abandoned it in favour of more broadened use of TMS principles (e.g., Dyke, 
Kim, Jackson, & Jackson, 2016; Horvath, Carter, & Forte, 2014; Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 
2015; Priori, Hallett, & Rothwell, 2009; Sadnicka, Kassavetis, Saifee, Pareés, Rothwell & 
Edwards, 2016; van Wessel, Verhage, Holland, Frens, & van der Geest, 2016). Repetitive 
TMS (rTMS) seems to offer the benefits touted by early tDCS research. While it is likely that 
tDCS is not whatsoever ineffectual, its utility appears to be mediated by too many factors for 
it to be either clinically suitable or experimentally valid as a reliable measure of 
neuromodulation at this time. Perhaps technological advancements will provide a more 
precise protocol for spatial targeting, but individual differences in neuroanatomical structure 
would remain a barrier. 
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4.13 General Discussion of the Foregoing Manuscript 
This study was ambitious in design. Our results are reasonably strong, theoretically 
cogent, and remain statistically significant after correcting for multiple comparisons, so I 
believe that they can withstand criticism but are not altogether unquestionable. Had either the 
presence, absence, or magnitude of any effects correlated with our proxy for neuroplasticity, I 
would be more confident; however, the large within-participant variability in MEP amplitude 
that seems inherent in such measures weakened any statistical support in this regard in any 
case. With that said, this study was largely exploratory in nature, and certainly warrants 
further investigation into the cognitive neurobiology of response inhibition with rTMS or 
even deep-brain stimulation (DBS). 
DBS is a neurosurgical procedure that implants a neurostimulation device in the brain, 
which effectively operates as a pacemaker for the brain and the mechanism of action may be 
desynchronization of abnormal oscillatory activity, blockade of the depolarisation process, 
antidromic activation of neurons which results in the activation of blockade of efferent 
neurons or slow axonal conductance, or synaptic inhibition (its underlying principles remain 
unknown, despite its established efficacy in treating disorders such as Parkinson’s Disease; 
Garcia, Pearlmutter, Wellstead, & Middleton, 2013; Hammond, Ammari, Bioulac, & Garcia, 
2008; Herrington, Cheng, & Eskandar, 2016; McIintyre & Thakor, 2002; Mogilner, Benebid, 
& Rezai, 2004). Because the DBS device can be inserted into GPi, thalamus, STN, or the 
caudal lobe of substantia nigra (the pedunculopontine nucleus), each of which are different 
nodes in the divergent basal ganglia pathways, we may develop a deeper understanding of the 
pathological disturbances to reactive and proactive networks in the profile of Parkinson’s 
Disease through the use of this procedure via direct modulation of subcortical neurons. The 
stimulator is usually inserted into the STN to treat symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease, a node 
of both the hyperdirect and the indirect pathways, and qualitative and quantitative data 
strongly support its efficacy in controlling unwanted movements, but given the dual- 
exchange of the STN and the inability to detect whether such motoric improvements are the 
result of reactive or proactive processes, a more rigorous experimental procedure is required 
to draw meaningful inferences. 
The key conclusions of this paper are that the processing required for the SART, even 
the motor response element, possibly recruits prefrontal regions to a greater extent than do 
the SRT or even the CRT. Since response time in the SART is quicker under anodal 
stimulation compared to both the baseline and the sham control, this may indicate that the 
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putative processing that takes place in the prefrontal regions is reduced in such a way that 
response initiation can commence sooner. To me, this points to the hyperdirect pathway as a 
candidate for the engagement and/or deployment of proactive inhibition, since it diverges 
singularly from those pathways recruited by simple motor actions, and the inhibitory effect of 
the cathode likely either disrupted oscillation synchrony or synaptic efficacy via 
downregulating membrane excitability at a critical prefrontal locus which synapses with the 
hyperdirect pathway. This supports the tentative conclusions of the first chapter in which we 
showed that a higher D1 to D2 ratio supported the engagement of more PES. Since our 
sample in this paper was smaller and younger, we were unable to advance the compensatory 
mechanism hypothesis presented in the first two chapters. 
In this chapter, we provided some sound evidence that PES is amenable to 
manipulation using neurostimulatory techniques. In the broader context of this thesis, these 
data provide additional support for a biological distinction between reactive and proactive 
inhibition, and provide strong evidence that this distinction is mediated by brain activity in 
some way. Despite the evidence in this chapter being descriptive and not explanatory, we can 
hypothesise from this that PES is separable from the classical interpretation of the response 
inhibition network that largely resides within the basal ganglia. Moreover, we can infer that, 
at least partially, the proactive segmentation of this response inhibition network must recruit 
unique neural regions, likely underneath or near the location of either the anode or the 
cathode. Given the absence of effect in both Simple and Choice Reaction Time tasks, it 
stands to reason that, since the anode was situated over the motor cortex, which is the primary 








The utility of neurostimulation techniques for clinical purposes hinges on a valid 
conceptualisation of the entire response inhibition network just as much as on the use of 
suitable tasks to measure that network. We have provided some evidence that may indicate 
PES relies on hyperdirect basal ganglia activity, which is important when considering the 
pathological profiles of dopaminergic disorders and their common behavioural substrate of 
disturbed response inhibition. Given the role of dopamine in the processes it might be 
important to reconsider the nature of the disturbances to response inhibition in Parkinson’s 
and Huntington’s Diseases (PD and HD), for instance, as well as in psychopathology such as 
ADHD, where the link between response inhibition, pathology, and genotype is reasonably 
well established, but where the precise behavioural deficit is not well-articulated. In such 
populations, though, measurement of response inhibition has proven difficult due to the 
nature of the disorder. The impulsivity, absent-mindedness, and behavioural dysregulation 
that characterise ADHD are not conducive to laborious tasks such as the SART. Indeed, the 
physical manifestations of PD and HD are likewise problematic for lengthy tasks. Since the 
very tasks that are most critical in quantifying decline are those that are demanding to 
undertake and challenging to administer, it is therefore pertinent to investigate the possibility 
of producing shorter tasks that do not sacrifice reliability of the outcome measures. Even in 
healthy populations, such tasks become difficult after only a few minutes. So, our aim is to 
test various methods for investigating response inhibition. 
It remains central to the goal here to investigate post-error slowing. In the previous 
chapters we have shown that proactive inhibition influences overall response inhibition 
measured by the SART. Whether proactive inhibition influences reactive inhibition measured 
by SSTs is not yet known. Since proactive inhibition is clearly involved in inhibiting a 
response and has become central to empirical studies on response inhibition, it is important to 
investigate whether conditions designed to manipulate proactive inhibition affect measures of 
reactive inhibition and overall response inhibition. 
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Our aims in this chapter are not only to evaluate the implementation of a staircase 
procedure that minimises the number of trials required for a stable estimate of the reactive 
process, but also to implement manipulations to those tasks that allow us to simply observe 
proactive inhibition. In this chapter, we introduce an additional measure of proactive 
inhibition. Previously we have used post-error slowing as a single index of proactive 
inhibition. Here, we consider the possibility that proactive inhibition has not only a remedial 
mechanism, but also a predictive mechanism. 
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Traditional response inhibition tasks, the Stop-Signal Task (SST) and the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART, a Go/No-Go task) are commonly assumed to capture 
one’s ability to inhibit a response. The ability to inhibit a response, however, requires a 
reactive process and at least one proactive process, post-error slowing (PES). Recent 
evidence has shown that SSTs in fact measure the reactive process, and while the SART does 
indeed measure overall response inhibition, that measure is confounded by PES. The role of 
discrete inhibitory processes in disease, for instance, are important to understand and 
articulate. Since the diseases associated with deficits to response inhibition often manifest or 
are comorbid with symptoms that diminish the capacity for lengthy behavioural testing, and, 
since it is unknown to which process such decrements can be attributed and where in the 
brain these processes are generated, rapid, precise, and isolated measurement of reactive and 
proactive processes is important. To address these issues, we administered a battery of four 
response inhibition tasks to healthy young adults (N = 123), two SSTs and two Go/No-Go 
tasks. In three tasks, we implemented adaptations to allow direct observation of proactive 
inhibition as PES, reactive inhibition, and overall response inhibition. Additionally, we 
introduced a cueing procedure novel to response inhibition tasks to investigate the possibility 
of a predictive mechanism of proactive inhibition whereby the probability of a Stop or No-Go 
signal on the next trial was cued to participants. We argue that slower response times on trials 
with a higher Stop or No-Go probability indicate predictive proactive inhibition. Based on 
these findings, we propose a novel demarcation to proactive inhibition: remedial proactive 
inhibition (PES), and predictive proactive inhibition. Additionally, we provide empirical 
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support for a Bayesian adaptive staircase (described by Livesey & Livesey, 2016) that allows 
for rapid convergence on accurate estimates of reactive inhibition in SSTs in as few as 20 
trials. Alongside our modifications to the SART, this represents a very brief but complete 
battery of tasks which can be administered to pathological populations and yield robust, 





The nature of impulsivity and cognitive control has been the subject of extensive 
empirical investigation in neuroscientific and psychological disciplines for the last fifty years 
(e.g., Bennett & Gottfried, 1970; Rabbitt, 1966). This research interest is not only expanding 
within these disciplines but also into adjacent disciplines such as computer science and 
mathematics (e.g., Heathcote et al., 2019; Montes, 2017). In a laboratory environment, this 
cognitive mechanism is often conceptualised as response inhibition, the operational definition 
of which centres on the effective stopping of a planned action in response to altered 
contextual demands that have rendered that action maladaptive. The empirical popularity of 
response inhibition has a basis in its functional significance to a range of disease states and 
psychopathologies, usually those involving dysfunction in the dopaminergic system (see 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). In fact, disturbances to inhibitory control are being investigated 
as potential endophenotypes for a number of conditions, such as ADHD (Slaats-Willemse et 
al., 2013). 
Despite extensive investigation, the true neurocognitive architecture of response 
inhibition has proven difficult to elucidate, due, by varying accounts, to inconsistent 
nomenclature, inconsistent task design, and inconsistent data analysis (see, for example, 
Dutilh et al., 2012; Mostofsky & Simmons, 2008; Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2011). The 
ecological consequences of this line of discussion, however, are the same: that common 
approaches to the data structure do not yield a veridical account of human inhibitory 
processes, and it is, therefore, possible that as a result of these misinterpretations, some of the 
putative neurocognitive effects of pathology have been misinterpreted for many years. It is 
thus critical to articulate a formal structural model of this behaviour and to design 
behavioural assessments that map onto this structure to ensure that antecedent theory and 
treatments are apt. 
The inability to withhold motoric or behavioural actions is characteristic of many 
conditions, neurological and psychological, so its precise measurement and valid 
operationalisation are of considerable concern to those investigating these conditions. It is not 
the purpose of this paper to exhaustively list the diseases associated with deficits in inhibitory 
and control processes, to describe their discrete downstream effects, or to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the cortical pathways that subserve their function. These have been excellently 
reviewed elsewhere (see Oosterlaan, Logan, & Sergeant, 1998; Kooijmans, Scheres, & 
Oosterlaan, 2010; Wright, Lipszyc, Dupuis, Thayapararajah, & Schachar, 2014); however, 
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these accounts are incomplete and imprecise due to the very nature of the task design and 
data analysis undertaken in the studies used to formulate them. Given the use of psychometric 
tools in assessing diagnostic symptoms (e.g., Bondi et al., 2014; Gilhooly, 1990; Jones- 
Gotman et al., 2010; see also Larrabee, 2012), it is important that these tools are valid and 
reliable, criteria that are not always satisfied. 
The two most commonly used tasks to measure response inhibition in healthy and 
pathological populations are the Stop-Signal Task and the Go/No-Go task. In Stop-Signal 
Tasks, participants are presented with Go signals to which they must respond, but in some 
instances the Go signal is followed by a Stop signal, indicating that the initiated response 
should be withheld. The outcome measure of this task is the minimum delay required to stop 
an initiated response (the Stop-Signal Reaction Time, SSRT). On the other hand, in the 
Go/No-Go paradigm, a participant is presented with a series of stimuli and are instructed to 
respond as quickly as possible to Go stimuli, but not to No-Go stimuli, which differ on some 
salient dimension. Failures to inhibit this response, errors of commission, represent the 
critical outcome measure in these tasks. 
Most implementations of these tasks have failed to consider a reasonably novel dual- 
control model of response inhibition that includes an overt measure of motor reactivity and a 
covert measure of cognitive control, reactive and proactive inhibition, respectively (see Aron, 
2011). The theoretical formalisation of this distinction was born of data showing that healthy 
human participants very reliably slow down after they commit an error, in what is termed 
post-error slowing (PES), which constitutes proactive inhibition (see Dutilh et al., 2012a, 
2012b). Increased response latency after an error prolongs stimulus processing time, which 
may enhance the success of response inhibition. If it does, it represents a substantial confound 
in the overall measure of Go/No-Go tasks. Alternatively, in Stop-Signal Tasks, Go and Stop 
signal presentation are controlled by an adaptive algorithm that adjusts the interval between 
the Go and Stop signals following successful and unsuccessful response inhibition trials. 
Nevertheless, proactive inhibition strategies such as PES may still confound the SSRT 
estimate, and their effect on response inhibition may be inconsistent between stimulus- 
presentation methods and from trial-to-trial. So, under this account, the Go/No-Go task 
provides a measure of overall response inhibition that is likely confounded by proactive 
inhibition, and the Stop-Signal task provides a measure of reactive inhibition (that could also 
be, in principle, confounded by proactive inhibition processes), but not overall response 
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inhibition or proactive inhibition. A singular task that yields measures of all of these 
processes would markedly advance the study of response inhibition. 
As an illustrative example of the need for precise measurement of these two processes 
in experimental tasks for diagnostic or prognostic purposes in medicine, consider the 
behavioural profile of two neurodegenerative diseases with opposing pathophysiological 
profiles. Response inhibition is negatively affected in both Parkinson’s and Huntington’s 
Diseases (Beste et al., 2010; Henderson et al., 2011). Since dopamine is known to underpin 
the motor system and is strongly implicated in its inhibition and regulation (Albin, Young, & 
Penney, 1989; Albrecht, Kareken, Christian, Dzemidzic, & Yoder, 2014; Brooks, 2001; 
Cummins et al., 2012; Groenewegen, 2003; Haber & Gdowski, 2004; Henderson et al., 2011; 
Hershey et al., 2004), these disturbances have been attributed to the dopaminergic 
disturbances associated with these diseases, despite these dopaminergic disturbances having 
opposing pathologies. Though not explicitly identified in the literature, it is possible that 
reactive inhibition is disturbed in Parkinson’s while proactive inhibition remains relatively 
intact, and the reverse may be true in Huntington’s. Likewise, even in healthy individuals, 
deficits in response inhibition in the young and the old can perhaps be explained by these 
same mechanisms. It is known that dopaminergic neurotransmission and production are 
downregulated in the ageing brain (Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005; Lars Bäckman et al., 2000; 
Lyn Harper Mozley, Ruben C. Gur, P. David Mozley, & Raquel E. Gur, 2001; Wang et al., 
1998), and that until late adolescence, dopamine innervation and expressing genes tend to 
migrate posterior to anterior (where much of the response inhibition network resides), 
allowing frontal regions to become populated and more effectively utilise the dopamine 
system (Collier et al., 2007; Goldman-Rakic & Brown, 1982; Irwin et al., 1994; Lambe, 
Krimer, & Goldman-Rakic, 2000), alongside more general upregulation of neurotransmission 
and production (Rothmond, Weickert, & Webster, 2012). That is, deficits associated with 
young and old age may be differentiated by the process from which those deficits arise; 
logically, older adults may be compensating for poorer reactive processes with enhanced 
proactive processes, and children and adolescents may exert less proactive inhibition because 
their reactive mechanism is still adequate. 
Modified versions of the SST have recently gained attention due to their ability to 
discriminate reactive and proactive processes. These modified SSTs do so by instantiating 
varying cues which provide participants information on the relative probability of an 
upcoming Stop signal (e.g., Bloemendaal et al., 2016). Proactive inhibition in such tasks can 
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manifest itself as a slowing in response speed to the Go signal in the presence of a cue that 
signals a high probability of a Stop signal. Indeed, while such modifications strengthen the 
interpretability of the data by differentiating reactive from proactive processes, they draw on 
additional cognitive resources, which may not be directly pertinent to those under 
investigation. For instance, in the task introduced by Bloemendaal and colleagues, 
participants had to memorise up to five different cues associated with different probabilities 
of a Stop signal. The additional processes required in this task (e.g., working memory, 
learning, attention, visual processing speed) are, indeed, likely related to, or perhaps even 
contribute to, response inhibition in some way but no formal model has been sufficiently 
articulated to explain such complex relationships. This makes interpreting the resultant data 
difficult. For example, the finding that older adults are less likely to strategically slow down 
their Go reaction time in conditions with many cues may be due to a failure to retrieve the 
corresponding Stop signal probability associated with each cue rather than a failure to engage 
proactive inhibition processes. Therefore, designing and validating simpler tasks that 
minimise these confounds is critical. Indeed, older adults in the Bloemendaal et al. study 
showed a trend towards increased (rather than decreased) proactive slowing in a simple 2-cue 
condition relative to young adults, a result that mirrors our own finding that older adults show 
increased PES (Beu, Burns, & Baetu, 2019). So, as it stands, proactive inhibition is likely 
task-dependent, and may indeed vary in validity across tasks, and perhaps even rely on 
separate neurochemical equilibrium (e.g., Beu et al., 2019; Rincón-Pérez et al., 2019). 
Although it is possible to extract measures of reactive and proactive inhibition, as well 
as overall response inhibition from adapted versions of these procedures, such adaptations 
usually effectuate additional cognitive processing, which introduces other confounds. 
Additionally, the number of trials required to yield stable estimates of performance is often 
quite high. Fluctuations in sustained attention and motivation throughout time-intensive, 
potentially laborious tasks and the effect that these have on performance produce 
considerable empirical problems that are well-documented (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & 
Hohnsbein, 2002; Karweit & Slavin, 1982; Lim et al., 2010; Olofsson & Polich, 2007; Sun et 
al., 2014; Treptow, Burns, McComas, 2019). Since deficits in response inhibition are most 
pronounced in populations who tend to present with additional attentional and motivational 
deficits, impulsivity problems (i.e., inability to maintain interest in task demands or try their 
best), and physical limitations to the ability to remain still for even moderate periods of time, 
or to exert explicit control over their motor movements for such periods, then efforts should 
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be made to develop a relatively short task that imposes few additional cognitive demands. 
Importantly, the task should yield measures of reactive inhibition and proactive inhibition, 
and in particular, a measure of reactive inhibition that is not confounded by proactive 
inhibition. To date, there is no adequate formal account of proactive inhibition. Given the role 
of proactive inhibition as a strategy to compensate for what may be physiological constraints 
in achieving optimal reactive inhibition (e.g., Beu et al., 2019), it seems likely that it could 
take two forms in an experimental environment. The first could be considered a predictive 
form, characterised as attenuating a response pattern under conditions where there is a real or 
perceived increase in the likelihood of a need to inhibit a response. That is, proactive 
inhibition can result in a slowing reaction time to Go signals in anticipation of a likely Stop 
or No-Go signal. The other is a remedial form, a well-established empirical phenomenon 
characterised by PES, that is, slowing reaction time to subsequent Go signals after failing to 
inhibit a response in the presence of a Stop or No-Go signal. Each of these accounts are 
supported by some experimental data which are reviewed elsewhere, although the predictive 
form has not been conceptualised as a form of proactive inhibition (e.g., Aron, 2011, Aron et 
al., 2007; Dutilh et al., 2012; Niewenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok., 2001; 
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Critically, though, predictive 
proactive inhibition seems to adhere to common reinforcement learning principles (i.e., 
learning by trial and error the likelihood of different events and adapting behaviour 
accordingly), whereas, on the other hand, PES has been the subject of competing 
explanations for some time (Beu, Burns, & Baetu, in preparation, see Chapter 3; Dutilh et al., 
2012b). 
There are several variations of both the Stop-Signal and Go/No-Go paradigms in the 
literature that assume unity in the underlying inhibition process, and convergence in the 
outcome data. That is, it is assumed that ‘response inhibition’ is the same in Stop-Signal and 
Go/No-Go tasks, despite no empirical or theoretical support for this assumption. The 
underlying theoretical assumptions differ between these two tasks insofar as the SST relies on 
an independent horse-race model of competing going and stopping processes, whereas 
Go/No-Go tasks favour a not starting process over a stopping process. There is some 
evidence from imaging studies that shows that these processes engage overlapping but 
distinct neural circuitry, and are therefore not identical (Dunovan, Lynch, Molesworth, & 
Verstynen, 2015). In an fMRI experiment, Swick and colleagues (Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 
2011) concluded that stopping and not starting recruit many of the same brain regions, but 
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that there are distinctions that are not insignificant. Not only do these two tasks measure 
processes that diverge at some point, but it is also common that different instantiations of the 
Stop-Signal paradigm itself impose different cognitive demands on participants, which 
confound measures of the stopping process. Even a simple review of the SST literature will 
show that it is now common to introduce additional complexity in order to attempt to capture 
some additional process, or to modify the semantic meaning of the stimuli which may not be 
processed in the same way by different people, or to add contingency rules to Go and Stop 
signal presentation which favours certain learning abilities that are known to differ between 
people. While these adaptations to the paradigm can provide important insight into 
complementary and separate processes to outright stopping, there is no doubt that they do not 
exert the same effect between people, and that they inherently modify the task demands and 
the underlying going process. Although it is clearly important to understand how robust 
outcome measures are to such modifications and, indeed, whether estimates of response 
inhibition are correlated at all, there has been very little empirical investigation into this. 
To this end, our aim, therefore, is to improve extant response inhibition tasks by 
producing and evaluating an experimental task that eliminates their limitations. That is, a task 
capable of distinguishing motor processes from cognitive processes (i.e., reactive from 
proactive inhibition), computing estimates of two independent cognitive processes (i.e., what 
we have termed predictive proactive inhibition and remedial proactive inhibition), and, 
further, to account for individual differences in reaction time in so doing. We also aim to 
design tasks that are relatively short. To achieve this, we implement a Bayesian adaptive 
staircase that was recently developed by Livesey and Livesey (2016) and that has been shown 
to yield a reliable estimate of SSRT in a small number of trials in two adaptations of the Stop- 
Signal paradigm that have different response requirements. We also test a modified version of 
the Go/No-Go paradigm that assesses both predictive and remedial proactive inhibition. 
In this paper, we report data that provide support for Livesey and Livesey’s (2016) 
Bayesian adaptive staircase as an effective method to minimise the duration of Stop-Signal 
paradigms by rapidly converging on highly-reliable estimates of a participant’s critical Stop- 
Signal Delay, a measure used in the computation of their reactive process. We demonstrate 
that while our modified procedures assess both remedial and predictive proactive inhibition, 
the estimates of reactive inhibition are not confounded by predictive proactive inhibition. In 
addition, we address a common limitation to the meaningfulness of estimates of response 
inhibition between paradigms, and we compare performance in the two SSTs, which impose 
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different task demands, to test the degree to which the paradigm is robust to such 
modifications. We comment on the measures of response inhibition between the two SST 
paradigms and offer recommendations on task design for future experiments. 
5.5 Methods and materials 
 
5.5.1 Participants and testing procedure 
 
The sample (N = 123; 72 females; aged 18-34 yrs, M = 20.0 ± 3.14 yrs) was recruited 
from the 2017 and 2018 first-year Psychology cohorts from the University of Adelaide in 
accordance with its Human Research Ethics guidelines, and participants were awarded course 
credit for their time. After explaining the experiment and obtaining consent, participants were 
seated 70 cm from a 24-inch, 120 Hz Eizo (Eizo Corporation, Ishikawa, Japan) computer 
monitor with 1 msec response time for approximately 60 minutes. Prior to administration of 
behavioural tasks, participants self-reported age, sex, and handedness (88% right-handed, 
10% left-handed, 2% ambidextrous). Responses were made with a standard Logitech 
keyboard (Logitech International S.A., Lausanne, Switzerland). Stimulus presentation was 
controlled by Xojo software (Xojo Inc., Texas, USA). 
5.5.2 Experimental tasks and data analysis 
 
We administered four response inhibition tasks: two Stop-Signal Tasks (SSTs) and 
two Go/No-Go tasks. In each task, participants were instructed that going and stopping are 
equally important, and that neither speed nor accuracy should be favoured over the other. To 
mitigate potential fatigue effects, tasks were separated by breaks of between two and five 
minutes. 
5.5.2.1 Stop-Signal Tasks (SSTs). Each SST consisted of 320 trials that included two 
Stop signal probability (p(Stop)) conditions indicated by colour cues (see below): one colour 
cue indicated that a Stop signal had 0.5 probability of following a Go signal, whereas the 
other cue indicated that the Stop signal occurred with a probability of 0.2. The two trial types 
were intermixed, with 160 in each p(Stop) condition, resulting in a total of 112 Stop trials (80 
Stop trials in the 0.5 condition and 32 Stop trials in the 0.2 condition). The tasks both utilised 
an adaptive staircase method for estimating the critical stop-signal delay at which the 
probability of successful inhibition, p(i), equals 0.5, described briefly below (see Livesey and 
Livesey, 2016, for a detailed description). Independent staircases were run in parallel for each 
p(Stop) condition. That is, for instance, a failed inhibition in the p(Stop) = 0.2 condition does 
not influence the critical Stop-Signal Delay (the delay between the Go and Stop signal that 
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yields a successful inhibition probability of 0.5; SSD) in the p(Stop) = 0.5 condition. Before 
the tasks proper commence, participants were trained on each component of the tasks 
(accurate responding and stopping) until an adequate success criterion was reached (see 
below). In these tasks, the measure of reactive inhibition is the Stop-Signal Reaction Time 
(SSRT), that is, the covert latency of the stop process. 
5.5.2.2 The Ψ Staircase. We used a Ψ staircase to control the SSD on Stop trials in 
both SSTs that is described in more detail by Livesey and Livesey (2016), and that was 
adapted from Kontsevich and Tyler (1999). Kontsevich and Tyler (1999) formally described 
an adaptive technique that uses Bayes’ theorem to determine test variable rules based on the 
principle of minimising entropy, the amount of information required to have complete 
knowledge of a system. This method allows the algorithm to find reliable estimates of some 
variable in relatively few trials compared to other methods. It does so by calculating the prior 
probabilities of a correct response for each of an array of possible stimulus values that could 
be presented to participants, assuming that those probabilities operate within the constraints 
of an underlying psychometric function with a range of different possible parameters. The 
aim of this method is to identify the combination of parameters within a defined parameter 
space that best captures the participant’s behaviour. In other words, it ascertains the best 
fitting psychometric function under known or expected parametric families of probability 
distributions for each possible outcome of a response. Contrary to simple stepwise staircases 
commonly instantiated in psychophysical tasks that may, for example, increase the SSD by 
25 msec after a successful inhibition or decrease the SSD by 25 msec after a failed inhibition, 
this method minimises entropy on every trial by calculating the amount of information that 
could be gained from testing each possible stimulus value in the array, and selecting the 
stimulus value that stands to yield the most information. Posterior probabilities of each 
combination of parameters are updated on the basis of the response in order to calculate 
entropy for selecting the next stimulus value (Livesey & Livesey, 2016). This allows the Ψ 
staircase to rapidly converge on the most likely psychometric parameters. For our purposes, a 
correct response is successful inhibition on a Stop trial, and the parameters being estimated 
describe the slope and threshold of the function that relates probability of successful 
inhibition, p(i), to the SSD. Hence, the aim is to use the Ψ staircase method to quickly and 




The efficacy of this method for calculating reliable psychophysical threshold 
estimates in as few as 30 trials was first demonstrated by Kontsevich and Tyler (1999). 
However, their implementation was designed for and validated using two-alternative forced- 
choice psychophysical discrimination. Recently, Livesey and Livesey (2016) demonstrated 
its efficacy in the reliable estimation of SSRT over as few as 20 Stop trials using real and 
simulated data. The Ψ staircase is based on an underlying horse-race model that assumes 
response inhibition can be conceptualised as a race between independent Go and Stop 
processes, where the success or failure of inhibition depends on the relative finishing time of 
these processes; that is, on any given Stop trial, if the Go process finishes, or reaches decision 
threshold, before the Stop process, then the response is executed (Logan & Cowan, 2009; 
Matzke, Verbruggen, & Logan, 2018). Under this model, RT is assumed to be distributed 
according to the convolution of Gaussian and exponential distributions, that is, the ex- 
Gaussian distribution that accurately accounts for the positive skew of most RT distributions 
(Heathcote, Popiel, & Mewhort, 1991). This underlying model assumes the distributions for 
both Go and Stop trials to be the same. That is, it assumes that the appearance of the Stop 
signal exerts no effect on the speed of executing that Go response. 
Since the aim is to estimate the SSD at which the probability of successfully 
inhibiting a response is 0.5, the first step requires calculating the probability of successfully 
inhibiting a response at all possible SSDs. The probability of successful inhibition, p(i), can 
be thought of as a survival function since the probability of successful inhibition decreases 
monotonically as the duration of SSD increases. On the other hand, p(i) could also be thought 
of as a cumulative function of the time remaining until the trial times out after the Stop signal 
is presented (~SSD). The nearer the SSD to the time when the trial times out (~SSD = 0), the 
lower the probability of successfully inhibiting the response, whereas when SSD equals zero 
(i.e., ~SSD is the full response period), the higher the probability of successfully inhibiting 
the response. Livesey and Livesey (2016) compared three methods for deriving p(i) as a 
function of the difference between SSD and ~SSD. We chose to use the Weibull cumulative 
density function (CDF) with a base of 2 over the normal CDF or the Weibull CDF with a 
base of e, as the authors recommend, because the Weibull CDF is not symmetrical around p(i 
~SSD) = 0.5, and may therefore more accurately describe the function for the skewed RT 
distribution that is common (see Equation 1: Weibull CDF with exponent of 2). In this 
function, α is the scale parameter and β is the shape parameter. E is the error rate set to reflect 
an assumed additive value of the proportion with which participants commit an error 
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regardless of the SSD and fail to respond to the Go signal (i.e., omission errors). There is 
substantial variability in these two processes across tasks and samples, and no reason to 
expect uniformity in their true values, but it is necessary to include this parameter to protect 
against disproportionate influence on the estimate of p(i) of a single error at an easy SSD or a 
single absence of response, whether intentional or an omission, at a difficult SSD. Consistent 
with the authors’ use, we set E = .04. 
 
 ~SSD β 
P(i) = (1 − 2E) × (1 − 2−( α 
) 
) + E (1) 
 
The method iterates a sequence of steps on each Stop trial that revises the best 
parameter estimate and selects the most informative SSD value to test on the next Stop trial. 
To do this, it considers the likelihood of various values taken by α and β parameters, and the 
probability of events (successful or failed inhibition) given each combination of those values. 
To implement this, we defined a parameter space with monotonic increments in β and 
equidistant msec steps in α. The resulting two-dimensional parameter space establishes a 
basis of likelihood estimates for the data, and for estimates of p(i) given each combination of 
SSD and α and β. Livesey and Livesey (2016) ran simulations testing parameter spaces with 
steps in α between 1 and 20 msec and found similar results. We used 15 msec steps. 
The first step requires calculating the probability of each possible response outcome 
(i.e., of successful and of unsuccessful inhibition) for each SSD that could be selected on the 
next Stop trial. This requires calculating the probability of each of those two response 
outcomes for each combination of SSD and α and β parameters, and then weighting those 
probability values according to the prior probability of each α and β combination. 
This method uses Bayes’ theorem to estimate the posterior probability of the α and β 
parameters under each possible set of events that could occur on the next trial (i.e., for each 
combination of SSD in the array and response outcome) before selecting the SSD to use on 
the next Stop trial. Entropy can be estimated for each of the resultant probability density 
functions, yielding a measure of the uncertainty remaining should that SSD be presented and 
responded to with each possible response outcome. This is an important innovation of the Ψ 
algorithm: it estimates the entropy for each candidate SSD in the array and selects the SSD 
with the highest utility, that is, that which results in the greatest reduction in entropy. By 
summing the entropies for each possible response outcome at a given SSD, weighted 
according to the probability of each possible response outcome, the algorithm finds the test 
value with the greatest potential to reduce entropy. That is, it finds the SSD with the greatest 
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potential to minimise uncertainty to present on the next Stop trial, the outcome of which is 
the most informative. After the response outcome is known (the participant successfully 
inhibits their response or does not), the corresponding posterior probability distribution is 
chosen. Livesey and Livesey (2016) recommend taking the mean of this distribution to 
estimate the psychometric function rather than α, β coordinates with the maximum 
probability because they seem to yield a more reliable estimate of underlying parameters. The 
authors’ simulations show that a wide α parameter space minimises bias, so we set our range 
to 555 msec (ranging 30 to 585 msec in 15 msec increments), and initial SSD at 270 msec for 
the Scale SST and 315 for the Discrimination SST, which was the closest starting point to the 
real estimates at task completion, despite all starting points converging on similar estimates in 
very few additional Stop trials. 
5.5.2.3. The Scale Stop Signal Task is a simplified form of an anticipation Stop- 
Signal Task described by Bloemendaal and colleagues (Bloemendaal et al., 2015; see also 
Zandbelt & Vink, 2010). Trials consist of a white bar, 10 mm in width, increasing in height at 
a constant rate from a lower horizontal line to an upper horizontal line. The distance between 
the upper and lower bars is 65 mm (5.32° of the visual field). The task is to click a mouse 
button when the bar reaches a horizontal bar 4/5 of the distance from the lower line to the 
upper line (see Figure 27), which takes 800 msec. This action stops the movement of the bar 
and constitutes the Go response. On some trials, a Stop signal is introduced. The stop signal 
is the bar stopping its vertical movement and, in these trials, participants attempt to withhold 
their response. The Stop-Signal Delay (SSD) is the minimum distance (in time units) away 
from the middle bar at which a participant effectively withholds a response at chance level 
(i.e., the nearer the bar is to the middle line when it stops, the smaller the SSD). Contrary to 
common SSTs, this is not the time it takes to override a speeded response, but rather, to stop 
an anticipated response, which may provide a cleaner measure of the stopping process by 
removing the initial motor engagement phase of a speeded response. The middle horizontal 
bar represents the cues that indicate the probability of the Stop signal occurring by varying in 
colour, where a cyan bar represents p(Stop) = 0.2 and a magenta bar represents p(Stop) = 0.5. 
Unlike Bloemendaal and colleagues (2016), but in line with the original description by 
Zandbelt and Vink (2010), the onset of the cue and the bar rising was simultaneous. If the bar 
reached the upper line (1,000 msec), the trial timed out and no response was recorded. The 
inter-trial interval (ITI) was 500 msec. Participants were trained on each element of the task. 
First, participants were presented only with Go trials and were trained to respond within 150 
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msec of the middle line, where feedback was provided on each trial to respond sooner or later 
(6 trials). Second, Stop trials were introduced and participants were trained to withhold a 
response when the Stop signal was shown (16 trials), where an accuracy criterion of 80% was 
required before moving to the task proper. If this criterion was not reached, the 16-trial 
practice set was repeated. 
Figure 27. An example of two trials in the Scale SST. The left panel represents a Go trial, 
where the white bar extends upward toward the response cue (i.e., the magenta-coloured line 
representing one p(Stop) condition). The right panel represents a Stop trial, where the white 
bar stops its vertical movement toward the cyan-coloured line. Note that the grey arrows 
indicating the movement direction of the white bar and the red x indicating the point at which 
the white bar would stop were not visible to participants. 
Because Bloemendaal and colleagues (2015) used a fixed procedure for SSD onset in 
which the SSD implemented on any given Stop trial was selected at random from an array of 
predetermined SSDs, they used the integration method described by Verbruggen and Logan 
(2009) to calculate SSRT. Recently, Matzke, Verbruggen, and Logan (2018) explained that 
the integration method is suboptimal when the method for SSD onset is not fixed. So, 
because we used an adaptive protocol for SSD onset, we used the mean method for SSRT 
calculation in our primary analyses. We calculated SSRT using the integration method to 
report consistency measures between the two methods, but we do not use the SSRT derived 
from the integration method for any main analyses. In this task, the SSRT is calculated by 
subtracting the critical SSD at which inhibition success and failure are equally likely from the 
average Go RT in each condition. This yields a measure of SSRT for each condition that 
reflects the average time it takes a participant to successfully inhibit a response. 
5.5.2.4. In the Discrimination Stop Signal Task, participants are presented with a 
coloured circle on a black background which contains one of two white Go signals, < or >, 
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and based on its direction are instructed to respond by pressing any key on the corresponding 
half (left or right) of the keyboard. The order in which < and > are presented is 
pseudorandomised. The circle containing the Go signal is 30 mm in diameter, subtending 
2.7° at the retina, and the Go signal itself is 20 mm in breadth (see Figure 28). Since the cue 
(the circle colour which indicates the p(stop)) and the Go signal are presented simultaneously, 
there is no stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) and the ITI is fixed at 500 msec on every trial. 
Trials time-out at 1,000 msec and if the participant does not respond in this period, a ‘no 
response’ is recorded separately to an ‘error response’, and there is no change to the Ψ 
parameters that control Stop signal onset. 
The Stop signal is the Go signal of the opposing direction being superimposed over 
the Go signal. Because we wanted an explicit measure of predictive proactive inhibition, 
participants were given a cue as to the probability of having to stop their response. With 
equiprobability, the Go signal was coloured either orange or purple, colours which were 
chosen because they are not semantically associated with Going or Stopping and are closely 
matched for luminance. The colour of the Go signal represents probability cueing; one of the 
colours indicates a 20% probability that a Stop signal will appear (n = 32 Stop trials), 
whereas the other indicates that the probability of a Stop signal is 50% (n = 80 Stop trials). 
To minimise the effect of individual differences in learning on the staircase algorithm in its 
early stages where stepwise adjustments in SSD are greatest, participants were advised that 
the colours cued Stop probability and their associated values. As above, participants were 
trained on each component of this task, the discrimination component and the stopping 
component. As above, SSRT is calculated by subtracting the critical SSD from the average 
Go RT for each condition. 
 
Figure 28. An example of two trials in the Discrimination SST. The left panel illustrates a 
trial in which the orange-coloured circle indicates p(Stop) and in which an initial Go signal 
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indicates that a key corresponding to the > symbol (i.e., on the right half of the keyboard) 
should be performed, shortly followed by a Stop signal overlaid over the Go signal, which 
indicates that the Go response should be inhibited. The right panel illustrates a Go trial in the 
alternative p(Stop) condition in which the < corresponding response should be made. 
5.5.2.5 Go/No-Go Tasks 
 
In the Traditional Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 
1997), a Go/No-Go paradigm, participants are presented with random single digits (1 – 9) 
displayed in the centre of the screen in fonts of differing sizes (48, 72, 94, 100 and 120 point, 
ranging from 12 mm to 29 mm on the screen; i.e., subtending 1° × 0.75° to 2.4° × 1.8° at the 
retina). Each digit is displayed for 245 msec, immediately followed by a mask for 900 msec, 
resulting in a response period of 1,145 msec from digit onset to mask offset (see Figure 29). 
The mask interrupts residual visual processing (Herzog, 2008) and attenuates fixational drift 
(Snodderly, 2016). Participants are instructed to rapidly respond by pressing the left mouse 
button, using their preferred hand, as soon as possible after any digit, except the digit ‘3’, is 
displayed (‘Go trials’; 0.89 probability), and to inhibit this response when the digit ‘3’ is 
displayed (‘No-Go trials’; 0.11 probability). This task consists of 225 trials, each digit 
presented with equiprobability in random order, with 25 No-Go trials. The critical measure of 
overall response inhibition is the proportion of correctly withheld responses on No-Go trials. 
 
 
Figure 29. The traditional Sustained Attention to Response Task. Participants are instructed 
to press a mouse button for any digit except the digit 3. The diagram illustrates a Go trial 
followed by a No-Go trial. 
The traditional SART allows the investigation of remedial proactive inhibition 
(indexed as PES), but in order to additionally measure predictive proactive inhibition as we 
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could for the two SSTs, we developed and administered a modified Sustained Attention to 
Response Task. The modified version used the same principles as the traditional SART with 
the following exceptions. Instead of using digits 1-9, we used digits 1-6 for computational 
tractability and time considerations. The No-Go stimulus remained the digit 3. To assess 
predictive proactive inhibition, we included the cueing principle introduced in the two SSTs, 
where a fixation point operated also as a cue indicating the probability that the next stimulus 
would be a No-Go stimulus. The fixation point we used was a solid circle 22 mm in diameter 
with a cross removed from its centre that was visible for 600 msec prior to critical stimulus 
onset (see Figure 30). Snodderly (2016) determined this to be the most effective fixation 
point to attenuate fixational drift. Two colour cues (yellow and cyan, randomly assigned to 
the two conditions) indicate that the p(Stop) is 0.2 or 0.5. We used the same backward mask 
for the same duration as in the traditional SART. There are 300 trials in this task, with 150 in 
each probability condition, resulting in 30 No-Go trials in the 0.2 condition and 75 No-Go 
trials in the 0.5 condition. We calculate a measure of overall response inhibition (number of 
errors, or failed inhibition) for each condition. As for the two SSTs, trials in each condition 
were randomly intermixed. 
 
 
Figure 30. Two trials in the modified Sustained Attention to Response Task. The left series 
of three frames shows the yellow p(Stop) cue on a No-Go trial, and the right series of three 
frames shows the blue p(Stop) cue on a Go trial. The trial structure is similar to the SART, 
except each digit is preceded by a coloured cue that indicates the p(Stop), i.e., the probability 
of the digit 3 appearing. 
5.5.3 Data analysis and processing 
 
Data were analysed using R (R Core Team, 2013). Participants were excluded if they 
executed any more than 30% invalid responses for any given task. Invalid responses 
constitute omissions to Go trials, invalid or incorrect responses, or premature responses 
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(<150 msec). The number of participants whose data was omitted for the Scale SST, Discrete 
SST, SART and modified SART were 0, 17, 19, and 19, respectively. The Discrete SST data 
from a further three participants could not be used due to a coding error. Furthermore, these 
criteria resulted in an average of 3 (1%) Go trial exclusions from the Scale SST, 14 in the 
discrimination SST (7% trials), 14 in the traditional SART (7% trials), and 21 in the modified 
SART (10% trials) in the participants whose data were included in the analyses. It is common 
in RT tasks to use the median because it is robust to the influence of skew and truncation due 
to the positive skew common to RT distributions (Ulrich & Miller, 19494), but such skew is 
less common in Go/No-Go tasks, especially in those with the additional complexity of 
probability cueing, so we report means here. 
5.5.3.1 Predictive proactive inhibition. To compute a measure of predictive proactive 
inhibition, in the discrimination SST and the modified SART we included two Stop/No-Go 
probability conditions. Our measure of predictive proactive inhibition is, therefore, the 
difference in average RT between the two conditions, where we would expect participants to 
respond more slowly when there is a higher known probability of a Stop or No-Go signal. 
These two tasks may impose very different demands on the inhibition network and, indeed, 
Stop-Signal and Go/No-Go paradigms are not analogous, measuring the stopping and the not 
going process, respectively. As such, we do not expect these measures to necessarily be 
correlated with one another between tasks as a requisite criterion for construct validity. Since 
the scale SST is an anticipation-type task that involved prolonged motor action preparation 
and imposes an artificial constraint on the response (i.e., every Go response should be 800 
msec), it is not sensical to compute a measure of predictive proactive inhibition in this task 
since any difference in Go RT between conditions would not represent proactive inhibition, 
but rather failure to perform the task well. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the two conditions in 
this task allows us to test whether the estimated SSRT from this task is robust against any 
stopping strategies that may be generated in response to a high-probability Stop signal cue. 
5.5.3.2 Remedial proactive inhibition. Our measure of remedial proactive inhibition, 
on the other hand, is post-error slowing (PES), which is derived by subtracting the average 
RT of the four Go trials before each error from the average of the four Go trials after each 
error, a method validated by Dutilh and colleagues (Dutilh et al., 2012b). No-Go trials that 
fell within these 4-trial windows as well as Go trials that could be classified as both pre- and 
post-error trials were omitted from this analysis. Because all tasks present stimuli in a 
randomised order and the rate of error commission varied between participants, the number 
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of trials that could be classified as pre- or post- error trials differed between participants. We 
chose not to exclude participants from PES analysis based on the number of trials or pre-to- 
post error comparisons used to calculate it alone because there is no reason to expect that one 
post-error adjustment would differ in any meaningful way to the next. We did, however, 
exclude those participants from the PES analysis who adjusted their performance an extreme 
amount, which we defined as greater than 250 msec in either direction. This resulted in the 
exclusion of two participants (1.6%), both of whom were removed only from SART analyses. 
5.6 Results and Discussion 
We have three main aims: (i) to investigate how many Stop/No-Go trials the staircase 
needs in order to converge on a stable estimate of SSRT – Livesey and Livesey (2016) 
reported real and simulated data showing that fewer than 30 are needed, but since we ran dual 
staircases in parallel, we might find that a few more are needed; (ii) to measure reactive 
inhibition, to show remedial proactive inhibition, and to establish predictive proactive 
inhibition as a construct; (iii) to test whether the values calculated for reactive inhibition are 
robust to the adaptations that we made to these tasks. If so, we would expect to see 
comparable estimates of reactive inhibition across cued probability conditions while 
observing differences in estimates of proactive inhibition. 
A final, largely exploratory, aim (iv) is to test whether task variables are correlated, 
since there has been very little investigation into the extent to which performance varies 
across response inhibition task. Furthermore, if SSRT in both SSTs and the number of errors 
of commission in both Go/No-Go tasks are correlated, then we can be confident that the tasks 
are effective response inhibition tasks. Likewise, if measures of proactive inhibition, either 
remedial or predictive, are correlated, then we can assume the existence of some underlying 
proactive mechanism. If, however, they are not, then we might assume that the proactive 
mechanism differs based on task demands and recruitment of different cognitive processes 
and neural regions. Either of these potential explanations are acceptable; remedial proactive 
inhibition is more likely to be a top-down higher-order process under control to some degree 
from frontal regions, whereas predictive proactive inhibition is more likely to be associated 
with reinforcement learning principles whose neural bases originate in basal ganglia and 
might be less susceptible to agentive control. The presence of proactive inhibition in either of 
its forms between these tasks suggests an adaptive and flexible compensatory strategy that is 
based on task requirements. 
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Scale p(Stop) = 0.2 
Discrimination p(Stop) = 0.2 
Aim (i) 
 
Our data support the findings of Livesey and Livesey (2016), who reported that 
estimates of SSRT based on ~SSD stabilise quite rapidly. In our experiment, stability 
occurred in as few as 20 Stop trials (see Figure 31) and was generally not influenced by the 
distance away from which the starting SSD was set to the final SSD. Even with the inclusion 
of two p(Stop) conditions, the Ψ staircase proved remarkably effective in converging on a 
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Figure 31. The average ~SSD (y axis) for each p(Stop) condition in each SST determined by 
the Ψ staircase plotted as a function of Stop trial. 
Aim (ii) 
 
Task performances are described in Tables 13, 14, and 15 and illustrated in Figure 32. 
It is important that the reactive processes between conditions within tasks are equivalent and 
correlated so that the unitary reactive process is comparable and that we can ensure that 
proactive processes do not influence it. Despite differences in Go RT between the two 
conditions (suggesting predictive proactive inhibition did take place, see Table 14), the 
Scale p(Stop) = 0.5 
Discrimination p(Stop) = 0.5 
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average difference in SSRT between conditions in the Scale SST was less than one 
millisecond (p = .699), and only 5 msec in the Discrimination SST (p = .344). This suggests 
that the estimate of reactive inhibition (SSRT) is robust against predictive proactive inhibition 
in these two tasks. Within each task, SSRT in the two conditions was correlated (Scale SST: 
r121 = .37, p < .0001; Discrete SST: r105 = .35, p = .0002). 
The proportion of errors in the modified SART (the Go/No-Go task with cued 
probability conditions) was significantly higher in the p(No-Go) = 0.2 condition compared to 
the p(No-Go) = 0.5 condition (t102 = 4.85, p < .0001). This suggests that predictive proactive 
inhibition (longer Go RT under higher No-Go probability conditions, see Table 14) 
confounds the measure of overall response inhibition (the number of errors); the latter 
therefore cannot simply reflect reactive inhibition. Despite the difference in number of errors 
between conditions, performance in the two conditions was nevertheless correlated (r102 
= .81, p < .0001). 
 
So, the first criterion for accepting the robustness of our task adaptations to measures 
of reactive inhibition is satisfied in the SSTs, but not the modified SART. To satisfy the 
second, we need to observe remedial and predictive proactive inhibition in these tasks. Our 
data support the presence of remedial proactive inhibition (i.e., post-error slowing, PES) in all 
tasks (while PES is meaningless in the Scale SST because it is not a speeded task and its 
design imposes an artificial window within which responses should be made, it was 
nevertheless observed). PES was nearly identical in the Discrimination SST (29.6 ± 35.1 
msec) and the traditional SART (30.1 ± 42.0 msec), and this slowing was positively 
correlated in the two tasks, but not quite significantly so (r86 = .19, p = .079). Likewise, 
predictive proactive inhibition, indexed by the slowing of responses in higher p(Stop/No-Go) 
conditions, was present in all three tasks. To isolate this difference to the effect of predictive 
proactive inhibition, we must ensure that any differences between conditions in SSRT or 
proportion of errors are not correlated with the magnitude of predictive proactive inhibition. 
This ensures a stable measure of reactive or overall response inhibition that is robust to 
proactive compensatory strategy. The difference in reactive and response inhibition between 
p(Stop/No-Go) conditions was not correlated with predictive proactive inhibition in any task 
(smallest p = .588). 
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Table 13   
Measures of reactive inhibition in two SSTs (SSRT in msec) and 
response inhibition in two Go/No-Go tasks. 
Task 
Condition 
p(Stop) = 0.2 p(Stop) = 0.5 
SSRT (SD) 
Scale SST 185 (18.2) 185 (22.0) 
Discrimination SST 279 (50.0) 274 (52.5) 
proportion of errors (SD) 
SART 0.54 (0.21) 
Modified SART 0.31 (0.21) 0.25 (0.17) 
 
 
Table 14      
Paired sample t-tests to assess remedial proactive inhibition as post-error slowing (PES). 





t (df) p d 
Scale SST 830 (31.2) 836 (34.6) 5.55 (120) < .0001 0.18 
Discrimination SST 603 (108.3) 633 (104.2) 8.69 (105) < .0001 0.28 
SART 314 (61.2) 344 (74.4) 7.02 (100) < .0001 0.43 
Modified SART 420 (105.8) 428 (97.8) 2.27 (102) 0.025 0.08 
 
 
Table 15      
Paired sample t-tests to assess predictive proactive inhibition as the difference in RT on Go 
trials between cued probability conditions. 
Task 
M RT (SD) 
t (df) p d 
p(Stop) = 0.2 p(Stop) = 0.5 
Scale SST 831 (32.9) 837 (33.4) 8.19 (120) < .0001 0.18 
Discrimination SST 612 (104.6) 635 (111.5) 8.50 (105) < .0001 0.22 





Figure 32. Proactive inhibition data for all four tasks. Remedial proactive inhibition reflects 
post-error slowing (PES), that is, faster pre- (black) compared to post- (grey) error Go RTs. 
Predictive proactive inhibition is reflected in faster average Go RT for p(Stop) = 0.2 (black) 
than in p(Stop) = 0.5 (grey) conditions. Error bars represent SEM. 
Aim (iii) 
 
Thus, in both SSTs measures of reactive inhibition are equivalent between conditions, 
though this is not the case for response inhibition in the modified SART, and both forms of 
proactive inhibition are observed. As such, we can assume that the two SST tasks are capable 
of measuring both forms of proactive inhibition while yielding reliable measures of reactive 
inhibition. In order to recommend a sound task to measure response inhibition and its 
constituent processes, it is important to assess the degree to which performance on these tasks 
covaries. That is, do measures of SSRT correlate between the two SSTs, of errors between 
the two Go/No-Go tasks, and of both forms of proactive inhibition between tasks or even 
between task paradigms? 
To the extent that our adaptations to these tasks introduce additional cognitive 
processing, congruence in outcome measures might be somewhat stifled. Although there has 
been little empirical investigation that compares performance on two or more response 
inhibition tasks, it seems sensible to expect that measures of reactive inhibition in the two 
SSTs and of response inhibition in the two Go/No-Go tasks might be correlated, but not 
necessarily that response and reactive inhibition be correlated (given that overall response 
inhibition seems to be confounded with proactive processes in the modified SART, but this is 
not the case for reactive inhibition in the SSTs). To our knowledge, only two studies have 
investigated the neural correlates of performance on these two tasks, each of which report 
very little commonality between regions of activation with the exception of the insula cortex 
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and the right inferior frontal gyrus (Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2011; Zheng, Oka, Bokura, & 
Yamaguchi, 2008), indicating both common and non-overlapping underlying process 
required for stopping and for not going. In a large cross-species review of the 
neuropsychopharmacology of inhibition including data from both tasks, Eagle, Bari, and 
Robbins (2008) reported little overlap in the drugs that modulate performance, concluding 
that serotonin is implicated in Go/No-Go tasks, whereas SSRT in the Stop-Signal Task is 
more sensitive to noradrenaline, providing further evidence that these tasks represent 
different forms of action inhibition. Both Littman and Takács (2017) and Verbruggen and 
Logan (2008) did not find any substantial correspondence between performance on Go/No- 
Go and Stop-Signal tasks in their respective measures of response inhibition, which further 
supports the hypothesis that proactive inhibition influences response inhibition and that 
response inhibition and reactive inhibition are not linearly related. In the only study of its 
kind investigating the latent structure of impulsivity using a battery of self-report and 
behavioural impulsivity and inhibition measures in a reasonably large (N = 1,252), cross- 
sectional sample, MacKillop and colleagues (2016) found a small but significant correlation 
between performance on Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks (r = .22), but their measure of 
performance in the SST was not SSRT. They instead used the percentage of errors, which in 
most implementations of the SST is held constant at ~50% by an adaptive staircase so as to 
derive the SSRT. In any case, in their three-factor model which best fit the data, performance 
on these two tasks loaded onto the same factor. We may also expect measures of predictive 
proactive inhibition to be correlated since it probably reflects some innate learning style that 
should hypothetically be consistent under various conditions. Remedial reactive inhibition, on 
the other hand, may not be correlated between tasks even within paradigms. Since we 
previously showed that PES appears to be the result of disturbances to early processing of the 
stimulus, but not later, more task-based stimulus processing (Beu et al., in preparation, 
Chapter 3), it may vary in different ways as do task demands. 
Aim (iv) 
 
An average of SSRT between the two p(Stop) conditions within each SST was 
positively correlated (r103 = .21, p = .033), indicating that our measure of reactive inhibition 
was moderately consistent between the two tasks. Our measures of overall response 
inhibition, the number of errors in the two Go/No-Go tasks, were highly correlated (r93 = .67, 
p < .0001). PES in the modified SART was unusually minimal and was not correlated with 
PES in the traditional SART (p = .52) or the Discrimination SST (p = .38). This is not 
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altogether unexpected. Despite different demands on the stopping process, there appears to be 
some consistency between PES in the traditional SART and the Discrimination SST, but it 
was not significant (r86 = .19, p = .079). Predictive proactive inhibition in the Scale and the 
Discrimination SSTs was positively correlated (r103 = .30, p = .002). It is unclear how 
predictive proactive inhibition might manifest in the modified SART since any advantage that 
might be afforded by offsetting the initiation of an action would be more effective in stopping 
than in not going. It was nevertheless observed in the task, and positively correlated with the 
same effect in the Discrimination SST (r89 = .24, p = .024), but not in the Scale SST (p 
= .987). Given the relationships between the outcome measures between tasks and the 
conceptual limitations to various measures of proactive inhibition in the Scale SST and the 
modified SART, there is a clear indication that, if one is interested in measuring the complete 




Here, we provided empirical validation supporting the utility of Livesey and 
Livesey’s (2016) Bayesian adaptive staircase in two Stop-Signal Tasks. Consistent with 
Livesey and Livesey’s conclusions, we show that it requires as few as 20 Stop trials to yield a 
stable estimate of SSRT, which is quite remarkable. Indeed, given the known effect of task 
length on performance, effort, and motivation, fewer trials (in as much as that does not affect 
the critical variable of interest) tend to yield more reliable parameters than do longer tasks, all 
other things being equal (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 2002; Karweit & Slavin, 
1982; Lim et al., 2010; Olofsson & Polich, 2007; Sun et al., 2014; Treptow, Burns, 
McComas, 2019). Since disturbances to response inhibition have been indicated as an 
endophenotype of disorders and diseases associated with behavioural and motor regulation 
and impulsivity (e.g., Slaats-Willemse et al., 2013), the utility of this algorithm in such 
populations may prove additionally beneficial. 
Our tasks allowed us to observe remedial and predictive proactive inhibition. Since 
proactive inhibition is effectively some mechanism that operates in such a way as to improve 
likelihood of response inhibition in the future, this is a sensical approach. Our results seem to 
indicate that this measure is somewhat consistent between the two task paradigms (the 
Discrimination SST and the traditional SART; note that the Scale SST is not well suited to 
measure individual differences in this type of proactive inhibition given the narrow 
distribution of RTs around 800 msec). 
195 
 
Although predictive proactive inhibition was correlated in the two SSTs, it is not a 
logical measure of the process in the Scale SST for the reasons already described. Likewise, 
remedial proactive inhibition is unlikely to be a logical measure in the Scale SST for the same 
reasons. The Scale SST potentially provides the purest measure of reactive inhibition because 
it is not confounded by speed-accuracy trade-off, and by the nature of its Go process it is 
potentially less confounded by proactive processes. However, the purpose of such tasks is to 
measure response inhibition, which requires assessment of its constituent processes. If a task 
were capable of measuring all three of these, it would have more broad utility. Since 
predictive proactive inhibition appears therefore to represent a more global process that may 
not be engaged in different ways between the two task paradigms, and because the aim here 
is to develop a task or battery of tasks that has a short administration time, including this 
modification in the modified SART is redundant since it yields no additional information to 
the same modification in the Discrimination SST. It is, however, plausible that predictive 
proactive inhibition affects the stopping and not going processes in different ways. 
Although the Discrimination SST yields measures of both remedial and predictive 
proactive inhibition as well as a measure of reactive inhibition that does not seem to be 
confounded by proactive inhibition, it alone cannot tell us the whole story about response 
inhibition. The SART remains a critical piece of this story. SSTs measure reactive inhibition 
and, with the additional components we described here, can also measure two forms of 
proactive inhibition. There is no method for combining reactive and proactive inhibition to 
give a measure of overall response inhibition; the SART is needed to provide such a measure. 
Our data suggest that the Discrimination SST and the traditional SART are needed to fully 
articulate the response inhibition process, and that including the Scale SST and the modified 
SART may be redundant. Our modified version of the SART yields a measure of predictive 
proactive inhibition, which may potentially differ in itself and its effect on the stopping and 
the not going process. Whether the additional data generated by this task provides sufficient 
value over and above the Discrimination SST and the SART is not known since the data we 
observed in the modified SART here are not particularly clean. Since a measure of response 
inhibition that is not influenced by p(No-Go) cueing is important, a tentative recommendation 
to measure response inhibition and its components is to administer the Discrimination SST 
and the traditional SART, however, further investigation is warranted. In particular, future 
research should determine whether predictive proactive inhibition does indeed exert a 
different effect on stopping and not going processes. Importantly, our data suggest that a 
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battery that includes the Discrimination SST with the Ψ staircase and the traditional SART 
would be relatively short and would yield considerably richer data on the response inhibition 
process and its constituent processes, while allowing the study of both stopping and not going 
processes. Such data may provide deeper insight and more precision into the source of 
disturbances to the inhibitory network under pathological conditions. 
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5.8 General Discussion of the Foregoing Manuscript 
 
The primary aim of this experiment was to validate a novel measure of response 
inhibition. We used a large sample to do so, and provided support for the data in the small 
sample and computational simulations from the initial paper8. Although there were only mild- 
to-moderate correlations between analogous measures across tasks, I used factor analysis to 
investigate the possibility of some underlying inhibition factor. This was unsuccessful. 
Personally, I think this can be attributed to the sustained motivation of participants; response 
inhibition tasks are both frustrating and relatively uninteresting—it is possible that the effort 
exerted by participants was not sustained across the testing session, or differentially exerted 
between the four tasks. Such an explanation could, in principle, be applied to any failed 
endeavour in behavioural analysis, but nevertheless, I think it is apt here. Alternatively, the 
absence of positive correlations in performance between the task paradigms is that the tasks 
simply may not tap into the same aspects of inhibitory control. The Stop-Signal paradigm and 
the Go/No-Go paradigm are quantitatively and qualitatively different tasks with different 
demands. In the Stop-Signal Task, the Go stimulus is first processed, and the appropriate 
motor response is prepared and engaged and, sometimes, initiated, when the Stop signal 
directs participants to inhibit. On the other hand, in the Go/No-Go task, No-Go trials are not 
Go trials that should be inhibited; they are No-Go trials in which the stimulus is not processed 
as a preparatory stimulus, so no appropriate motor response is prepared, only an inappropriate 
 
8 A secondary aim of this experiment was to investigate the construct validity and the test-retest reliability 
of the task. To do this we compared performance on the critical measures under investigation between the 
tasks, and we invited participants to attend a second session, separated by one week, in which they would 
complete the Discrimination SST and the traditional SART again. A very small number of participants 
were willing to return in 7 days (n = 10), at approximately the same time of day, to repeat two of these four 
tasks so that we could evaluate the test-retest reliability of two of these measures. High test-retest 
reliability signifies interval validity and ensures representativeness and stability. It is additionally 
important for a task to be reliable across testing sessions if it is to be used as a diagnostic tool or to 
quantify cognitive or behavioural decrements associated with pathology. Many studies have used changes 
in SART performance as an outcome measure of the effect of some intervention, but to my knowledge, 
test-retest reliability of the traditional SART has only been assumed, but not investigated. Likewise, we 
wanted to assess the reliability of the novel task that we previously validated. 
In the SART, Go RT was reliable (r9 = .95, p < .0001), as was the overall number of errors of commission 
(r9 = .91, p = .0003), but PES was not (r9 = -.13, p = .727). In the Discrimination SST, Go RT was reliable 
in both Stop-Signal probability conditions (20%: r9 = .91, p = .0003; 50%: r9 = 91, p = .0002), as was the 
difference (i.e., predictive proactive inhibition; r9 = .54, p = .108), despite not reaching statistical 
significance due to the sample size. PES was also reliable in the Discrimination SST (r9 = -.77, p = .009). 
SSRT was not reliable in the 50% Stop-signal probability condition, and was, in fact, highly negatively 
correlated (r9 = -.58, p = .078), and SSRT in the 20% Stop-signal condition was not correlated whatsoever 
(r9 = .01, p = .981). Unlike in the SART, PES was highly reliable in this task (r9 = .77, p = .010). 




one—one that is, by qualitative reports at least, more difficult to suppress. Stopping and not 
going are cognitively, experientially, and motorically different actions (or inactions). It is, 
therefore, not surprising that performance is not correlated across paradigms. The measures 
of proactive inhibition across these two paradigms, on the other hand, are probably more 
convergent on the same underlying process, but that process is recruited to a different end 
(i.e., stopping vs not going). It seems likely that remedial proactive inhibition affects these 
processes differently, but unlikely that predictive proactive inhibition could, since it occurs 
before the cognitive initiation of the response. 
In this chapter, I described two distinct forms of proactive inhibition: remedial and 
predictive. Until this chapter, the operational definition of proactive inhibition has been PES, 
but this may have been incomplete, since it stands to reason that predicting an upcoming need 
to implement a stopping or not going process reflects proactive inhibition. The need for a 
comprehensive articulation of response inhibition has already been defined in the preamble to 
this chapter. What we demonstrate above is that this can be achieved by administering a 
battery of as few as two, but potentially three, tasks. The total time to complete these three 
tasks in our experiment was around 25 minutes, including breaks and task-related training. 
Since it is possible that the modified SART is redundant, and because Livesey and Livesey’s 
(2016) staircase is remarkably successful, thereby allowing the Discrimination SST to be 
shortened somewhat (Figure 31 shows that in the p(Stop) = 0.2 condition for the 
Discrimination SST, 20 Stop trials appears to be where ~SSD stabilises; so, if the task were 
reduced from 320 trials to 200 trials, parameter estimates would not be meaningfully 
affected), a precise estimation of the response inhibition network could be calculated in as 








6.1 Conclusions and Directions 
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate post-error slowing (PES), and to 
contribute to the literature on its neural and cognitive architecture. This thesis was not so 
much a single, monolithic research project; instead, it comprised a series of research 
questions that I believe are the kinds of diverse questions that we should be asking about 
response inhibition. So, inasmuch as this work has a central theme, that theme was the 
analysis of PES using different methods and having in mind different questions. We set out to 
articulate the response inhibition network by focusing on PES as an index of proactive 
inhibition, to situate it in the anatomy of the brain, and to describe its potential sources both 
mental and biological. On the basis of the theoretical, psychometric, and experimental 
limitations in the field, an ancillary aim was to highlight some necessary considerations for 
future investigations. In so doing, we focused largely on the reactive/proactive distinction 
because it is certainly the most pressing matter. Although reactive and proactive inhibition 
are probably equally important, they provide very distinct insights into cognition, into 
pathology, into ageing, and so on. 
The majority of the data presented here were proactive inhibition data; that is, for the 
most part, PES. The reason for this focus is that reactive inhibition, insofar as it is captured 
by SSRT in SSTs, has been thoroughly investigated and, at least in my view, the extent to 
which proactive processes truly contribute to overall inhibition remains an open and 
important question. It is interesting that when taking a measure of overall response inhibition 
and a measure of proactive inhibition indexed by PES, that overall response inhibition was 
rarely predicted by other variables, but proactive inhibition was. It is, therefore, fair to 
assume that proactive inhibition represents a central role in the network that warrants further 
investigation. 
Since PES relies on more D1 relative to D2 neurotransmission, is predicted by 
disturbed attentional processing indexed by a blunted anterior N1 after an error, and is 
reduced by what seems to be the suppression of frontal activity by neurostimulation to right 
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hemispheric regions known to be recruited by response inhibition, then we can hypothesise 
on how it is deployed by the basal ganglia. In addition to that, we can make predictions about 
how Parkinson’s disease (PD) and Huntington’s disease (HD) might manifest behaviourally 
on response inhibition tasks, such as those we present in the previous chapter, where reactive 
inhibition and proactive inhibition are discretised. On the basis of these predictions, we can 
guide future investigation into the cognitive neuropathology of these diseases and, 
potentially, suggest that remedial proactive inhibition may be used as an early marker of the 
onset of motor symptomatology in each. 
6.1.1 Some comments on the proactivity of post-error slowing 
 
From the outset, hypotheses were guided by the assumption that PES was a strategic 
slowing of responses to maximise the success of response inhibition attempts, as was the 
common assumption in the literature; that is, that PES is, in fact, proactive. Strategy implies 
active planning and intention to achieve some end goal—presumably to minimise errors, in 
this context. It was taken for granted probably because if we were to consider ourselves 
encountering a circumstance in which we have erred and are subsequently faced with a 
similar choice of action in the real world, we might like to see ourselves taking a little extra 
time to settle on a course of action out of all of the possible courses of action. The data we 
present in each of our studies, to some degree, do not provide direct support for this 
hypothesis. We have shown that PES relies on more D1 receptor sites and fewer D2 receptor 
sites, that it is effectuated to a greater degree in older adults and those with lower estimates of 
general intelligence, g, that it is impaired when activity in right frontal cortex is 
downregulated by neurostimulation, and that it seems to be the outcome of disrupted 
subsequent attentional processing. None of this evidence suggests a proactive strategic 
mechanism of PES, but it does not amount to negative evidence of such. This evidence 
clearly suggests that PES is at least partially compensatory in some way, and is a 
consequence of disturbances to processing, but not necessarily proactive (i.e., intentionally 
deployed). 
Our data suggest that PES is compensatory in that it appears to manifest to a greater 
degree in the response patterns of older adults and those with lower g; that is, in those whose 
reactive process is likely less effective. It is known that in younger adults, motor execution, 
coordination, and control are more effectively regulated than in older adults. The mechanisms 
responsible for this are well-understood, and correspond to degeneration of neurotransmitter 
systems, in particular the dopaminergic system, demyelination of neurons and post-cerebellar 
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nerves, and weakened musculature (e.g., Haubenstricker & Seefeldt, 1984; Peterka & Black, 
1990; Seidler et al., 2010; Smith, Sharit, & Czaja, 1999; Thomas & French, 1985). Likewise, 
in those with lower g and IQ, which are near enough to analogous for this argument, it has 
been observed that the reactive process, indexed by SSRT, is worse (e.g., Engelhardt et al., 
2016; Schachar, Mota, Logan, Tannock, & Klim, 2000), but this relationship is not always 
found (e.g., Kooijmans, Scheres, & Oosterlaan, 2000). Kooijmans and colleagues (2000) 
found no correlation between general intelligence and SSRT, however their sample was a 
population of young ADHD children, which likely confounds conclusions given what we 
now know about proactive inhibition. It is possible that the effect of ADHD on response 
inhibition overshadows the generally small-to-moderate effect of g or IQ on its elements. It is 
interesting that higher IQ has long been associated with quicker RT (Jensen, 1982). Since 
lower IQ predicts a slower RT, and some evidence suggests worse reactive and overall 
response inhibition (e.g., Votruba & Langenecker, 2013; but see also Bitsakou, Psychogiou, 
Thompson, & Sonuga-Barke, 2008, who found no such relationship, once again, in a sample 
of ADHD children and adolescents), could it be the case that people with a higher IQ 
effectuate a more productive speed-accuracy trade-off? If lower g is associated with more 
PES, and PES enhances overall inhibitory efficacy, then it stands to reason that a more 
cautious speed-accuracy trade-off is a source of effective inhibition in those with higher g. 
These pieces of evidence point toward a natural compensatory mechanism, perhaps to 
compensate for a poorer reactive process, but on the other hand, perhaps to compensate for a 
less productive speed-accuracy trade-off. This account does not rely on an assumption of 
active agency or intentional deployment of PES. The physical and biological processes by 
which such a compensatory mechanism may be enacted might be outside of active agency, 
and perhaps even consciousness, and this very interesting question requires further 
investigation. 
In addition to their support of a compensatory account of PES, our data also support 
an incidental account. The apparent disruption to normal processing that is evident in our 
EEG data (Chapter 4) supports this, suggesting that errors dysregulate a pattern of thought. 
This dysregulation could potentially be represented in the mind as an incongruity between 
intended action and executed action, or it could be overridden by an emotional response to an 
error, as frustration or disappointment, perhaps. The effect of dysregulation of attention to a 
stimulus plausibly offsets meaningful processing (e.g., discrimination indexed by N2). This 
can be inferred from convergent evidence that quicker RT is predicted by a larger N1 (Kolev, 
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Falkensetin, & Yordanova, 2006), that the N1 does not appear later but is prolonged and 
larger in Choice RT tasks compared to Simple RT tasks (Vogel & Luck, 2000), and that the 
tail-end of the N1 in Choice RT tasks is a stronger predictor of RT than is onset latency or 
amplitude (Antonova et al., 2016). However, in Antonova and colleagues’ study (Antonova et 
al., 2016), the additional complexity of a choice task likely discriminates differences in 
performance between individuals more in later components associated with higher cognition 
such as the N2 or P3. 
Our data partially support an incidental account of PES in our EEG experiment, and a 
compensatory account in our genetics experiment. Both proactive and incidental PES may 
result in improved response inhibition, since the outcome is the same: more time to 
meaningfully interpret the stimulus. We do not see the N1 predicting response inhibition (i.e., 
errors), because attentional processing probably does not serve any discriminatory or 
hermeneutic function in a single-response paradigm such as the SART. Those ERPs that do 
so, the central N2 and the frontocentral P3, however, appear to predict overall response 
inhibition to some degree. While the N1 is negatively impacted by errors, the N2 and the P3 
are not, which suggests that they serve an important role in the reactive process, which is not 
directly affected by errors. 
These two accounts do not discount a proactive account of PES. PES may be partially 
proactive, intentional slowing of subsequent responses. Given our dual-process model of 
proactive inhibition, remedial and predictive, the latter of which implies active slowing down 
associated with a perceived heightened likelihood of needing to recruit the stopping or not 
going process, then it is clear that attenuation of response speed even to the millisecond scale 
is possible, and is under top-down control. As such, it remains plausible that some proportion 
of PES may likewise be proactive attenuation, given similar principles of predictive proactive 
inhibition apply in remedial proactive inhibition. The degree to which PES can be empirically 
separated into compensatory and proactive, and proactive and incidental, remains unclear. 
But the fact that our evidence indicates that PES does not enhance the reactive process by 
active facilitation or recruitment of additional neural resources, but rather the response 
inhibition process because the reactive process is unaffected, is an important finding. So, for 
the remainder, we do not assume the PES is wholly strategic or wholly incidental. Just that it 
occurs reliably and, through a combination of factors, contributes to successful inhibition. 
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6.1.2 Situating post-error slowing in the contemporary trinal-organisation model of the 
basal ganglia 
In the introduction, we reviewed evidence that PES is contingent on the error 
positivity event-related potential (the Pe) being conveyed to the STN, a critical locus of the 
hyperdirect pathway (Figure 5) and that this relay relied on sufficient levels of dopamine (see 
also Siegert et al., 2014). This notion was not central to our thesis, so the methods used here 
do not allow us to support or reject these findings, but it is theoretically consistent with our 
uGRS method representing proportion of D1 to D2 receptors. Our uGRS data indicate that 
more D1 relative to D2 receptors, which is consistent with a balance favouring the direct over 
the indirect basal ganglia pathway (but also heightened neurotransmission via the hyperdirect 
pathway), predicts greater engagement of PES. If the Pe being conveyed to STN relies on 
sufficient dopaminergic neurotransmission, and the STN is a critical locus of the hyperdirect 
pathway that synapses directly with frontal regions, then we can hypothesise two things. 
First, that our D1:D2 uGRS predicts a larger Pe, of which there seems to be some indication 
in our data (r33 = .27, p = .121). And, second, that deactivation of neurons in the hyperdirect 
pathway might disrupt PES. Again, our tDCS data support this if we assume that cathodal 
stimulation to the right inferior frontal regions, known to be involved in response inhibition, 
reaches hyperdirect efferents, which seems likely according to the work of Bikson and others 
(see Bikson & Tahman, 2013; Bikson et al., 2004; DaSilva, Volz, Bikson, & Fregni, 2011; 
Hogeveen, Grafman, Aboseria, David, Bikson, & Hauner, 2016). 
Taken together, this evidence implicates the hyperdirect pathway in PES. The Pe 
activates the STN, which is necessary for PES, and the STN synapses with the frontal regions 
at which the N1 is disturbed soon after, which predicts PES. Furthermore, a genetic 
predisposition to stronger hyperdirect activation predicts PES, and potentially reducing 
hyperdirect activation using neurostimulation diminishes PES. If an error signal is received 
by the basal ganglia, it can be rapidly conveyed via the hyperdirect pathway, perhaps to 
disrupt attentional processing in frontal regions. If that is the case, it is possible that the many 
studies indicating that right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) is involved in response inhibition 
(e.g., Chikazoe, Konishi, Asari, Jimura, & Miyashita, 2007; Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, 
& Duncan, 2010) might in fact have misattributed its activation to response or reactive 
inhibition, when it seems likely to be involved in proactive inhibition (see also Swick, 
Ashely, & Turken, 2008, who use fMRI to show that the left inferior frontal gyrus is also 
critical for response inhibition; this finding is not inconsistent with our argument here, since 
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the effect of tDCS is quite diffuse, and likely also diminishes activity in the left frontal 
regions). 
6.1.3 Can these findings help us understand the behavioural manifestations of 
neuropathology and psychological disorders? 
Differentially dysregulated activity that results from disordered dopamine signaling in 
basal ganglia pathways underlies the differential pathological profiles of several disorders 
and diseases (DeLong, 1990; Gerfen, 1995; Smith, Bevan, Shink, & Bolam, 1998). 
Hyperactivity in the direct pathway appears to underlie a substantial proportion of the 
behavioural dysregulation in gambling and addictive disorders as well as disorders of 
perseveration (e.g., OCD) and dysfunctional impulse control (e.g., ADHD), and even autism 
(Baker, Stockwell, & Holroyd, 2013; Haber, Heilbronner, 2013; Mous et al., 2015; Rapoport, 
1990; Rothwell, 2016; Sonuga-Barke, 2005), whereas genetic or other predisposition for 
increased indirect relative to direct activation has been assumed to underlie behavioural and 
personality disorders including depression, anxiety, and social problems (e.g., Behrendt, 
2019; Cummings, 1993; Krishnan, 1992). Much of the research on which the work cited here 
was based was undertaken before the hyperdirect pathway was characterised. Since that time, 
the frontal-basal ganglia connections of the hyperdirect pathway have been implicated in 
many of these disorders (e.g., Frank, 2008; Li et al., 2015; Maia & Frank, 2011). It is self- 
evident, then, that precise description of the cognitive functions that the three known basal 
ganglia pathways support can provide the basis of more effective psychiatric care. 
The ability to discretise the elements of cognitive processes that seem unitary, and to 
map their constituent elements to discrete segments of neuroanatomy upholds accurate 
characterisation of individual differences in cognitive functions, of changes to those cognitive 
functions, and of the behavioural and cognitive profiles of diseases that are thought to affect 
those cognitive functions. It is also important to develop this theoretical capacity given the 
direction of the cognitive sciences. The cognitive sciences, biopsychology, computational 
neuroscience, and mathematical psychology are increasingly interested in modelling, 
parameterising, and simulating data. The translational capacity of this work to the clinical 
field is very clear and will have considerable impact. Discretisation of cognitive mechanisms 
into constituent processes, and parameterisation of those processes into subprocesses 
provides incredible insight into behaviour, into the mind, and into the biological states that 
produce them. With the empirical models of disease that have been established over the last 
hundred years, the theoretical models of behaviour that are currently being established to 
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complement them are central to allowing us to postulate on the real effects of disease. This is 
particularly important in the clinical populations who appear most affected by disturbances to 
the response inhibition network, since they are so varied. Their pathophysiological profiles 
are well-understood, but their cognitive profiles are not. 
An accurate conceptualisation of the cognitive and behavioural profiles of these 
diseases that is constrained by what is known about their pathophysiological profiles has 
clear utility. What limits the realisation of this in practical terms are the experimental 
limitations summarised throughout this thesis. While we may have the capacity to formalise a 
model of deterioration of these functions, and may even be able to observe very subtle 
deterioration in those functions and use them as an early cognitive marker of the very early 
stages of neurodegenerative onset that leads to the more commonly observed motor 
symptoms, this relies on the precision and accuracy of the instruments of measurement that 
we use to measure such deterioration. If we do not have such an instrument or battery of 
instruments, then this utility is moot. Thus, we need the capacity for direct observation and 
measurement of the constituent elements of response inhibition. Response inhibition requires 
sustained attention, which is limited in psychopathologies such as ADHD, a population that is 
commonly investigated using such tasks. Other psychological and behavioural dysregulation 
disorders including OCD, social anxieties and phobias, Tourette’s syndrome, addictions, and 
antisocial and violent tendencies are also commonly investigated using such tasks. In addition 
to psychosocial disorders, psychiatric and neurological disorders including PD, HD, and other 
dystonic and dyskinetic, and hyperkinetic and choreic, diseases are of interest in this regard. 
One might assume that experimental interest in such populations can be put down to their 
limited ability to inhibit unwanted or to regulate contextually inappropriate actions. Certainly, 
such interest is warranted for clinical purposes. I have already described the limitations in 
self-report data to investigate such functions, but for different reasons there are limitations in 
experimental data to investigate such functions that have been described in Chapter 1 and 
subsequent chapters. These limitations can be attributed in part to task length, and in part to a 
failure to discretise the independent elements of response inhibition. Above I have discussed 
the latter. 
Those limitations that we can attribute to task length are introduced and addressed in 
Chapter 5, but a brief comment is justified here in relation to those populations of interest in 
response inhibition research. The plausibility of distinguishing early onset of PD and HD by 
reactive mechanisms from remedial and predictive proactive mechanisms has been 
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considered above, but what is more pertinent here is task duration. All of the populations 
described above, for very different reasons, exhibit limitations to maintaining behavioural, 
cognitive, motivational, and motoric/physical focus on experimental tasks. These lapses of 
focus have far reaching implications on overall outcome measures of tasks. We have 
integrated various task modifications to existing methods that allow very rapid estimation of 
all relevant variables without sacrificing accuracy or precision. 
Our evidence converges to implicate the hyperdirect pathway in the facilitation of 
PES, but it additionally allows us to consider once again the case of PD and HD in response 
inhibition. Such consideration is germane given the shift in clinical research just described. 
Given what we know about their pathophysiological profiles, we might not expect 
concordance in their behavioural profiles; yet, there is substantial evidence supporting this 
finding (Aron et al., 2003; Beste et al., 2010; Gauggel, Rieger, & Feghoff, 2003; Henderson 
et al., 2011; Lawrence et al., 1996; Ye et al., 2014). I gave an overview of their pathological 
profiles in Chapter 1, and commented on the empirical findings in response inhibition 
experiments, in particular, that data show response inhibition deficits. Very early on in this 
thesis, I referred explicitly to a failure to distinguish between reactive and proactive 
inhibition, and that they exert different effects on overall response inhibition. I touched on the 
idea that this is a glaring and significant limitation that engenders substantial impact on the 
validity of response inhibition data, particularly in pathological populations. PD and HD 
populations represent a model exemplar of this impact. To observe poor response inhibition 
or reactive inhibition in these populations, as many have done is perhaps interesting, but has 
minimal practicable utility. The aetiology of such deficits should be considered; that is, what 
are their cognitive neurocomputational sources? I think that our data allow us to make some 
inferences on this question. 
In PD, degeneration of the structure responsible for production of dopamine, the SNc, 
leads to weakened neurotransmission to striatum, and, therefore, stronger inhibition of the 
thalamus over its projections to the cortex. This can be due to poorer D1-mediated inhibition 
of GPi and SNr relative to D2-mediated inhibition of GPe, which represents strengthened 
indirect pathway function and weakened direct and hyperdirect pathway function in PD 
conditions. These pathophysiological changes represent the aetiology of the hypokinetic 
symptoms that characterise PD (e.g., rigidity and akinetic tremor). Since we have established 
the importance of D1>D2 in our uGRS method for invoking PES (PD roughly corresponds to 
a lower uGRS, i.e., D2>D1), we might assume that the performance deficits in response 
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inhibition tasks in PD can be attributed to a failure to deploy PES as a strategy to mitigate 
poor response inhibition indexed by errors of commission. Pathophysiology in HD, on the 
other hand, is to some extent inverted. Poorer inhibition (i.e., dis-dis-disinhibition) of the 
thalamus due to a higher uGRS (D1>D2) which exerts control over GPe, which, in turn, 
strengthens its inhibition of STN, GPi, and SNr, contributes to the hyperkinetic chorea that 
characterises HD. In essence, this represents a favouring of the direct pathway over the 
indirect pathway, invoking STN activity, which facilitates the deployment of PES. However, 
the motor symptoms (e.g., spasm, chorea, and desynchronisation of signals between basal 
ganglia and cerebellum) results in asynchrony of the signals between segments of the brain 
required for timing and planning of initiation, execution, and stopping of a response. For this 
reason, it seems sensible to infer that the deficits in response inhibition associated with HD 
have their origin in the reactive process. So, with these things in mind, the claim that PD and 
HD suffer from poor response inhibition can potentially be differentially attributed to its 
discrete elements, and not simply to overall inability to stop. That each of these claims invoke 
the importance of the STN, a critical locus of the hyperdirect pathway, adds weight to our 
suggestion that it is central to PES. 
We are in the planning stages of testing PD patients on and off medication (DBS and 
l-DOPA) on various tasks, including the discrimination SST described in the previous 
chapter. If we are able to demonstrate that these interventions improve overall response 
inhibition and, thanks to the modifications we make to the task, isolate them to PES, then our 
plausible claims here can be supported. Precisely how such findings could be translated into 
long-term interventions are not known, but they represent an interesting avenue for 
investigation. The mechanism of l-DOPA is fast acting, and recent evidence (e.g., Rincón- 
Pérez et al., 2019) invoked the inverted-U hypothesis of the effect of dopamine on strategy 
selection, which is dissimilar but not entirely unrelated, to PES. These authors claim that 
sensible strategy is invoked more at higher and lower dopamine levels based on a weighted 
GRS (using a different combination of SNPs than those that we used here). Although this 
inverted-U dopamine hypothesis is ubiquitous, and generally simple to apply to many 
findings, it may pose problems for generalised targeted treatment for or management of 
disturbances to the discrete elements of response inhibition. 
Based on these accounts, if we were to administer the response inhibition battery of 
tasks to PD and HD populations, we might be able to directly observe and compare 
differences in performance that are more precise than overall response inhibition. We can 
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hypothesise that PD patients might engage PES to a lesser degree than do HD patients, and 
that HD patients might have a slower SSRT or commit more errors than do PD patients. 
These tasks have the capacity to isolate and highlight very subtle changes in performance 
over time. It is well-understood that cognitive decline precedes motor symptomatology in 
both PD and HD in some cases by decades. The age of onset of these two diseases tends to be 
in late-middle or later life, which may obscure mild cognitive impairment as it may be 
perceived as a common sign of normal ageing. In adults with a familial history of PD or a 
genetic mutation responsible for HD, spaced, repeated administration of a battery of tasks 
such as this may have the capacity to identify early markers of the cognitive decline that 
precedes motor decline. This line of reasoning is purely hypothetical, but it warrants 
investigation. Mapping the individual trajectory of at-risk individuals allows mitigation 
strategies and lifestyle alterations to offset, slow, or minimise the effects of these diseases. 
Measurement instruments used for such purposes must be suitable for the population 
of interest. The behavioural and motor profiles of these diseases – as well of others, such as 
ADHD, OCD, and those previously described whose behavioural, attentional, and 
motivational regulation are deficient – are not well-suited in their current forms to yield 
accurate measurements of performance and, if those measurements provide insight into the 
extent of the neuropathology, the course of disease and its prognosis and treatment or 
management strategies. If response inhibition tasks are to be used for these purposes, and 
potentially to identify early markers of cognitive decline that signify the very early stages of 
neurological degeneration, then task duration is a critical consideration, hence, the tasks 
described in Chapter 5. 
6.1.4 Considerations for future work in this field 
 
In my view, there are two important approaches to be considered in future work with 
a trinal-organisation model of the basal ganglia and a triarchic structure of response 
inhibition. By trinal-organisation model of basal ganglia, I refer to its three pathways that we 
have robustly implicated in response inhibition: the direct pathway, the indirect pathway, and 
the hyperdirect pathway. By triarchic structure of response inhibition, I refer to reactive 
inhibition, remedial proactive inhibition, and predictive proactive inhibition. Recent research 
has used a reinforcement learning approach to response inhibition in SSTs (see, for example, 
Frank, 2005; Frank, 2006; Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; Wiecki & Frank, 2018; 
Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013). 
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I think that a limitation to this thesis is the lack of a meaningful, in-depth 
consideration of the principles of reinforcement learning from reward (i.e., a correct response 
to Go trials or a correct inhibition to No-Go trials) or from punishment (i.e., responding to 
No-Go trials), and to the role of prediction error in remedial and predictive proactive 
inhibition. In my view, this absence does not diminish the substance here, it would simply 
have provided an alternative interpretation of the data that would require a dedicated thesis in 
itself. It is unfortunate, though, since such principles lend themselves well to being 
investigated through the lens of the dopaminergic hypothesis presented here, its link to the 
basal ganglia, and especially to EEG data. Response inhibition tasks were not designed to 
measure learning abilities, and many of the conclusions here could not have been possible 
interpreting them through that lens; however, on the other hand, using a reinforcement 
learning framework to complement the data here could provide invaluable insight into the 
processes under investigation. For instance, implicit reinforcement derived from correctly 
executing a response on Go trials might explain some post-correct speeding of responses. 
Such an approach was outside of the scope of this thesis, and, in my view, answers a 
different question. A reinforcement learning approach considers the agent to be a product of 
an input/output system in whom very little active or agentive top-down control is deployed. 
With that said, we have provided some support for this notion, but also some support for the 
notion that active control is invoked in PES. Reinforcement learning is more amenable to 
modelling and simulating data, and may even allow for more precise conceptualisation of 
basal ganglia function since the pathways here have long been used in such disciplines to 
investigate learning and reinforcement. This approach may be particularly useful in thinking 
about the predictive proactive mechanism that we describe in the previous chapter, but, this 
predictive mechanism is only one element of a larger totality that should not be considered 
alone. Such experiments when applied to response inhibition tasks assume implicit 
reinforcement based on trial-by-trial accuracy, which is an assumption not yet established. 
The second approach builds on the first: mathematical modelling and computational 
simulation of data. Many have attempted this in response inhibition tasks, and an endeavour 
to apply these approaches to them are well under way. I described my hesitation in so doing 
in a previous chapter. Many research groups (e.g., Dutilh et al., 2012a, 2012b; Forstmann et 
al., 2008; Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016 ; Heathcote, 2012; Heathcote et al., 
2019; Heathcote, Popiel, & Mewhort, 1991; Logan, Schall, & Palmeri, 2015; Matzke, Love, 
Wiecki, Brown, Logan, & Wagenmakers, 2013; Montes, 2017) are making substantial 
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progress here that will undoubtedly synthesise the conceptual cognition with the 
mathematical laws that are needed to use such models logically. 
6.1.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Here, we have shown that PES is likely implemented via the hyperdirect basal ganglia 
pathway and mediated by dopaminergic neurotransmission. We have shown that it is 
measurable. It is reliable, common, subject to individual differences, and mediated by task 
demands, genetic variation, and age. Furthermore, we have shown what it is not. It is not the 
time associated with reorientation or upregulation of attention to the task at hand, and it is not 
a suspension of the commencement of the subsequent stimulus-response behaviour due to 
processing of the error. These things are, of course, critical contributions to the endeavour, 
but describing what something is not does not fill in the blanks, it merely tells us which 
colours not to use when we do fill them in. 
PES is an elusive construct to empirically characterise in a conceptual model simply 
because parameterising or operationalising qualitative, introspective state shifts is practically 
impossible. PES appears to be disorientation, and it appears to be compensatory in some way. 
It may partially reflect an active process, such as “oh, okay, I should slow down”. This may 
seem remiss, but post-error slowing is, partially at least, just post-error slowing. When people 
make an error in what, at first glance at least, is a relatively simple task, it is natural to be 
frustrated. There is no emergent ERP component of frustration to my knowledge. When 
people make an error in such a task, a task that they believe they could perform well if they 
were able to maintain the metacognitive facilities overseeing their performance, an error 
would presumably induce a moderation of a dynamic, implicit speed-accuracy trade-off – at 
least for a very short while. We have shown that PES compensates for suboptimal reactive 
processes in those in whom such compensation is needed. On the other hand, we suggest that 
a speed-accuracy trade-off may be the driving factor of successful inhibition in those in 
whom such compensation is not needed because they are already efficient at balancing speed 
on Go trials and inhibition accuracy. 
Certainly, alongside the predictive proactive mechanism we describe in Chapter 5, 
and empirical findings describing post-correct slowing, post-correct speeding, remedial 
proactive inhibition – as PES – represents one element of many in response patterns in 
continuous performance tasks. Perhaps the use of diffusion or accumulation models can be 
applied to these response pattern elements to characterise the changes that may underlie this 
211 
 
slowing and speeding up. We were unable to apply such models to our data for reasons 
already described. 
First, we demonstrated a neurogenetic basis of a proactive element of response 
inhibition in PES situating it in the dopaminergic system of the basal ganglia. Second, we 
showed that PES appears to be the result of disruptions to functioning indexed by the anterior 
N1, the neural generator of which is thought to be larger in the right hemisphere compared to 
the left, and in frontal or frontoparietal regions. It is difficult to localise the N1 from EEG 
data due to the inverse problem (Grech et al., 2008a, 2008b; Lopez Rincon & Shimoda, 
2016), but if it is generated in right hemispheric frontal or frontoparietal regions, it is 
consistent with PET and fMRI evidence reliably implicating such regions in response 
inhibition (Aron et al., 2004; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001; Rubia, Smith, 
Brammer, & Taylor, 2003). Since we have assumed based on substantial evidence that the 
motor, or reactive, elements of response inhibition to be strongly linked to basal ganglia 
regions (Beste, Saft, Andrich, Gold, & Falkenstein, 2008; Beste, Willemssen, Saft, & 
Falkenstein, 2010; Ray et al., 2009), our data support the hypothesis that the cognitive, or 
proactive and motivational, elements of response inhibition may be partially situated in these 
frontal regions. This would be consistent with our EEG data showing that PES is modulated 
by the anterior N1, and with a good amount of data showing that the rIFG and related regions 
are activated during inhibition tasks (Chikazoe, Konishi, Asari, Jimura, & Miyashita, 2007; 
Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, & Duncan, 2010). If we consider our genetic evidence 
alongside these claims, we might assume that the hyperdirect basal ganglia pathway, which 
synapses with the frontal cortex, is at least partially involved in supporting PES. We take our 
tDCS data as further support of this hypothesis, since the cathodal effects at rIFG appear to 
disrupt PES but not any motor elements of the inhibition task or any other speeded response 
task. 
The narrative connecting the manuscripts contained here is evidence of the biological 
substrate of a cognitive process, proactive inhibition. It is demonstrated that proactive 
inhibition is largely reliant on the dopaminergic system, but adapts to decrements in it 
associated at least with ageing; moreover, its magnitude is greater in individuals whose 
estimated general intelligence is lower, and this, to me, raises questions about the extent to 
which it is, in fact, ‘proactive’ in the agentive sense of the word—is it deployed actively and 
intentionally to a greater extent in people who perform more poorly, or is it administrated by 
some subconscious mechanism in people in whom it is more likely to be required for their 
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survival (or, more likely, more optimal performance in a lab)? Furthermore, is it the result of 
the same cognitive process in such individuals as in those with higher general intelligence, 
given that it is implemented (to different degrees) across the full spectrum of g? It is also 
pertinent to investigate whether it is an effective strategy, and, whether it is a transferable 
strategy that applies in conceptually distinct, but theoretically similar contexts. To me, this 
represents the unifying theme of the experiments in this dissertation. 
Some attention ought to be given to these considerations given the likely clinical 
relevance of response inhibition and changes to its processes across the lifespan. Likewise, 
despite the reliability of response time and response inhibition measures in the SART, the 
reliability of post-error slowing should be investigated in a larger sample, given its 
importance (however, the prevailing theory on the commission of errors in this task is the 
speed-accuracy trade-off which supposes an implicit balance that differs between people; so, 
if response time and the number of errors are reliable, but post-error slowing is not, we 
cannot conclude that post-error slowing confers any benefits or exerts an effect on overall 
inhibition or response time regulation). Furthermore, a particularly interesting finding here 
that certainly warrants continued investigation is the possibility of a dual-process proactive 
inhibition. A predictive/remedial distinction in proactive inhibition may explain some of the 
discrepancies between empirical data and real-world observations in pathological 
populations. 
We have articulated response inhibition, and provided some critical evidence 
describing its important elements. We have shown quite clearly that it has biological substrate 
and ought to be considered in those terms. We have answered several questions, but have left 
some unanswered. These are important considerations for the future and should be 
investigated. So, it is clear that PES is compensatory, but the nature of this compensation 
remains unclear. Is it supplementary or is it protective? That is, does is allow for improved 
performance, or does it protect against deteriorated performance? In addition, we are unable 
to conclude whether PES is strategic in nature (i.e., truly proactive) or whether it is the 
consequence of disturbances to attentional processing of stimuli. Either way, it improves or 
protects against poorer performance, but precisely how it does so remains unknown. Most 
importantly, we draw a distinction between two mechanisms of proactive inhibition: remedial 
and predictive. Given that the principles of reinforcement have been generally formalised into 
mathematical models, their application to predictive proactive inhibition could yield some 
very interesting results if this element of proactive inhibition deteriorates. In moving forward, 
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the data presented here strongly suggest an explicit distinction between these two forms of 
proactive inhibition in response inhibition, and likewise suggest that the assumption of 
proactivity or active agency in remedial proactive inhibition should be at least attenuated. 
So, with Rabbitt’s guiding question still in mind – what does a human do after they 
make an error? – we offer some thoughts. Rabbitt asked this under the assumption that what 
was done after an error was active, controlled regulatory behaviour; what does a human do. 
The data we have presented in this thesis require us to alter the underlying assumption of 
Rabbitt’s question. A better question to ask is what happens when a human makes an error? 
We are changing two elements of the original question: the time at which changes occur, 
since the onset of whatever changes take place may even commence before the error is 
executed, and, what those changes represent, since they do not appear to be fully under the 
control of the agent. To direct future investigation, we could ramify the question: (i) what 
happens in the brain when a human makes an error? (ii) how do such changes exert an effect 
on cognitive computations of future processing? and, (iii) how are these changes mediated by 
the functional state of the brain in which they occur? These are the questions that arise from 
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